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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In January 1970, the present writer visited Dambara, a 
little village situated near the banks of the River Moa, and only a few 
minutes' walk by bush-path from the Kailahun to Mano-Sewalu motor road. As 
he wandered through the village, a feeling which had been growing in him 
for a long time suddenly crystallized. This village, in its material culture 
and human activities, bore a striking resemblance to the sort of villages 
which were described by British travellers in the area during the 1890s. 
There was very little to be seen in Dambara which could be described as an 
innovation or development resulting from colonial rule. Eighty years of 
contact with Europeans had apparently made little impression on the everyday 
life of ordinary village people. Moreover, Dambara was not exceptionalt 
most human settlements in the Luawa area were similar. These thoughts provided 
the genesis of this thesis. 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty for the reader will be the 
lack of standardized spelling for the names of people and places in Luawa. 
As a result, when quotations are used in the text, a number of different 
spellings are liable to creep in. For example, Kailondo's name will appear 
spelt variously as "KI Lorxio", "Kai Lundu", and "Kailundu'U. Kailahun is also 
spelt "Kanne Lahun" and "Kiloun". It is hoped that the reader will use his 
common-sense in relating a curious spelling in a quotation to the different 
spelling of the same name which will usually be found in the main body of the 
text surrounding the quotation. Quotations from material which is being used 
as a primary source are distin ished by being enclosed within double inverted 
commas. For other quotations 
(and 
in other places where inverted commas are 
required) single inverted commas are used. Whether to use English translations, 
of Mende terms or whether to use the original Mende terms was a difficult 
decision to make. In the end., the latter course was chosen, and a fairly full 
Glossary is provided immediately after this Preface in an attempt to minimize 
the problems facing the English reader who has no knowledge of the Mende 
language. In notes and references, the expressions 'p. ,,, _ above', or 
'p. 
below' are often employed. 'Above' and 'below' are here used in relation to 
the point at which the number of the note or reference appears in the text of 
the chapter (no in relation to the number of the page on which the note or 
reference itself is to be found). 
So many people have contributed generously and graciously 
of their time and energy in helping to produce this thesis that it is 
impossible to list everyone's name. In Sierra Leone, thanks must o to all 
the people who gave interviews, and especially to Mr. T. M. Tengbo 
(Principal 
of the Methodist School, Kailahun), who arranged accommodation for my wife, 
daughter and myself in Kailahun in 1972. Mr. Tengbe gave a lot of valuable 
time to travelling round the Chiefdoms with me, not only acting as interpreter, 
but also allaying suspicion which village elders may have felt towards a 
uumo who had such a lot of questions to ask. Without exception, all the 
District and Chiefdom officials gave utmost cooperation during my field-work 
in 1972. The help of the District Commissioner was much appreciated, as was 
the information provided by the Paramount Chiefs and ax-Paramount Chiefs of 
Luawa and the three Kissi Chiefdoms (whose names are noted in the list of 
interviews in the Bibliogranhv and Table of Resources. Paramount Chief 
K. S. L. Kangoma Pambu V of Malema has always been a 'father' to me ever since 
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I arrived in Kailahun in 1965 (when he was Headmaster of the Methodist 
Primary School there). Too much stress can hardly be laid on the value 
of the information provided by Maada James Kailondo (son of the great 
Kailondo, and brother of Paramount Chief Momoh Banya), who freely gave two 
long interviews in 1972, as well as much real help to my wife and myself 
during the time when we were teachers living in Kailahun between 1967 and 
1970. In Fourah Bay College, Mr. J. G. Edowu Hyde (of the Institute of 
African Studies) and the College Librarians gave much assistance. My wife 
and I will, never be able to repay the love and loyalty which we have 
received from our 'son' and 'brother', James Kailondo (son of Mhada James) 
and Moiwo A. Lahai. 
In the United Kingdom, the encouragement and support of 
my supervisor, Mr. H. S. Wilson (Department of History, University of York) 
has meant a great deal to me: so has the kind advice of Mr. C. Fyfe (Centre 
of African Studies, University of Edinburgh). Mr. A. Abraham and Mr. E. 
Mashingaidze were both working on their own doctoral theses in African 
history at the same time as myself, and both provided me with constructive 
criticism and valued friendship. The librarians at the Royal Commonwealth 
Society Library, and the staff of the West Room in the Land Registry 
Building of the Public Records Office have always been most kind and helpful. 
The librarians at York University Library have shown great forbearance in 
their treatment of inumerable requests for obscure books and articles to be 
obtained through the Inter-Library Loan Service. It has been a privilege 
for my wife and myself to count among our friends Mr. and Mrs. J. S. Fenton, 
and Rev. and Mrs. W. R. E. Clarke, all of whom gave much more than simply 
information about Sierra Leone. For almost a year, until near the time of 
his death, Mr. Clarke gave one morning a week to helping me with the Mende 
language. Among other literature we read Hindoveli, the story of Mende 
village life in the early decades of the twentieth century, and probably 
the longest piece of creative writing ever produced in the Mende language. 
We also read Mark's Gospel in Mende, and I caught a glimpse of why the Mende 
, people nicknamed Mr. Clarke, "Ncewo lato" 
("Praise God"). Revs. Kenneth 
Crosby, Roger Smith and Leslie Wallace were among other Methodist missionaries 
who provided valuable help with this thesis work. Another British citizen who 
knew Kailahun District well, and who generously shared his knowledge, was 
Mr. N. C. Hollins, very sprightly at 85 years old. Mr. J. M. Malcolm also 
kindly gave an interview. 
Miss Mary Preston began typing this thesis (starting with 
the Appendices) early in 1973, and continued steadily in her spare-time until 
early 1974. When she was compelled by circumstances to give up the work, 
Mrs. Anne Nield kindly took over, and was responsible for typing all the 
chapters, except Chapter 3 and the first part of Chapter 4. Without sacri- 
ficial kindness on the part of the typists, this thesis would env have 
been completed. 
Words fail me in trying to describe the inspiration which 
the members of my family have provided. My parents-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. W. A. 
Holburn, have allowed their daily routine to be completely upset when we have 
visited them in order that I might continue my work uninterrupted. Through 
my own parents, Mr. and Mrs. W. J. McCall, I first gained an interest and love 
for West Africa. No one will over know the full extent of their share in 
this thesis. ley father was responsible for many of the photographs (which 
were kindly mounted by Miss Linda Wright). I have been grateful, too, for 
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the indulgence of my daughter, Joy (nearly three years old when this thesis 
was presented), who sweetly accepted that daddy needed to spend a lot of 
time 'drawing' in his study rather than playing with her. My precious wife 
Janet is truly "a blessing from the Lord" (Prov. 18.22). Her devoted love 
is matched by her practical help; and it would require a book far longer 
than this thesis to describe even a fraction of either. Her help with the 
thesis was the more valuable because she herself lived in Kailahun for three 
years from September 1967 till July 1970, teaching at the Methodist Secondary 
School there. She has shared in those experiences the fruit of which is this 
thesis. She did all the thesis indexing, most of the map-work, and has proof- 
read every sentence of the thesis chapters at least twice, using her linguistic 
skills to clarify my imperfectly-expressed ideas. Errors and confusions which 
remain are mine and not the responsibility of either herself or the army of 
friends who have made the production of this thesis possible. 
York, U. K. 
April 1974. 
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GLOSSARY 
OF FOREIGN AND TECHNICAL TERMS: AND SPECIAL ABBREVIATIONS AND USAGES. 
(Unless it is specifically stated as otherwise all the underlined words in 
the Glossary are taken from the Mende language). 
Ag. _ acting 
Buffi = temporary, open-sided shelter 
Barr31 = permanent, open-sided meeting-place or shelter 
Brushing = cutting down the undergrowth in a bushy or forested area as the 
first stage in making a rice farm: 'mowing' grass with a. matchet, 
round a house or at the sides of a road or path. 
Cassada = alternative spelling of cassava 
C. C. P. = Commissioner of Central Province (1919-1931), Sierra Leone 
Protectorate 
C. M. F. = Court Messenger Force of the Sierra Leone Protectorate 
CMs. Court Messengers. 
C. M. S. = Church Missionary Society (Anglican Society active in Sierra Leone) 
C. O. (or CO) = the British Colonial in London 
D. C. _ District Commissioner 
Fakai (pl. faknisia) = hamlet 
F. O. = the British Foreign Office in London 
F. P. _ the Frontier Police Force, used in the hinterland of the Sierrra.. Leone Colony between 1890 and 1901. 
Guinea (when spelt with a capital 'G') = the Republic of Guinea, formerly 
French Guinea. 
Hotel (pl. ho eisia) = stranger, foreigner 
K. D. O. A.. _ Kailahun District Office Archives 
Kene = title of respect, used when greeting or referring to a mature man 
Ki sý (pl. ) _ the title used by the Kissi people in their own language, 
when referring to themselves 
Kob na= open meeting-space, situated near a town 
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Komahe war-leader, commander of the armed forces 
Kp-Mende, Kao-Mende = North-Eastern or 'Upper' Mendeland 
Kpakoisia (pl.; sing, kpako, kpakoi) = the local 'big men' or important 
people. 
Krio the language of the Freetown Creoles. 
KuRba (pl., kogugbanga) = member of a polity's armed force, experienced 
fighter. 
Lavale = Speaker, the Chief's leading counsellor and assistant 
Maada = title of respect, used when addressing or referring to a senior 
and important man. 
M hpwai (pl. Mahawaisia) = supreme ruler, overlord, important Chief 
Mahne = chieftaincy, sovereignty 
Mahsi (indef. sing* maha; pl. mahhangeisia) _ Chief, ruler 
Manja = the man -ja 
farm was a rice farm made for the Chief by the free labour 
of the Chiefdom people, out of which the Chief entertained strangers 
and fed destitute persons, etc. 
Mende = Mendeland and Mende culture 
MFndebleisia. MFndeb a= the title used by the Mende people in their 
own language, when referring to themselves 
Mende-vin--x' = the Mende language 
Miles = when mileages are given, the reference is to the distance travelled 
on the ground by road, rail, or path, na# to the distance 'as the 
crow flies'. 
min. = minute 
M. M. S. _ Methodist Missionary Society 
M. O. = Medical Officer 
Mo1imo (pl. molib )=a Moslem 
Money = cash is recorded in the old British system of pounds, shillings 
and pence. 
N. A. = Native Administration (and also Native Authority, the body which 
was responsible for Native Administration in any particular 
Chiefdom) 
N. A. D. L. = Native Affairs' Department Letterbook 
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N. A. M. P. = Native affairs' Minute Paper 
n. d. = no date provided 
Ndoomahci (pl. Ndoomahangeisia) = Paramount Chief (see Note on Political 
Terminology pp. 42_43below 
Ndowe = weekly market 
No owa ý daily market 
n. s. ý new series 
o. s. = old series 
Pa = Creole title of respect, used when greeting or referring to a mature 
man, and now often employed by Mende and Kissi people. 
Palaver = trouble, unrest, disagreement, difficulty, or legal dispute. 
This Krio word had become almost 'standard English' in Sierra 
Leone even before 1896, so that even Governors and senior 
British officials used it freely in official correspondence. 
Patimahei (pl. patimahangeisia) = subordinate ruler, under the Paramount 
Chief, of a , pat or 
'section' of the Chiefdom. 
P. C. Paramount Chief 
P. R. O. = Public Records Office, London 
Puumoi (pl. nuubleisia) _ whiteman, European, British person (also trans., 
anyone adopting a European life-style) 
P. W. D. = Public Works Department of the Sierra Leone Government. 
R. C. S. = Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London 
R. H. ; Rhodes House Library, Oxford. 
S. L. G. &. = Sierra Leone Government Archives, which are located in the 
Library of Fourah Bay College., Freetown. 
S. L. P. M. B. = Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board. 
T. A. Tribal Authority 
Tamahe (pl. tamahanacisia) = town chief 
Univ. = university 
W. A. F. F. = West African Frontier Force (constituted in Sierra Leone in 
1901; received the title *Royal' in 1928, hence the 
abbreviation R. W. A. F. F. ) 
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MaP ONE 
SIERRA LEONE AND THE LUAWA ARFA 
SCALE 1: 2,000,000 
KEY 
-------- = Present-day international boundaries 
= The enclosed area is enlarged on subsequent maps 
in this thesis to the scale of 1: 100,000 
1 
The people of Luawa came together into a single 
political unit about the year 1880 (1). The ruler of this new polity 
(2) was Kailondo, a local Kissi-man who was born about 1845 (3). After 
acquiring fame as a kam , 
(4) fighting in other parts of lMendeland, 
Kailondo returned to his own country with wealth and a substantial body 
of followers, and established the town of Mofindor (5). Hin diplomacy 
and military skill encouraged the leaders of the area., when they met in 
conference at the village of Gbondou (6), to give him the mahmmi (7): 
and this same conference created the new Luawa. 
During the forty years following Kailondo'a accession, 
the name 'Luawa' was used in a number of different ways. Governor Cardew 
took 'Luawa' to mean a tiny area of territory in the immediate vicinity 
of Kailahun town (8), whereas other British travellers considered that 
the name referred to the whole region over which Kailondo exerted any 
political influence (9). From the proclamation of the British Protectorate 
in 1896, until 1911, Luawa was officially split by an international 
boundary into 'British Luawa' and 'Liberian Luawa', though in practice 
little attention was paid to this division (10). From 1911 onwards, when 
the Kisoi people were given a Chiefdom (11) of their own, British officials 
applied the name 'Luava Chiefdom' only to the western part of Kailondo's 
polity (I2). 
The present writer has tried to use 'Luawat in the way 
the mehanacisia (13) at the 4bondou Conference might have used it. They 
came largely from the present-day Chiefdoms of Luava, Kissi Kama, Kiesi 
Tong and Kisai Tungi (all of which are now in the Republic of Sierra Leone 
CIO), and the area covered by these four Chiefdoms seems to have been 
the territory which they loosely referred to as 'Luawa' (15). It was the 
heartland of Itai. londo's 'kingdom'. The convention of including the three 
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present-day Bissi Chiefdoms of Kama, Tongs, and Tungi within the defini- 
tion of Luawa, which is accepted in this thesis, was also often followed 
by British officials during the first twenty years of colonial rule. 
Between 1880 and 1890, Kailondo vastly increased the number of people 
who owed him allegianoe, creating a 'Greater Luawal centred on his capital 
town of Kailahun (16), but he also consolidated his hold on the Luawa 
heartland so that its people came to feel a special allegiance to him (17). 
This Luawa heartland is the primary concern of the present study. 
It might be argued that Wunde in the present-day 
Republic of Guinea, and Kissi, Tengea in Liberia should be included in 
this heartland, since representatives from both these areas attended the 
Gbondou Conference. Mr. N. C. Hollins, for example, recorded that as a 
result of the promises made by the mahaneciaia at the Gbondou Conference, 
Kailondo took control not only within the four present-day Chiefdoms of 
the 'Kailahun salient', but also further afield in the Wunde, Mafessa 
and Kama Chiefdoms in Guinea, and Kissi Tengea in Liberia (18). It is 
probable, however, that Kailondo's control was not really established and 
accepted in these outlying areas at the time of his accession, but rather 
in developments during the first few years of his reign (19). Moreover, 
by 1896 the Wunde people had ceased to recognize the authority of Luawa's 
ruler over them. In the same year the British, the new political power 
in Luawa, accepted that Tengea was in Liberia, and they thereafter adhered 
to this principle even though the Liberian Government exercised no real 
control in the area for several years (20). For these reasons, Wunde, 
Tengea, and the 'countries' (21) beyond, were excluded from this study 
of Kailondo's heartland. 
Various explanations have been given for the meaning 
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of the name Luawas significantly, all the explanations seek for the 
name's derivation in the Mende language, rather than in the Tussi 
language or some other. Rev. W. R. R. Clarke was told that Luawa comes 
from the words 12 (to stand) and EA (firmly), giving the meaning, 
"Stand firm : "s when people came to this area they liked it and decided 
to stay (22). Mr. H. N. Combey's explanation was that the Luawa people 
were much feared by their neighbourss Lys means fear, and g means 
greatly. Mr. Kulu-Banya noted that the name was a modified form of 
Lauwa, the name of the stream which flows through Kailahun town (23). 
Maada James Kailondo (24) derived the name from a corruption of the Mende 
words for the expression, "When you go, you must come back" - an offer of 
hospitality to visitors (25). Several of these explanations imply that 
at some stage the present inhabitants of Luawa took possession of the land 
by immigration. This possibility will be more fully explored later (26). 
4. 
1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND. C. 1880 (27). 
Kailondo'a polity lay in a region of transition with regard 
both to relief, vegetation, and climate. The land rises to the north and 
east in a slow climb, up to the massif of the Guinea Highlands (28): the 
north-east of Luawa is about 800 feet higher above sea-level than the 
south-west (29). As one climbs inland, north-eastwards, rainfall (30) 
rapidly diminishes, and the vegetation thins from secondary tropical 
forest into farm bush and grass (31). There is, especially in the south- 
vest of Luawa, thick tropical bush (32); but the north-east of Kailondo's 
heartland, south of the Moa-Mafessa confluence is now mainly thicketted 
grassland (33). Probably the extent of the grassland increased during 
the twentieth century as a result of increasingly intensive shift-culti- 
vation, and there was a complementary south-westward retreat of the limits 
of the thick tropical bush; yet even in 1880 the north-east of Luawa 
probably had considerable areas under grass (34). 
The watershed in the Guinea Highlands is lese than a hundred 
miles from Kailahun town, and beyond that watershed rise the headwaters of 
the River Niger, flowing north-eastwards (35). On the other side of the 
watershed, nearer to Luawa, a number of relatively small rivers take their 
rise and flow swiftly down the Guinea Highlands towards the Atlantic Ocean. 
One of these rivers is the Moa, Luawa's main river. With its tributaries 
reaching towards Kissidougou and north of Macenta, it drains a larger area 
than moat of its south-westward flowing neighbours. As it passes by Luawa, 
the Moa is joined by the Meli, one of its largest tributaries: both rivers 
are in their middle course, and navigation in impeded by rocks in the river' 
bed and by rapids (36), as well as by a dramatic fall in water. -level during 
the dry season from November to February (37). The distance down the Moa 
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valley from the confluence with the Mali to the estuary is about 120 miles. 
After passing Luawa, the Moa descends about 500 feet until, some 20 miles 
before entering the sea it reaches the limit of navigation on the edge of 
the coastal plain (38). 
In terms of travelling distances, then, Luawa is only 
about a week's journey by foot from both the Atlantic coast and the heart 
of the Guinea Highiando (39). 
The annual, rainfall of just over 100 inches experienced in 
most of Luawa (40) is less than on the Atlantic coast, but more than in the 
Sudanic savanna to the north (41). More significant than the amount of 
rain is the fact that the rainfall is mainly confined within the months of 
March to November (42). It is not only the division of the year into a 
rainy season and a dry season which affects human activities, but also the 
unpredictability of the beginning and end of the rains (43). Since virtually 
all the people of Iiailondo's Luawa were (and still are (411 ) upland-rice 
farmers, the time when the rains 'set in' each year was of crucial import- 
ance to them. In a year when the rains come early, the farmer could start 
preparing his farm in January and work steadily from than onwards; but if he 
waited to make the farm after February, it would produce only a poor yield. 
However, when the rains came late, it would be possible to prepare a 
successful farm starting as late as April (45). Only a major political 
event could distract the ordinary people's attention in the early months 
of the year from the overriding question of when to prepare the farm and 
plant the rice-seed (46). Similarly, between September and November, 
everyone would be preoccupied with the ricer-harvest. 
Temperaturaa in Luawa ahoy only a small annual range (about 
10 degrees Fahrenheit) with s mean around 80 degrees (47), but that does 
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not mean there is blazing sunshine day after day all the year round. 
For much of July, August, and September at least part of most days is 
cloudy, and this brings a consequent fall in temperature, though 
humidity may rise to almost 100% (48). Throughout the year, the diurnal 
temperature range is greater than the annual range. In the months of 
December, January, and February this range may be as great as 30 degrees 
Fahrenheit, the cold harmattan winds from the north-east sometimes 
making everyone feel uncomfortably cold late in the evenings and early 
in the mornings - with a mean daily minimum for January of little more 
than 60 degrees Fahrenheit (49). At this time of the year, too, early- 
morning mist may add to the discomfort. Also at the beginning and and 
of the rainy season, the evening line-squall storms bring sudden and 
violent drops in temperature for a few hours (50). 
Turning to the details of Luawa'B physical features, the 
southern boundary of Kailondo'e 'kingdom' was largely marked by the 
Magowi River, a tributary of the Mauwa, which in turn flows into the 
Mo s, (51). Another tributary of the Mauwa, the River Keya, runs through 
the middle of Luava. In Kisai country (52), the valley of the Keya pro- 
video a trade and communication route between the hilly and heavily 
forested country to its south and the Kissi Mountains to the north. 
T. J. Alldridge, the first European visitor to Luawa, described the 
difficulties of travelling through this area in 1891. He was using the 
Nyandehun-Gbandewulo-Yandahun road south of the Keya River, in "very 
mountainous country. It seemed like a succession of ranges. We were 
incessantly going up one side and down the other .... Going on 
from Dambalu7 through all kinds of dense vegetation, with the ground 
so hilly that I was unable to use any description of hammock, I was 
compelled to walk all the distance". From Gbandewulo to Yandahun, some 
7 
of the mountains were "very precipitous; it seemed to be a series of 
scrambling up and down them for a great part of the iay. 
The very rude bush tracks were narrow cuttings and lanes.. 
through vegetation so dame as to be almost impenetrable ... " (53). 
To the north, the Kissi Mountains reach a height of about 
2,700 fest at their highest, and stretch northwards towards the Moa 
valley (54). They not only provide an obstacle to communisation but 
also considerably reduce the amount of vegetation (55), and crops will 
grow only on the lover slopes. In 1924 F. W. H. Migeod, whilst staying at 
Kangama (56), noted the appearance of Jawi, one of the largest mountains 
of the groups "Its steep sides are partly bare rock. Some oil palms 
grow a good way up on the right and a solitary palm stood at the top. 
I was told the hill had always been rocky: God made it so" (57). Such 
a description would almost equally fit any of the Kissi Mountains., and 
was probably as accurate half a century before Migsod visited the area 
as it was half a century later. 
Apart froia the Kissi Mountains, the outstanding relief 
feature in Luawa is Mount Mamba, just south of the Keyya River near the 
town of Nyandehun. Alldridge described it in his 1891 vie it s "This 
mountain rose very abruptly and appeared to be of rook formation entirely 
barren in manyparts with here and there a few bushy looking trees 
studded about, eepesially upon the summit, where they stood out in relief 
against the sky" (58). The flat-topped mountain, about 2,400 feet high 
(59), is clearly visible from places 8 or 9 miles away. 
Mamba and the Kiwi Mountains are noticeable because they 
rise above the surrounding land-mass, but since Luava is set in the foot- 
hills of the Guinea Highlands, almost the whole country is hilly. Roads 
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and paths, typically, present to the traveller a long series of pro- 
nounced undulations, with the occasional really steep hill, and, more 
rarely, with a stretch of fairly level ground lasting for between a 
hundred yards and half a mile (60). 
Surprisingly, the division between the two main peoples 
(61) of the area, the Ktssia and the Mendeblci is (62), is not clearly 
marked by any geographical feature (63) -a reminder of the difficulties 
of differentiating between 'peoples', and of defining them satisfactorily 
(64). In the case of the Mende and Kissi people, each of the two groups 
distinguished itself from the other in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (65): but the criteria used to make the distinction are not 
obvious - not even, perhaps, to the people themselves. Differences in 
'physical characteristics' and in 'ethnic origin' do not establish any 
clear division between the two peoples. A linguistically-based criterion 
seems most helpful, since the KivIjA and Mc deblcisia speak languages 
which are quits unlike each other (66), and it is possible to mark quite 
definitely on a present-day map those places in which the Mends language 
is predominant, and those places where the Kissi language is the more 
common (67). Throughout our period, the Kiesi people predominated 
numerically in the 'eastern third' of Kailondons Luawa, the Mende people 
in the 'western two-thirds' (68). This linguistic boundary is not, how- 
ever, entirely acceptable as a dividing line between the two peoples. 
Some men, in the 1970s, would call themselves _Kisisia although 
they are 
more proficient in the Mende language than the Kissi language (69). A 
century earlier, Kailondo himself, though he was usually associated with 
the Mendebl Eisig and must have spoken the Mende language with complete 
fluency, was recognised as a Kissi-man by the people of Luawa (70): this 
9 
might point towards intermingling between the two peoples even before 
Kailondo'a reign, and although there is little evidence of Mends people 
living in Kissi country before 1880, groups of Kisai people were living 
in present-day Luawa. For example, the towns of Mano-Sewalu and libema 
were populated entirely by Kieaia, together with the surrounding villages 
of Kornalu (where Kailondoto mother lived), Kpengalu, Tundufulu and 
Mamutu (71). 
Population figures for about the year 1880 cannot even 
be approximated, either for the different peoples as a whole or for 
Kailondons Luava in particular, but undoubtedly the Me deb1cisia altogether 
were a much larger group than the Kinds. In the mid-twentieth century, 
the Mende people were numerically about five times larger than the Xis at 
people (72), and there is little evidence that the relative size of the 
two peoples was significantly different seventy years earlier (73). 
The peoples who lived nearest to the MEndebleisig and Kg 
of Luawa were the Kono, Gola, and Gbande. The southern and eastern 
boundaries of the Kono people, at least by the 1890s, coincided roughly 
with the present boundary of Bono District in Sierra Leone (74). North 
of the Moa and east of the Meli lived Xis sic, while Mer k predominated 
in the lands west and south-west of Luawa (75). Due south of Wawa, in 
present-day Liberia, was a heavily-forested, sparsely-populated area 
inhabited by the Gola people (76). To the east and south-east of Luawa, 
beyond Kissi country, lived the Gbande people (77). 
A long and fa, irlp complete list of the mahnnacisiA who 
attended the Gbondou Conference can be compiled (78), and this list should 
indicate with some precision the places which gave Kailondo support, and 
which together made up ' ailondo's Luawat (79). Oral tradition places 
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the emphasis on the people who first gave Kailondo their allegiance 
rather than the area over which Kailondo's rule first extended, and 
in mapping Luawa before the colonial period it must be remembered that 
the Luawa peoples had a personal rather than a territorial concept of 
the may (80). 
Bundu, the leading figure among the mahangeieia at the 
Gbondou Conference (81), controlled the village of jjanpahun, and also 
had influence in Talia, Bandajuma, and possibly Mofindor (82) all 
villages within 5 miles radius of present-day Kailahun town, except for 
Talia. Other akoisia (83) from within that same area were Mbowa from 
Yandohun, a village near the present Kailahun barracks (84); Ngobeh 
Bahunla, later to be P. C. of Luawa (85), whose home was associated with 
a site near the centre of Kailehun (86); and Sagba, who came from Bobobu 
(87). There were at least three representatives from Bombali country: 
Mano Boko came from Nyandehun, the centre of Bombali, Bongo Wudja from 
Fandu, and Kabatundu from Konjo (88). Each of the main villages of 
Gbeila country sent alk: Mbapu and Koliwa came from Sandiglu, Tangbu 
Landa from Dodo-Comma, and Ba from Gbalahun (89). Other kmakoinia, from 
villages in present-day Luawa Chiefdom were Fagbandi Fakoeh from Yibema 
(near Mano-Sewalu), Jimor from Ngiehun, and Kpawo Bundu from Giema (90). 
There were leaders from each of the three present-day Kisai Chiefdoms: 
from Kissi Kama, Koma of Dokosu and Bondo Foryyoh of Dia; from Kissi Teng, 
Segbeba of Petema and Ngombu Hiteh of Senehun; from Kiest Tungi, Ngegba 
of Buedu and Kaikai of Gbendewulo (91). Two mahanacisia came from north 
of the Moa, from Wunde country: Katewe of Sakona (a village a few miles 
north-east of Mofindor), and Bauwa of Yamandu (in the centre of Wunde, 
some 25 miles north-east of present-day Kailahun 192-7 ). Towel from 
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Foya, Ndawua. from Konosu (93), and Vama Howura from Konia (94) attended 
the Conference from Kissi Tengea country in present-day Liberia. Lt 
that time, Towei was mahe of Tengea (95), and Foya was the chief tarn 
of that mahawui. about 25 miles east of Kailahun. 
Noticeable by absence from the list of representatives 
are from Gau country in the mouth-west of Luawa, including the 
villages of Bewabu, Sengema, Batwoma, and Jengballu. A partial expla- 
nation may be that some people in Gau and even in Giema and Ngiehun (96), 
were not ready to support Kailondo's accession. Manjakewa and Jobo of 
Giema joined Ndawa, Kailondo's main protagonist in 1880 (97), as did 
Fagbandi of Sakabu and Kpawo of Mende (98). Kailondo's military victory 
against Ndawa'a forces confirmed the decision of the Gbondou Conference 
that Kailondo should be ruler of the whole area. However, Ndawa briefly 
returned to Wawa soon after his initial defeat "at the invitation of the 
Ngiyema people" (99) and harried places as far into Luawa as Talia. In 
reprisal, Kailondo burnt the town of Giema, and before long Ndawa finally 
left Luawa in peace. Later again, Jobo, Manjakewa and Pagbandi were 
involved in yet another rebellion against Kailondo which cost them their 
lives (100). There are indications that this lack of support from the 
Mende-speaking Gau and Giema areas towards the new rulers of Luawa 
continued after Kailondo's death and played a part in local politics 
during the colonial period (101). 
Although Alldridge and other British officials regarded 
Kailondo as a Mande Chief (102), Kailondo himself was a Kiaei-men (103), 
and seems to have received much of his support from Kiesi country: about 
half the mahan etsi at the Gbondou meeting seem to have been of Kissi 
origin (104) and represented a much wider spread of territory than did 
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those of Mende origin. To the first British travellers, Kailondo' a 
Luawa gave the impression of being predominantly Mende because in east- 
west distance, about two-thirds of the polity was Mende-speaking. But 
the Kissi-speaking constituent had a longer north-. south distance, and 
was slightly larger in total area than the Mende constituent. The three 
present-day Kissi Chiefdoms, which represent the Kissi part of Kailondots 
heartland, occupy 210 square miles, compared with 180 square miles for 
Luawa Chiefdom, which roughly represents the Mende part (105). 
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2. THE ORIGINS OF THE MCNDEBLEISIA AND 11SSIA IN THE LUAWA AREA. 
'Where did the Mendeblelsia and their neighbours come from V 
is a question which has aroused considerable discussion since the publi- 
cation in 1920 of Northoote Thomas' article, 'Who were the Manes? ' (106). 
Perhaps questions like these encourage unsatisfactory discussion because 
they foster the illusion that there is sufficient evidence to reach clear 
conclusions. L more suitable question, in relation to the subject of 
this present thesis, might be, 'What scraps of information can be dis- 
covered about the people of Lüawa before 1880? ' - recognizing that little 
information exists. In the absenee of written and archaeological evidence, 
the present writer bad to rely solely on oral tradition for pre-1880 events 
(107): but oral tradition concerning events before Kailondo's rule consists 
largely of lists of rulers and genealogies. The longest genealogy dis- 
covered was, not surprisingly, that of Kailondo himself, going back five 
generations (108). Many genealogies and lists of rulers do not go back 
further than one generation before Kailondo's time. The beat that can 
be done is to relate useful evidence found in Lm m's oral traditions 
to the wider discussion of Meade-Kissi origins. 
Modern historians agree that the Ki_saia almost certainly 
settled in their present home]aad (109) before the l4cndeblcisia arrived. 
Dr. Walter Rodney, writing of the situation in the twelfth century A. D., 
notes: The Kissis at that time occupied most of the eastern portion of 
the present Republic of Guinea and the region along the present Sierra 
Leone - Liberia frontier" (110), M. Person agrees that the i, at 
least by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, occupied almost their 
present boundaries; though he thinks it is an exaggeration to state that 
they formerlyoccupied the main part of eastern Republic of Guinea (ül). 
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The Mcndeblcisia, by contrast, are not mentioned at all by European 
writers in the sixteenth century, which may imply that they arrived 
in the area after that date (112). Ogildby, writing in 1670, was the 
first person to mention the Mendeblcisia, by which time the Kieaia 
were quite well known (113). Between the late seventeenth and early 
nineteenth centuries little reference was made to the Mendebleisia or 
their country. By 1843, however, Dr. Robert Clarke, referring to them 
by the now pejorative title of 'Kuasoh', could outline fairly accurately 
the area which they occupied: "The Kussoh country appears to lie between 
the parallels of 7° and g° 15' north latitude and in a south east 
direction, between the degrees of 10° 301 and 12° west longitude" (114). 
This eastern frontier of longitude 10° 30' west is of interest beanies 
it passes through the heart of Luava, and over a century later is still 
approximated to the linguistic boundary between the Mcndebleiata and the 
Xissia. 
The advent of the Mcndeblcieia in the area has usually 
been related to the Mane invasion which European observers reported in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (115). Dr. P. E. H. Hair has use- 
fully suggested that "the invasion vas probably only a war of political 
conquest, and not a mass migration, as the sources suggest" (116). 
Dr. Peter Kup, in a rather involved argumeat, suggests a date of just 
after the mid-sixteenth century for the Mane invasion (117), but believes 
that the Mende people in a related movement were still migrating into 
present-day Sierra Leone during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries (118). Rodney, taking a different views seeks to establish 
that the Manes arrived "in about twenty years after 1545" (119). He, 
explains the absence of reference to the Mende people in,. written sources 
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until another whole century had passed, and lack of frequent reference 
before the mid-nineteenth century, by trying to draw "a careful dis- 
tinction between the arrival of the conquering forces and the formation 
of new tribal entities" (120). During this period of silence, the Mende 
people were formed by "the Mane fusion with the Bulloms and the Kissis" 
(121): the Mendebl Eisieg are "clearly the product of an intermixture on 
a Bullom base, and with an upper strata showing distinct Mande traits" 
(122). Elsewhere, Rodney has added that the Manes "overran all of the 
Sherbro Bulloms, but their greatest impact was made around the Gallinas 
and Cape Mount, and at some distance inland" -. a description which would 
probably include Luawa itself (123). "Here, therefore, the Mande 'tribe' 
can be said to have emerged, moving deeper into Sierra Leone proper 
during the eighteenth century" (124). M. Person has agreed that this 
is an accurate assessment of Mende origins, and has suggested that the 
term 'Mende' developed after the Mane newcomers "bestowed their name, 
Mane, to the Mel^. speaking autochtones, borrowing their language (Mandonyi)" 
(125). After assimilation of "the autochtonous Bulom or Ktsi", the Mende 
people began "pushing toward the coast during the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries" (126). 
When applied to Luawa, the Rodney-Person theory appears 
inadequate in several ways. Dr. Rodney gives only one example of inter- 
mixing and cultural fusion - "the presence of both matrilineal and patri- 
lineal features of inheritanoe" (127) - and notes that "Mends tradition 
distinguishes between the earliest settlers and invaders who came from the 
north" (128)s but tradition in the Luawa area does not distinguish in 
this way (129). Granted that the Mcndeblcieia represent considerable 
intermixing of various cultural and linguistic groups, there seems little 
evidence that this intermixing took place simply between the Memme, Bonoma 
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and Kiasi people, or that it occurred between the sixteenth and eight- 
eenth centuries. Many of the cultural features which are common to 
Kissi, Mende, and Sherbro (Bullom) people, stich as Secret Societies (330), 
are shared by many other peoples of Upper Guinea (131), and it is improb- 
able that these common social and cultural features originated through 
interchange only between the Manes, Kiesaa and Bullom people. The 
popular idea of two distinct 'physical types' among the Mcndeblcia a, 
which Dr. Rodney also adduces as evidence supporting his theory, seems 
to have originated in some comments by F. W. H. Migeod in Chapter 16 of 
A View of Sierra Leone (132) -a chapter containing so much doubtful 
material, including an excursion into the pseudo-science of phrenology 
(133), that suspicion is cast on the value of its conclusions in general. 
A more serious objection to Rodney'a theory is that it the 
Monde ilia are partly the product of a fusion of Manes and Kieme how 
is it possible still to draw a clear boundary between the Mende and Kiasi 
people ? In 1896, for example, Governor Cardew indicated that Guabu was 
a Mends village, but moving eastwards from Guabu one entered Kiwi country: 
Buedu, little more than two miles further east, was a Kiesi village (134). 
Does this mean, according to Dr. Rodney's theory, that at some stage the 
Riete from Guabu westwards fused with the Manes to become the Mond bicia a, 
whilst the contiguous Us from Buedu eastwards never fused in this way? 
This may have been the case, but sufficient evidence does not exist to 
prove it. Inadequate evidence is a sad limitation, but at least for 
Luawa it is better explicitly to admit the limitation rather than to 
build tenuous arguments about Mende-Kiesi origins. 
The present writer would acoept Dr. Haire judgement on 
the problem of Mende origins. The Mende people probably reached the 
Atlantic coast in the late eighteenth century, but, wrote Dr. Hair, 
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"the accounts of the interior of this area are so thin and so diffi- 
cult to interpret that the possibility that this Hands people, like 
the Susu, in earlier centuries occupied the immediate hinterland cannot 
be ruled out. But we cannot identify the Mende, decisively, in the 
early sources" (135). 
In recent studied, Mr. Arthur Abraham has developed two 
points concerning the advent of the Mendeblcisia in Ko . Mcnde (North. 
Eastern Mendeland 1362 ) during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries (137). First, there is little evidence that the emergence of 
the Mendeb1 ij and their states involved war and conquest. "Early 
Mende states came into being through movements of migrant people(s), 
not through waves of invaders". Secondly, perhaps the most significant 
factor in the emergence of the Mende people and their polities was the 
infiltration into the present Mende homeland of Mande settlers from the 
north. "Many oral traditions seem to be in general agreement on the 
introduction of the Mande factor, as they recall their ancestors coming 
from 'Koh' i; e. 'up-country' (3392. This would seem to refer to the 
country around Puta Jallon and beyond. The tradition also seems to imply 
that there were small, if somewhat detaahod, people roaming the country, 
who would come and settle in an area that begins to grow in fume under 
some leader" (140). 
The present vritez s evidence from Luawa (mainly for the 
nineteenth century) would tend to support Mr. Abraham's conclusions. 
References in oral tradition to the decades before 1880 suggest that 
Mandingo people (141) and other 'strangers' from the north, were coning 
peacably into Luawa, settling in the area, and intermarrying with the 
local people. Jimoh, who founded Giema perhaps a generation before the 
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accession of Kailondo, came from Kono (112). A few Muslim Mandingo 
and Susu people settled in Mano-Seealu, praying for the m2ha , 
(143), 
converting some of the people, and working as farmers (144). Mandingo 
traders from present-day Guinea settled in Kissi Kama and introduced 
Islam there. They intermarried with the Kisaia and became part of 
the local community to such an extent that their children did not know 
where their fathers same from (145)t these children were fluent only in 
the Kiaai language and ]mew little of the mother tongue of their fathers. 
The numbers of these settlers may not have been large, but neither, 
perhaps, was the local population (146). 
Research in Luawß has suggested a further point concerning 
the movement of peoples in this area during the century before Kailondo's 
accession: groups of Kieaia were migrating over fairly small distances 
in a generally south-west direction. Kids settlers may first have 
come into the Luawa area at a time when there were few other inhabitants, 
though it is impossible to discover how long before the accession of 
Kailondo this original influx of KjoeJA occurred. "The first known 
settlements were said to be founded by a great warrior named 'GBANGON' 
who came from the north-east, likely Kissi Kenema (now in French Guinea), 
accompanied by brothers, war-boys, wives, children and many other people. 
This party, on crossing the Moa River ..., built a little town on its 
banks and called it Yebema" (147). There was some fighting between these 
Ussia and the Mend®bleisia who were already living in the area (348). 
Wotayº, the son of Gbangon, succeeded his father, and during his reign, 
"intermarriage began and the Kiaai people learnt to talk the Mendi tongue 
and the Mendia to speak the Kissi language" (149). Kailondo's own father 
was a Kissi-man from Wunde who migrated south of the Moa to live with his 
wife's family near Mano-Sewalu (150). Pweka, chief of Koindu in the early 
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1920sß had a great-grandfather named Kuliberi who had come from the 
north and built the town (151). Simfl. arly, in Kissi Kama the great- 
grandfather of Chief Jabba (Chiefdom Speaker of Kissi Kama, 1955 -) 
of Dia came from Wunde, just north of the Moas in fact all the people 
of Kissi Kama may originally have been immigrants from Guinea (152). 
Ex-P. C. Kaitungi of Kissi Tungi made the same point about sa 
migratioai "We the Kissis of course, we migrated from Guinea about the 
seventeenth century. We migrated from Guinea and came towards this 
way by war. L batch of Kisais went to Liberia, a batch of them came 
here" (153). 
W. D. Bowden, Central Province Commissioner in 1929, noted 
this same migration of the K, i, s. sia. and suggested it may have been matched 
by an earlier (though possibly less forceful) eastward movement of the 
MEndeb1cie4a. Bowden was trying to discover which Chiefdom should be 
given control of several villages on the Mende - Kisai border (154), 
but the arguments of the different factions "left it very doubtful 
whether the villages spread eastwards by Mendi influence or westwards 
by Kissi influence. I rather inclined to the latter view, though Bela 
section of Luawa Chiefdom (155Jwas or is undoubtedly a remnant of an 
old Mends chiefdom just as the old Bendehun chiefdom was a Monds one but 
in now Kiaai Tongi-Tingi having been overrun by Kiasis or rather Komendis" 
(156). This change of name from Kpendehun to Tungi-Tingi (indicating a 
change of ownership from Mende to Kiasi people) is also mentioned in oral 
tradition (15? ). Further, it is claimed that many of the names of streams 
and hills in this area are of Gbande origin (158), which might point to a 
still earlier Gbande occupation before the Meadebleisia established the 
mahagui (159) of gpendehun. The largest town in Tungi-Tingi at the 
beginning of the colonial period was probably Gbandewulo, which in the 
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Mende language means literally 'Little Gbande1, perhaps with the sense 
'Satellite of Gbande country' (160). 
A further indication of eastward expansion by the Mende 
people (which preceded westward expansion by the K a) is to be found 
in evidence discovered by Arthur Abrahams parts of the country just east 
of the Mos. River which, by the colonial period, were known as part of 
Mende country, had once been Gola territory, and had been called Dola 
(161). The distribution of villages named 'Mendekelema', meaning 'The 
end (or limit) of the Mende people', provides another clue to earlier 
limits of Mende country; and these limits in the Luawa area seem oonsis-. 
tently west of those of the present-day (162). 
The evidence from Luawa, then, points to a steady and 
largely peaceful process of south-westward migration by groups of Kta a 
following an earlier eastward movement by groups of cndebl sie (163). 
These limited migrations had not ceased by the nineteenth century: Ki 
were, in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, continuing to 
travel comparatively short distances, enter Luawa, and settle there, inter- 
mingling and intermarrying. Although a fairly clear linguistic boundary 
was fixed between the cnd b1cis_ and Kivsid by the mid-nineteenth 
century at the latest (164), Small group movements went on right through 
the colonial period (165). Some _Mcndebl 
iris began moving back into Kissi 
country,, while Kjosla continued to move south-westwards into Mende country. 
Such movements did not involve the mass migration of one 
particular people, but rather concerned individuals and small groups 
from a number of different peoples, with Mende and Kie, si people predomi- 
nating; neither did these group movements turn on one invasion or one 
'period of infiltration', but stretched over several centuries. This 
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conclusion accords well with the modified views of Yves Person on the 
subject of folk movements in Upper Guinea at large. "If heavy die- 
placements and substitutions of population were rare", he wrote in 1971, 
"parties were nevertheless continuously on the move for economic or 
political reasons; the result is the modification of population through 
intermarriage, the transformation of social structures, and the 
expansion or regr©osion of languages" (166). Unspectacular and not 
easily pin. -pointmd, this continuing infiltration was probably a more 
significant long-term factor in Iuawa'a history than a single dramatic 
invasion by the Manes or any other group, either in the distant or the 
comparatively recent past. 
`,. 
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3. SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN LUAWA, 
c. 19LO l8$ß. 
The earliest written reference to Luawa dates from as late 
as 1890, when T. J. Alldridge, a Travelling Commissioner of the Sierra 
Leone colonial government, reached the area (167). It is tempting to 
extrapolate from the situation described by Alidridge in the early 1890e 
back into the past to explain what society -. its politics and economics - 
'must have been like' a decade or two earliers but such methods have done 
serious violence to Mende history (168). Since wood, thatch and wattle 
were probably the main building materials, and since most artifacts were 
made from materials like sun-baked clap and wood (which quickly perish in 
a tropical climate), archaeology provides little help. The onlyysubstan- 
tial piece of pre-nineteenth century archaeological evidence in this area 
are the stone apmoliieia (in the Mende and Bullom languagess the Kissia 
call them ). These are small figurines, usually less than a foot 
high, carved in soapstone. Recent research into their origins and signi- 
ficance has emphasized the almost insuperable problems of interpreting a 
single archaeological 'clue' when little also is known about the Society 
(169). Likewise, local oral traditions, which are very thin until 
Kailondo's accession (170), give almost no help on economic and social 
matters. 
Even what little evidence does exist for the decades before 
1880 may not be a very helpful pointer to the nature of 'traditional 
society' in the Luawa area, because by the second half of the nineteenth 
century Luawa had probably experienced a succession of socially disruptive 
experiences spread over the previous three hundred years or so. First, as 
both Kup and Rodney agree, the coastal forest belt of Upper Guinea 
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(on the northern edge of which lay Luawa) was "a retreat for those who, 
uprooted elsewhere amidst the clash of imperial armies, sought sanctuary" 
(171). Some of the settlers in Luawa from the sixteenth century onwards, 
including the Manes themselves, may have been fleeing southwards from 
conquering rulers in the Sudan; or, in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, from the Ithads of Muslim leaders (172). Even though most 
of the settlers came peacably, many probably came as disorganized refugees, 
and their movement into Luawa would make for fluid and unsettled social 
relationships. Second, the arrival of mol bbla (173), or Muslims, in the 
community would tend to increase the possibilities of social conflict, 
even if the Muslims were few in number and were ready to accomodate 
'pagan' practices within their allegiance to Islam (171; ). Third and 
possibly most important, illegal trans-Atlantic slave-trading continued 
from Sulima, the town at the end of the shortest route from Luawa to the 
sea, until the mid-nineteenth century (175). The destruction of the 
'factories' at Sulima by the British navy in 1,. 9 symbolized the end of 
a terrible era for the hinterland (176). The amount of slave-trading 
which went on in the area in the late nineteenth centurymight suggest 
that in Luawa, as in many other territories comparatively near the coast, 
from the seventeenth century until the first decades of the nineteenth 
century, social, political and economic life was organized to produce 
"a steady flow of slaves for ships anchored along the coast" (177) - and 
the influence of the trans-Saharan slave-trade may also have affected the 
area (178). 
£ diaoueaion of life in Luawa before 1880 would have to 
take account of those disruptive factors which probably continued to 
produce an abnormal state of affairs in the area as late as the 1870e. 
The likely conclusion to be drawn from any euch diacasaion would be that, 
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as regards Luawa, 'traditional societyl is a fictitious stereotypes there 
was no settled, static social order which had remained unchanged for 
centuries. It is not impossible that Luawan society experienced more 
radical changes during the hundred years up to 1880 than it did in the 
subsequent hundred years. 
Slavery as a local institution and slave-trading as an 
element in commerce both continued in the Luawa area into the late nine- 
teenth century: to what extent this situation represented an outworking 
of conditions which had been created earlier by the Atlantic and Saharan 
trades is difficult to judge. Yves Person's opinion is that domestic 
slavery "knew a rapid spread during the Sudanese Middle Ages, but the 
part it played among stateless societies, especially along the Guinea 
coast, was quite marginal. Its place was enlarged through the harmful 
influence of the European slave trade, but this does not lead to a denial 
of its previous existence" (179). One of the main prizes of war in Luawa 
during the 1880s was the number of slaves gained. For example, after his 
defeat of Ndawa, "Kai (180] distributed twenty slaves and spoils of war 
amongst the chiefs, and each returned to his own country well satisfied" 
(181). Slaves were also used as payments for instance, a dowry might be 
made up of a cow, some country cloth, and one or two slaves (182). If the 
main economic activity in Luawa was upland-rice farming, then presumably 
slaves would be employed mainly as farm labourers (183). Slaves had, 
however, limited opportunities to Improve their social position. Ndawa, 
Kailondo's adversary, had been a slave but his ability as a ko=ba had 
won him both his freedom and later the status of a Omaha (184) with a 
substantial following (185). Ndawa was an exceptions most slaves would 
not be able to achieve so much, but under a good master a slave might 
feel part of the household to such an extent that, even if he was given 
25 
the opportunity of independence, he might opt to stay in the same 
position under the same master (186). 
Politically, there was no single superior ruler in auth- 
ority over the whole of Luawa in the decades before Kailondo's access- 
ion (187) s many petty maigar gI (188) each ruled a few square miles of 
the countryside. "A. town of about 150 houses in those days would be 
considered very large", noted Rev. W. R. E. Clarke, "and it seems that 
the majority of 'chief' towns were well under the 100. Each town would 
have its own chief, who would, perhaps, rule over a few outlying villages, 
and whose position depended upon his own prowess or the prowess of his 
warriors. 
As in thews daps, Farming was the chief occupation, together 
with Hunting and Fishing, and the spasmodic gathering of Palm Kernels for 
the making of soap or the crushing of the oil nuts for Palm oil" (189). 
This correlates with the description given by M1 James Kailondon 
"There had always been the tg i (1907. The person who built the 
town was the tamjýjgi: when he died, than his children or his descendants 
became the tam .... The founders of tarns and those whose towns 
became the largest were the owners of the country .... Somebody founded 
a town, then this town expanded over a very large area, People from this 
town founded villages themselves, and this area was naturally under the 
founder of the bigger town. Therefore the area was under him, and was 
named after him" (191). For example, the area round Mano village in 
Luawa was named 'Seealu' after K Seva (192) who built up the town of 
Mano (193); and Sewalu was one of many tiny, independent polities existing 
in the area at the time of Kailondo'e accession (194). These independent 
polities became the na&iisia or (sections, of Kailondo's new, larger 
political unit; Kailondo's Luawa (195). 
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In a sensitive otudy of Mende sooio-political organi- 
nation, Rev. A. C. Lamb, writing in the colonial period (196), commented 
on the anthropological significance of this development of the gam, or 
'section'. The life of the Mende centres round two focii: the family 
and the chiefdom. To take one of these first, the family, does not imply 
that the chiefdom, especially in its modern form, is a natural outgrowth 
of Mende life duo to the ooalescenoe of various families. In fact it is 
highly probable that the 'section' is the natural unit formed from the 
development of the family" (197). In the Luawa area, the patiisia 
probably grew 'organically' out of the extended family (198)s the m-ah-awai, 
of Luawa, by contrast, was created partly in response to new political 
pressures and partly through the politico-military actions of one man 
Kailondo. 
Many of Luawats largest human settlements (199) were well.. 
established before 1880, having developed as 'headquarters towns' of the 
many tiny independent polities of the area. Representatives attended the 
Gbondou Conference from the towns of Ngiehun, Giema, Nyandehun, Dodo. 
Cotuma, Sandialu, Gbalahun, Buedu and Dia (200). Oral tradition indicates 
that Batwoma (201), Mano-Sewalu, Yibema, and Gbandewulo (202) were among 
the other large villages in the area. This list shows, somewhat surpris- 
ingly, that of the nine largest towns in Luawa at the end of the colonial 
period (203), at least five were already in existence even before Kailondo's 
accession. The extent and number of fakSisi a (2CV+) controlled by the 
mahangeisia of these towns no doubt depended partly on the size of the 
central town, and partly on the power and prestige of the individual 
Ma-W. 
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Upland-rice farming was, from the time of Kailondo onwards, 
the basic economic activity, necessary for subsistence and involving 
virtually the whole community for much of the year (203). There in little 
evidence as regards Luawa itself to indicate whether this was also the 
situation before Kailondo's reigns but a crop which was clearly the staple 
food of Luava by the 1890a is likely to have been widely grown for at least 
decades, if not centuries, before that date. Certain species of rice are 
indigenous in this part of West Africa, and may have been cultivated for 
several thousand years (206). Most British officials who visited Luawa in 
the 1890a presumed that arable farming could only have been introduced on 
a wide scale since the recent arrival of the 'pax Britannical: before that, 
people must have been too busy fighting to be serious cultivatcors (207). 
But this was pure conjecture based on the presumed beneficial results of 
British rule: since no British official had ever been to Luawa or even 
heard of the name before Alldridge's visit (208), they could not have had 
any first-hand knowledge of conditions there before 1890. 
That rice was commonly grown in Luawa before 1880 is 
suggested by the symbolic gifts offered to Kailondo when he was granted 
the nh&vcit these gifts included some rice which almost certainly repre- 
sented the staple food of the people (209). One tradition about the 
founding of Giema in Luawa is that Jimoh established the town on the site 
of a rice farm he made for his wife perhaps a generation before Kailondo1e 
accession (210), and Mr. Kulu-Banya's Histo indicates that rice farming 
was the main activity of the people of Luawa by the end of the eighteenth 
century (211). In 1786, Lieutenant Matthews wrote from Bunce Island in 
the Sierra Leone River that the "customary food of the natives is rice, 
which they always boil quite dry, and either eat it with palm. -oil poured 
over it, or a very strong gravy made of fish, flesh, or foul, and vegetables 
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boiled together, highly seasoned with pepper and spices, and palm oil" 
(212), If this was also the typical diet of the people in Luava in the 
succeeding century, then agricultural activities there must have included 
not only the planting of rice, but also the harvesting of palm produce 
(in order to make palm oil), and the growing of vegetables. 
As regards commerce before 1880, weekly markets were 
established at least in Gbande country. Alldridge noted in 1891 the 
existence of one such market outside the town of Popalahun (east of 
Luawa in Gbande country), and there was every sign that this was a well- 
established market of long-standing (213), though neither A. lidridge nor 
any other written or oral record gives any indication of when these 
markets first developed. According to oral tradition, they were fairly 
common in Gbande country before the British arrived (214). A colonial 
official writing in 1906 stated that Bomaru (in present-day Dia Chiefdom, 
near the southernmost tip of Luawa) had been "the market place since time 
immemorial for the Bandi, Gola Gidzi (KissiJ and Mendi tribes", the 
market being held every Wednesday (215). Presumably Alldridge was 
refering to this when he noted that weekly markets did not seem to exist 
"ii localities that oe. n be supplied from the Coast; the nearest being at 
Bai-wara [near Bomart r' (216). These markets only existed in areas 
far from the coast not simply because there was a greater need for inter. 
change of locally-made goods in up-country areas, beyond the range of 
European manufactures. Another reason, probably, was that petty trade 
wars between rulers near the coast had prevented the development of 
sufficient political stability to allow weekly markets to function (217). 
But beyond the coastal fringe, rulers like Kailondo achieved a degree of 
law and order which allowed weekly markets to be carried on. According 
to certain oral traditions, weekly markets existed within Kailondo's 
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Luawa, at least in Kissi country, before the British arrived: for 
example at Kpo~ya (near Koindu), Yeballu (near Sandia), and Vuahun 
(near Buedu) (218). 
The presence of eich markets in the Iaiawa area is the beat 
proof of the existence of organized local trading before 1880. In his 
comments on warfare before the time of Kailondo, Rev. Clarke mentions 
the exchange of slaves, country cloths, cattle, guns and salt (219)" 
These were probably the staple items of commerce in a weekly market 
before Kailondo's time, together with loca]ly. -groin foodstuffs. Oral 
traditions record the existence, in addition to these weekly markets, of 
trade between the coast and Iuawa, and though they give no indication of 
when this trade began, they suggest that the staples used in this long. 
distance trade were similar to those in local markets. Kissi and Mende 
people would go to buy salt and guns, together with tobacco, at Sulin , 
Kano Salija and Boothe, in exchange for country cloths and cattle (220). 
An indigenous local currency was in widespread use, at least 
in Kissi country, before 1880 and consisted of a twisted strip of iron 
about one-eighth of an inch wide, with a 'T' shape at one end and k 
flat 'lobe' at the other. In 1891, Alldridge noted the length as about 
2 feet 6 inches (221), but later examples were typically about one foot 
long (222)t the first European visitors called these strips of iron 
'Kissi pennies' or 'Kissi irons'. Alldridge remarked of the market at 
Popalahun that the "local currency was Iron and Salt. The iron which 
was all of native manufacture was always of one shape somewhat resembl. 
ing a long T hing (eic7, and was valued at one leaf or two short 
leaves of American tobacco of this description, one bundle of salt 
about 7 pounds weight) being valued at 20 Irons" (223). Alldridgs 
suggested that one Kissi penny was the equivalent of one English 
°KI$SI PENNIES" 
(These are in the possession of the present writer. 
) 
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penny (224). "In the bush I met several native women who were going 
to this market, with their purses under their arms, in the shape of a 
mat, containing perhaps a couple of dozen of these pieces of iron" (225). 
These Kissi pennies were apparently manufactured up-country in present- 
day Guinea and Liberia (226), and were a currency of considerable 
antiquity. Mr. Tamba Ngendu of Dokosu in Kissi Kama, an elder whose 
age in 1972 was estimated at over 90 years, said, 'Even my great-grand- 
father used to sell people to get these irons, because without them you 
were nowhere". They were sometimes obtained in exchange for children 
known to be from an illegitimate union (227). Kissi pennies, then, were 
established as a form of currency at least by the end of the eighteenth 
century. 
Little can be said about the 'quality' of the daily life 
of the ordinary people around the year 1880. It has been suggested that 
at this time tropical Africa in general was "still largely unexplored, 
unadministered and unannexed at a moment that probably marked its lowest 
depth of disorder and misery' (228). However., the few details which haus 
been uncovered about the Luava area just before Kailondots accession 
clearly demonstrate that this area was sufficiently well administered 
and ordered to prevent the ordinary people from collectively experiene- 
ing serious, long-lasting misery. 
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4. THE KPOVE WAR AND KAILONDO'S ACCESSION. c. 1880. 
The accession of Kailondo marks a turning point in oral 
tradition concerning political events in Luawa. Stories about his 
accession and events thereafter are numerous, clear and precise, in 
contrast with the vague and scanty information on earlier years (229). 
About the year 1880 there began the Kpove War (230), which 
was to affect large areas of Mendeland including Luawa. It appeared to 
start with the raids of Mahal Banya of Blama (231) against his neighbours, 
and the consequent counter-campaign against him by the Ku2be (232) Ndawa. 
(The latter was born near Segbwema [-2332, but spent most of his early 
manhood round the Tikonko area, before building the town of Wende 1-23&7. ) 
The Kpove War then developed into a series of separate campaigns, raids 
and disturbances lasting a number of years (235). Some accounts even 
suggest that the Kpove War had already begun before Ndawa launched his 
campaign: certainly the aftermath of the war was felt long after Ndawa's 
defeat. This is illustrated for the Luawa area in a history of Kailondo'a 
reign which was provided by his son, P. C. Momoh Banya. "The Pove Wars 
were attacks or raids led by Mendigra and Bobona who crossed the Guma 
country on the south-eastern borders invaded and plundered the towns of 
Normor,, Gaura, Damas Nongowa, Jaluahun, Jawi, Maleraa, Dia, Mando, Upper 
Bambarra and part of the Gau country 02362 where Kai-Lundu with his 
sub-warriors met them and heedlesslywith might and main as far as 
Wandoh .... Next followed another pove War led by Dawa, the whole of the 
Guma country C237J, Upper Bambarra, despoilt and burnt everybody fled 
for their lives - Kailundu took up arms against Dawa, defeated him, and 
drove him out of that country .... Later another war broke out led by 
Manya, a Konno Warrior, he invaded the towns of the northern territories, 
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burnt every town he met and invaded the Wunde Chiefdom .... our great 
warrior with his sub-warriors followed him defeated him as far as 
Kamayiendo in Konno" (238). Although the chronology of this account 
may be confused it clearly shows that the effects of the Kpove War were 
felt all through Ko--Mende and beyond - from Bandajuma near Pujehun (239) 
in the south, to Kono country in the north (240); from the Seva River 
in the west (241), to Luawa, Malema (242), and Koya (2.43) countries in 
the east. Its repercussions were felt as far east as Kpelle country 
(in present-day Liberia) whither Kailondo chased Mbawulomeh, one of 
Ndawa's lieutenants (244). 
In the late 1880s, the contusion created by the Kpove War 
was still being felt in eastern Mendeland, and British officials took 
this to indicate that war had been part of the people's way of life from 
'time immemorial' (245). However, the very fact that the Kpove War was 
so well-remembered in local folklore, and that it produced such a 
remarkable reaction among the mahl ieia at the Gbondou Conference 
(21x6) suggests that it was altogether exceptional, not part of the usual 
state of affairs. Ndawa, a k2zwzb 4 with few responsibilities and only 
a weak territorial base (247), was free to wage war with a recklessness 
and ferocity which the people of Luawa had not ]mown before (248)s 
possibly for the first time they experienced 'total war', very different 
from the occasional raid of one irate, a against a village belonging 
to another. Probably, the Kpove War was an unprecedentedly terrible 
experience for the people of eastern Mendeland. 
British officials $on the spot' up-country in Mendeland 
were ready to typify the disturbances of the Kpove War period as the 
normal condition in Mende country because they were concerned with the 
extension of British control in the area, and they inais ted that euch 
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an extension was of enormous benefit to the indigenous people themselves. 
The greater the contrast between the wildness of conditions before the 
British arrived and the improvement which took place afterwards, the 
more justification there was for the activities of Alldridge, Garrett 
and the others who enlarged British territory (249). Writers who later 
discussed this period tended to draw the contrast even more sharply than 
the first officials. Professor Little, writing about the whole of 
Mendeland before the colonial period, stated that warfare was "the 
principal form of activityand institution" (250). Dr. Wylie, dealing 
with the Luawa area just before the colonial period, noted that, although 
war was no more 'natural' to the people of eastern Mandel and than to 
Europeans, yet society was "organized. around war", that war "became an 
essential part of the life of the people, and it is evident from traditions 
that war largely dictated even the emerging politics" (251). Mr, J. M. 
Malcolm took a similar view (252). 
There may be a email elemant of truth in these 
estimates concerning the role of war in Luawa, though war stories are 
dramatic enough to lend themselves to being retold, and therefore 
generally play a large part in oral tradition, whether or not war was 
the main activity of the society (253). Colonial officials were certainly 
correct to emphasize the large amount of fighting which took place during 
the second half of the nineteenth century in the immediate hinterland of 
Freetown and Sherbro (254), but that does not prove anything about the 
situation further inland in a polity like Luawa. The warfare which did 
occur further inland was probably on a small scale and far from continuals 
one or two villages might be captured and burnt in a single raid, a hand- 
ful of people killed on both sides (255) -a serious matter, but nothing 
like the 'total war' of the 1880e, and bearing no comparison in 
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destructive potential with 'set-piece' battles between large armies 
ranging over a wide area. 
Alldridge himself implies a distinction between 
different types of warfare by noting that ware (i. e. limited ware) 
had been carried on "from time immemorial" in Mende country (256), but 
when he set out on hie travels in 1890 the people of Mendeland had 
just reached the and of a particularly long and serious war (i. e. the 
Kpove 'total' War) which had "depopulated and devastated much of the 
country" (257). Before the Kpove War, according to another careful 
writer, the interior "seems to have been relativelypeaceful until about 
1874" (258); even limited war was apparentlyuncommon in Luawa in the 
decades before 1880. Rev. Clarke's opinion was that farming provided 
the chief occupations "War served as a sort of interlude .... On the 
whole there does not seem to have been much fighting between the Luawa 
chiefs themselves, although one or two instances are on record" (259). 
The present writer found that oral traditions concerning events occurring 
before 1880 lacked records of serious fighting in the area before the 
Kpove War (260). There would probably have been some unrecorded fight- 
ing, but it would seem a serious misrepresentation to go as far as to 
suggest that society in Luawa before 1880 (or afterwards) was organized 
round war. 
There are different aooounte of how Luawa came to 
be affected by the Kpove War. The fullest acoount, recorded by Rev. Clarke, 
suggests that Ndawa first entered the area in pursuit of Bamya of Blama, 
who fled north to Kono country. Kailondo joined Ndawa in the pursuit, 
but a quarrel between them caused Kailondo to return home. This annoyed 
Ndawa who left following Banya and instead turned his kogur against 
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Kai]. ondo and Luawa (261). Other accounts simply show Ndawa entering 
Luawa on a marauding expedition, against which the local mahanstcis3a 
had to take some immediate action (262). Whichever account is most 
accurate, the fact is that Luawa was almost bound to be affected event- 
ually by the Kpove War; and if there was a quarrel between Ndawa and 
Sailondo, it acted as an occasion for Ndawa's attack rather than its 
real cause. 
The Luawa mahan2Eisiaa, reacted to the Kpove War crisis 
by meeting at the village of Gbondou (263). Some accounts suggest that 
Bundu of Oanyahun called this conference (264) and was the chief 
supporter of Kailondo (265): he certainly acted as the spokesman or 
representative (266) of the assembled mahangeisi a. After a chequered 
career he had settled in the country of his birth, Luawa, at the village 
of tanyahun (near present-day Kailahun) and achieved a position of some 
prestige and influence in the area, developing his birthplace.. Tslia, 
together with Bandajuma and Danyahun (267). If to acted as ad hoc leader 
of the Gbondou assembly, it is likely that he was also the moat powerful 
political figure in the Luawa area during the years before Kailondo'a 
accession. 
Another account of the conference suggests that it 
was Kailondo who took the initiatite. When Ndawa of Bandajuma raided 
and ravaged the country, burning Giema, Nyandehun, etc. Chiefs Masa, 
Pauwo Bundu, Bowa, Jimmi, Sagba, and Bundoh met with Kailondo to discuss 
'what should be done. Kahunla, Fa Bundeh's Chief Santiggi (268) was 
present at the meeting. Kailondo asked the others what they would give 
him if he defeated Ndawa, -and. they all swore. to make him Chief of-the 
whole country" (269). Yet another record has been provided by Mr. Kulu. 
Banya. Although his story cannot easily be reconciled with the Clarke 
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account (270), it does give an insight into the way decisions may have 
been reached at the conference. According to Air. Kulu-Banya, Ndawa 
sent a message to Kailondo, inviting him to join forces in a common 
campaign, and at almost the same time, the 'big men' (271) of Luawa 
called Kailondo to meet them. Before Kailondo's arrival, "a great meeting 
was held to determine a spokesman and what they should tell him on his 
arrival. By this time the messenger sent by Dawn ... had also arrived, 
and when asked the course Dawa wished to take, the inhabitants of 
SARKABU (272J and other neighbouring towns who were already gathered 
there were informed that Dawa had sent him to ask Kailundu to join him, 
and if he failed to do so he would lay waste all the lands and kill, every- 
one of them. When Kailundu arrived he was met by the spokesman, Bundor 
of Nganyahun ... who narrated to him the reason he was called and the fear 
they entertained towards Dawa. The messenger of Dawn too delivered his 
message at the same time. Bundor seeing that Kailundu was more inclined 
to fight Dawa as an enemy, promised that if Kailundu succeeded in driving 
him away, they would make him chief of SARBABU and all the neighbouring 
towns and villages, and confirmed his words by calling all the big men 
of the country who swore loyalty and allegiance to him. 
Kailuthu having the support of all the people about 
him, sent word to Dawa that he would on no account join himm.... " (273). 
This account suggests that Kailondo himself recognized the Gbondou 
Conference as a crucial point in his own career, and "wasted no time in 
exploiting the doubts and fears of the Luawa-lords to his best advantage" 
(274). 
Apparently there was no great difficulty either in 
assembling a considerable number of mahanga from-a fairly wide area, or, 
in getting them to accept Kailondo's, leadership, and this was surprising, 
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since a recognition of Kailorido as Mahr i (275) would inevitably result 
in a reduction of their own political independence and power. The main 
reason for their acceptance was probably the serious disturbance genera- 
ted in the area by the Kpove War. The decision of the Gbondou Conference 
to give Kailondo soureignty over the whole area created a novel situation 
in Luawas but that decision was a response to a possibly unprecedented 
condition of 'total war' in the area (276). Kailondo, the outstanding 
warrior of the country, was the only hope for the Luawa mahangcisia. 
They could not individually resist Ndawa, nor maintain their independence 
in the turmoil of the Kpove War. Ndawa'a character and previous actions 
(277) indicated that whether or not they submitted to him, he would 
ravage their country. Only collective resistance could save them from 
destruction; and Kailondo seemed the k2 most likely to lead them 
to success in this. If he was successful, he would naturally keep in his 
own hands the political power he had wont but the only alternative seemed 
to be certain destruction (278). Even so, at least some of the mahane ieia 
promised sotia^eignty to Kailondo if he defeated Ndawa "not without some 
degree of reluctance; a reluctance growing out of the known relationship 
existing between the two warriors" (279) earlier in the Kpove War. Some 
people objected, "This Kissi man is too proud, saying he will go to 
Ngiehun and catch that other man and kill him. He is very vain", to which 
Bundu replied, "you say that this man Kai is too proud, let us wait and 
see what he can do" (280). 
No doubt some of the mahanJEcieiea accepted Kailordo 
because the influential Bundu encouraged them to do so. A deeper factor 
making for political unity was the social cohesion already existing among 
the people of the Luava area before Kailondo's accession: the common 
languages of Mende and Kissi; the same social institutional geographical 
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proximity; overlapping kinship ties between the people of the different 
towns which resulted in a complex of interlocking loyalties - for example, 
Kailondo's mother Sefui, was the sister of Bundu of t yshun (281). The 
people of Luawa had much in common before 1880, they almost certainly 
possessed a 'sense of belonging' to each other, and all this provided a 
firm base on which to build the new polity. 
The creation of this comparatively large political 
unit under Kailondo was not a unique development, isolated from what was 
happening in other parts of present-day Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Although the points of comparison between Kailondo's Luawa and Samori 
Tours's Empire are few (282), yet traders coming into Luawa must have 
brought stories of the great empire which had developed further north. 
Such stories may have affected the political thinking of the Luawa 
mahangcisia. Also, proximity to the activities of Samori's fig may 
have encouraged the leaders at the Gbondou Conference to think of uniting 
to resist not only Ndawa but also this ultimately more fearsome threat 
from the north. Almost certainly, fear of the sofas among the Luawa 
eisia played at least a part in Kailondo's consolidation of power 
in Luawa, if not in his accession (283). 
A more direct comparison may be made between Iiailondo'a 
achievement of power in Luawa and the development of similar nearby 
polities like Nyagua's Lower Bambara (284) and Mendegla's Gaura (285), 
Also in the second half of the nineteenth century, Madam Yoko's 
KA M ndg confederacy developed some 150 miles west of Luawa (286), and 
Boatswain's Bopora confederacy grew up some 100 miles south of Luawa (287). 
There may have been other similar polities developing for which little or 
no documentation existss for instance, there was possibly a small polity 
just east of Kailondo's Greater Luawa, centred on Kpanddeme (288). These 
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developments were par4lleled by the development of Kailondots Luawa, 
which was one of the moat, powerful of the new polities. The almost 
simultaneous creation of these polities is not easy to explain, but 
possibly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, migration 
into the area (289) created such political unsettlement that state- 
building was impossible. Are-emergence of political stability occurred 
in the nineteenth century and hence new polities could develop; but this 
stability had been barely achieved when the European partition began to 
affect the area. 
If some of the n&langc1sia at the Gbondou. Conference 
had been half-hearted in accepting Kailondo, his clear military victory 
over Ndawa gave him a virtually impregnable position as ruler of Luawa. 
The details of Kailondo's campaign have been told too often to require 
further description (290). Kailondo countered Ndawa's attempts at an 
outflanking movement (291)3 he successfully stormed Ngiehun where Ndawa 
had established himself and defeated Ndawa in single combat (292)3 the 
Luawa forces twice routed Ndawa'e kagugba g as they retreated from 
Ngiehun and Ndawa'a band was driven across the Moa River, away from Luawa 
(293). This was a remarkable achievement since it represented Ndawa's 
first defeat in the Kpove War, and of all the leaders involved in that 
war, Ndawa was possibly the most able and the most feared (294). 
Descriptions of Kailondo's war against Ndawa have 
generally concentrated on the excitement of the single combat between 
the two leaders, and have given insufficient prominence to Kailondots 
military strategy which produced the success of the whole campaign. 
Similarly, preoccupation with warfare has obscured the significant part 
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which diplomacy and ritual played in Kailondo's accession. The records 
agree that Kailondo became Maki of Luawa not simply through a successful 
display of military force. Though his accession was partly dependent on 
prowess in war, it was not, as previous writers have asserted (295), due 
solely to that prowess. Central to his receiving the mahmi were two 
similar ceremonies, one taking place at the Gbondou conference and the 
other in Ngiehun after Ndawa had been driven away. The common elements 
in these two ceremonies were the gift to Kailundu by Bundu of Uanyahun of 
a white cloth containing a little earth -a symbolic offering of the 
country (296); and on both occasions the mg geisia promised on oath to 
be faithful to lailondo, while he also promised to be faithful to them 
and not to remain idle if there was any fisting to be done. At Gbondou 
Kailondo was also given a goat and some rice (297), while at Ngiehun he 
was given a gun (298) and a young girl (299). The ceremony with the earth 
and the white cloth was the customary way of indicating submission to an 
overlord (300). For example, when Ngevau was made mahl of Jojoima in the 
same period, a presentation of a white cloth and a young woman was made to 
him (301). Similarly, Faba, who was father of Nyagua and ruler of Dodo, 
gave some soil wrapped in a white cloth to anyone who required permission 
to build a village in the area (302). Presumably the ceremony at Gbondou 
was in anticipation of Kailondo's success against Ndawa; and the similar 
ceremony at Ngiehun after Kailondo's victory confirmed the decision of the 
mahange isia. 
At the end. of the -Gbondou Conference, the gift of the 
ayes, was confirmed by semi-religious rites in which traditional religion 
and Islam combined. Everyone concerned swore on 1medecinei to keep his 
promises -a traditional form of oath-taking (303). Then, several j11b1ft 
spent some time in isolation to consider and pray about the coming war (304): 
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when they emerged they said the war should be called the 'Kanga War' 
or 'War of Rebellion' (305). After a final ceremony involving every- 
one's touching a snake, Kailondo set out against Ndawa (306). 
The o, ib]. a were apparently for the most-part 
Muslim Mandingo people from the north who had come into the area either 
as itinerant teachers or traders, or as settlers (307). Early British 
writers, translating the Mende-language mýiUaa as 'Horiemen', mytholo- 
gized them as a highly sinister and seditious 'caste' of wandering semi. 
Muslim magicians, quite separate from the local community (308). MM3li1 a, 
however, simply means 'Muslims' in the Mende language (309), and there is 
little evidence that they were sharply differentiated from other sections 
of the community. People applied to them for medecine or advice, and 
possibly through these Muslims, vague stories had spread into Luawa about 
the eighteenth century ih in the Fouta Djallon, the iihada around the 
Upper Niger . basin in the first half of the nineteenth century 
(310), as 
well as about the development of Samori'a Mandinka Empire (311). The 
calling in of Muslims, and their designation of the campaign as the 'War 
of Rebellion', might have represented a faint and distorted echo of a 
Jihad against pagans. 
Kailondo won the of Luawa not only by military 
success but also by means of certain civil ceremonies, reinforced by semi- 
religious sanctions, in which the local malhmacisi, a shared. But more than 
that, Kailondo secured the ahaYel for himself in the decade after 1880 
by his striking success 'at home and abroad', The next two chapters of 
the thesis are devoted to an analysis of that success. 
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A NOTE ON POLITICAL TERMINOLOGY 
For reasons which are discussed in the main body of 
the thesis (312), the present writer has tried to maintain a clear 
distinction between the political vocabulary used in Kailondo's day and 
that which became common under British influence during the colonial 
period. 
Political teams in use before the arrival of the British in L 
*Maj awai = overlord, a ruler who possessed considerably more political 
power than most surrounding rulers; supreme political ruler, who was 
given personal allegiance by a number of lesser political rulers and 
their subjects. In English, the word is usually translated as chief'. 
But the word schief' (like 'tribe' and 'race') is vague in meaning and 
possesses many connotations in English which are inappropriate to the 
Wawa situation. 'Chief' has therefore been avoided (together with 
'chiefdom' and 'chieftaincy') except where refering specifically to the 
post-1896, alien (and often artificial) British creations. A mahawa 
would commonly be called 'Nahei'; and in this thesis the terms m ems, 
and Mahd (with a capital 'M') are used interchangeably. 
*m he, (with a small 'm') = lesser political ruler, who received the 
personal allegiance of people scattered over several towns or villages. 
His subjects might be numbered in thousands, or only in hundreds. 
___, -m ei ruler of a single 
town. 
_ul_ 
__ _l = ruler of a eing]. e village. 
*%omAhgj = war-leader; the commander of armed forces. He might be a 
mw or am ham, but he might be neither. For example, the kon 
Ndawa, during long stretches of his career, did not rule over any groups 
of settled people: his political power was based solely on his position 
as leader of a group of fighting men or kaoaa. 
maha -uL = 
the groups of people, collectively, over whom the m} , or ruled; the polity governed by a mahawai or m&i. 
*mah 
__ = overlordship, ea aigaty; an abstract noun refering 
to the 
power possessed by a mahawai or t ,,, 
i. 
PolitAgg tam's so These terms 
continued in general use after the end of British rule in 1961. 
'Paramount Chief (often abbreviated to P. C. ) =a British-created local 
government official (though the British Vh2ggh& they were merely 
institutionalising existing political organization in Mendeland). The 
P. C. possessed, under the British, political oontrol in a given amount 
of territory: he represented the senior indigenous 'traditional' local 
government official. From 1920 onwards, in Pendembu District (later 
Kailahun District) there were between 12 and 15 P. C. s, under one British District Commissioner. 
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*Ndolomahei (generally shortened to Ndoomahei) = Mara-lcole vo in the 
Kissi language = an attempted translation into the Mende and Kissi 
languages of the British concept of 'Paramount Chief'. The term 
Ndolomahci was commonly used among the Mcndeblcisia from the early 
twentieth century onwards. 
*chiefdom _ the territory allotted by the British to one particular 
P. C., to be ruled by him in matters of 'native law and custom' which 
were outside British interests. 
*chieftaincy =a collection of disparate (and changing) British ideas 
about the nature of a P. C. 's rule. 
*chief =a British-recognized lesser ruler, subordinate to the P. C. 
in British local administration; a 'sub-chief'. In this thesis, chief 
with a small 'c' refers to a lesser ruler subordinate to the P. C.., while 
Chief with a capital 'C' refers to a P. C. (313). 
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NOTES AND REFERENCES FCR CHAPTER ONE 
1.1880 is the date generally accepted for the uniting of the people of 
Luawa under Kailondo. Sees- 
(a) Clarke, W. R. E., The Foundatioll o Ch om ýto the 
ddeath f Ka o Albert Academy Press (Freetown), 1933. ] 
p. 6. This booklet provided the basis for Rev. Clarke's more 
widely known article, "The Foundation of the Luawa Chiefdom 
(the story of Kailondo and Ndawa)" in Sierra Leone Stu( (nose) 
No. B (June 1957)" The booklet, however, contains a somewhat 
fuller account than the article. Kai1on42 kea Nw (no a., The 
Story of Kailondo and Ndawa in the Mends language Bun bu Press, 
Bo, Sierra Leone, 1953, revised and extended ed. 1959)1 is, up 
to its account of Kailondo's death, an exact translation of 
Rev. Clarke's 1933 booklet. 
(b) Hollins, N. C. 0 "A Short History of Luawa Chiefdom" in S terra 
one Stud. iea (o. s. ) No. 3.4 (1929), p. 12. 
(o) Gorvle, M., Peo e of tSie =a Lene Protectorate (APrica'u 
Own Library No. 6, Lutterworth, London, 1944) p. 42. 
(d) Wylie, K. C., "Innovation and Change in Mende Chieftaincy 1880- 
1896" in Th a7, of African History, X, 2 (1969), p. 341. 
(e) Abraham, A., Rios 2C IrAdjti2nal Lea eh amorur hMs 
Ao ou unpub. M. A. thesis, 
Univ, of Sierra Leone, 1971), p. 63 if. 
None of these writers give their reasons for choosing 
1880, and it is extremely unlikely that the date was provided in the oral 
traditions. All the writers link Kailondo's accession with the Kpove War, 
and since 1880 is the date most widely given for its outbreak, the present 
writer has accepted 1880 as the year in which the new polity was created. 
There has, however, been some disagreement on when the Kpove War began. 
Inns, G., A Mende-English Dictionary (C. U. P., 1969), p. 61, gives 1885. 
Fenton, J. S., NS (Govt. Printer, 
Freetown, 1948) p. l, suggests 1874, though he does not mention the Kpove 
War by name. 
Mac James IKailondo estimated that Kailondo'a accession 
was 18 years before the coming of the Europeans - presumably in the sense 
of their coming as rulers in 1896 (Int. 19). A date of 1878 would be 
supported by a comment in Rev. Clarke's later history of Kailondo'o reign 
in which he states that Kailondo, ba c. 1845, would have been "just over 
thirty" at the time of the Kpove War 
,] of 
Siena Leone (unpub. MSS 1960, in possession of the present writer) 
2. Luawa was a 'new polity' in 1880 in the sense that what little evidence 
exists on the pre-1880 political situation indicates that there had been 
no comparable political unit in the area during the previous century. 
But this does moo necessarily mean that there had never been any organized 
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polity in the area in earlier centuries - though many writers have 
wrongly inferred this. B contrast, Dr. Rodney (basing his conclusions 
on the writing of Alvares) suggests that shortly after the Mane invasion, 
the whole of present-day Sierra Leone was part of a single political unit, 
or at least of a single Confederacpt "The Mane generals and captains, on 
the basis of a clan system, had apportioned Sierra Leone among themselves, 
and proclaimed themselves 'kings'. There were four principal kingdoms 
.... Within each of those kingdoms there were subdivisions .... Strictly 
speaking, a number of the petty rulers called 'kings' by the Europeans 
should really be regarded as 'chiefs'. It was a pyramidical structure 
of governments the chiefs owed allegiance to the local kings, who them- 
selves supposedly paid deference to the kings of the 'metropolis' at 
Ce Mount, who in turn paid tribute to an overlord who remained behind" LRRodney, 
W., "A Reconsideration of the Mane invasions of Sierra Leone" 
in The Journal of African History, VIII, 2 (1967), p. 227J 
3. Kailondo was born in the village of Kornalu, near Mano-Sewalu, close by 
the Moa River, See: - Clarke, Foundation of Luawap p. 5; Hollins, "Short 
History", pp. 59-60; Wylie, "Innovation and Change", p. 300. In these 
accounts also will be found full descriptions of the early life and 
activities of Kailondo. The present writer has not repeated these des- 
criptions, since they are in the main clear, uncontroversial, and easily 
available. More important, they do not add greatly to an understanding 
of either Kailondo as a ruler or the nature of his polity, which are the 
concerns of this thesis. 
4. Korueba (pl. koauabanga) is a Mende term which may be roughly translated 
into English as 'leading warrior' or 'experienced fighter'. Komeba is 
often shortened in conversation to ku ba, though inns, Dictionary, p. 67 
gives kggbg. 
5. Clarke, Foundation of Wawa, p. 6 
6. Gbondou, sometimes spelt Gbondo or Bondo, was a small village about 6* 
miles east of Kailahun. 
7. Mahs_vci is a Mende term which may best be interpreted by such English 
words as 'sovreignty', 'rule', or 'leadership'; though none of these 
words are really adequate. See 'Note on Political Terminology' appended 
to this chapter of the thesis, Chap. l. 
8. Cardew in 1896 defined Luawa as the area north of the Keya River and 
Upper Bambara country, east and south of the Moa River, stretching no 
further west than Sandialu and Guabu (C0267/I 25/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96). 
9. This confusion of British officials is understandable in view of the 
fact that Kailondo and his people probably did not themselves possess 
any clear territorial definition of Luawa. (See this chapter of the 
thesis, Chap. 1, p. to below. ) 
10. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp, le3" below. 
11. For the meaning of the tam 'Chiefdom' see 'Note on Political terminology' 
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12. In 1974, the term 'Luawa Chiefdom' was still used in this way. 
3.3, Mahangcisia (pl. ) is a Mende term meaning 'political leaders', 
'rulers', 'landowners'. See 'Note on Political Terminology'. 
14. See map opp. p. 9 in this thesis. 
15. Bundu of Uannyahun used the word 'Luawa' in handing over the country 
to Kailondo, according to NEU James (Int. 19), but there is no 
indication of what Bundu himself meant by the word. The ordinary 
people of Luawa in 1880, however, probably thought of the mahl 
in terms of personal allegiance to Kailondo himself rather than in 
terms of a strictly-defined geographical area. Specific evidence 
for the mahai as a personal rather than a territorial concept is 
difficult to find, but is suggested by the general tenor of oral 
tradition concerning Kailondo'a reign. 
16. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. ", +-7$ below, for an estimate of the 
size of 'Greater Luawa'. Sie otse %4; &., p. iob. 
17. Even in the early 1940e, the Kissi Chiefdoms still paid an extra tax 
of 6d. per head to the Paramount Chief in Kailahun as a sign of their 
continuing loyalty to Katlondo and his successors (Int. 19: see also 
Chap. 6 of this thesis, pp. 504., Si4 below). 
18. Hollins, 'Short History', pp. 15-16. 
19. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 74-3l below. 
20. See Chap. 14 of this thesis, passim, for a tall discussion of Liberia's 
claims to Luawa, 1896-1911. For Luawa and Wunde, see Chap. 2 of this 
thesis, pp. «m - as below, and Chap. 4, pp. 264. " aso below. 
21. 'Countries' as used in the writings of Alldridge and the other early 
European visitors to Luawa is a useful but rather indefinite term 
generally used to describe a *polityt governed by one ruler. It was 
often a unit of less than 100 square miles in area. 
22. Int. 1. 
23, The Combey and Kulu. Banya ßS have been of great interest to the present 
writer in that they are the first histories of Luawa to be written by 
local people. Both Mr. Combey and Mr. Kulu-Banya were residents of 
Kailahun, and they were among the first young people of Luawa to receive 
an 'English-typet education up to 'secondary' level. Both wrote their 
histories at a time when there were many people still living in Wawa 
who perconallp remembered the period of Kailondots reign. Both accounts, 
which are reproduced in substance in Vol. 2 of this thesis, contain clear 
inacouräoiee, but they also provide some corroborative details which are 
not to be found elsewhere. References to the two ISS are as follows$- 
(a) Combey, B. N., Histor-Y awj (unpub. MS, 1948, in possession 
of the present writer)* 
(b) Kulu-Banya, S. K. II, A Histor of the Kulu-Ban FAMUZ 2f I UM 
(unpub. MS, 1940, in possession of the present writer), 
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24. Insofar as oral tradition could be chocked against accurate written 
facts, the traditions provided by* Magda James proved in almost every 
instance to be correct. 
25, Int. 19. 
26. See this chapter of the theaia, Chap. l, pp. M-ti below. 
27, The description of Luawa'a geography is based largely on the following 
books t, 
(a), 'Clarke, J. I., Sierra Le i Maps (Univ. of London Presa, 
London, 2nd ed. 196)g 
(b) Church, R. J. H., W Af t at of the iro n 
manta use of it Longmans, London, 6th ed. 1968). 
(c) Morgan, W. H., and Pugh, J. C., Wests Africa (Methuen, London 
1969). 
(d) Cran M. I. (ed. ), N23pon'o Siena. Lene, e Atlas (Nelson, London, 
19663. 
Between 1965 and 1970, and again in 1972, the present 
writer visited almost every major human settlement in Luawa, so his 
description also draws on personal observation - though it is recog- 
nised that, especially as regards vegetation, the situation in the 
late 1960s may have been very different from that in the 1680s. 
Considerable space has been devoted in this and several other chapters 
of the thesis to geographical factors, because these factors so 
controlled human existence in Luawa that by comparison such matters 
as particular forms of social organization seem of secondary importance. 
28. Clarke, J. I., op. cit., p. 13. 
29. Ch the present Pendembu-Kailahun road up to about Mile 5, the land 
remains below the 650 foot contours but a spot height on the edge of 
Koindu town gives a reading of 1428 feet [ see C ur Man of Sierra 
Leone, pub. Directorate of Overseas Surveys (U. K. ) for the Government 
of Sierra Leone, D. 0.419 (series 9742), Edition 2-D. O. S. (1969), 
scale 1: 50,000. Sheets 70.72,82_84,93-94 cover Luawa and the 
surrounding area, and are here ter referred to in this thesis by the 
short title, IQý, 9 ContguiMat 
J. 
30. Mean annual rainfall in being referred to here. See Clarke, J. I., 
op. cit., p. 21. 
31. Ibid., . 25. Speaking of Wunde, just north of Luawa, Pa Langam noted (Int. 20) that at the beginning of the twentieth century the bush "was 
not very big there, so it was easy to set fire to it". 
32. 'Bush' is the word generally used by Mende and Kisei people, when they 
are speaking in English, to refer to what an Englishman might call. 
'forest' or 'jungle'. The Mende word is ndpgb2. 'Forest' or 'jungle' 
in English has the connotation of an extensive area of dense virgin 
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woodland which has scarcely been penetrated by man. However, the 
"continued existence of original high forest anywhere in Gent Africa 
is doubted. Probably the whole of the present forest area has been 
cultivated at some stage, with secondary growth over farm clearings" 
(Morgan and Pugh, op. cit., p. 215). For this reason, the tam 'bush' 
is preferred to 'forest' or 'jungle'. 
33. This statement is based on personal observation travelling, for example, 
along the Pendembu-gailahun-Buedu-Koindu-Ningowa road (the main arterial 
road in the Luawa. area). It is reflected in the vegetation map in 
Clarke, J. I., op. cit., p. 25, and in the description of vegetation on 
the 1969 Contour Mae. Strangely, however, most authorities still place 
the whole of Luawa in the 'forest zone' (e. g. Morgan and Pugh, op. cit., 
p. 209). Wylie, "Mende Chieftaincy", p. 295 noted: "Luawa sat in the 
middle of dense-forest land .... The roads linking the towns might 
aptly be described as tunnels through the green canopy". The present 
writer, while walking through thicketed grassland in the north-east of 
Luawa and sweating profusely under a blazing midday sun, often longed 
for the shady cool of a green canopy, but rarely found it. 
34. Aa early as 1924, F. W. H. Migeod, writing about a visit to Kissi country, 
noted at Koindu: "All about the town is old farm land with very small 
growth on it and some grass, but even small trees seem absent. There 
are, however, of, ], palms dotted about. The old Chief said when he was 
young ýc. ], 0? / 
there was a lot of bush about, but it had all been 
cut down" 
AA 
Veo Sierra Leone (Kegan Paul, London, 1926) p. 107,,,, %. 
This would suggest either a growing population, or fairly recent 
, settlement, or both. 
35. See Clarke, J. I., op. cit., p. I3, for the Moa River and its relationship 
to the Niger. Ibid., p. 16, it is stated that the Sewa basin is larger 
than that of the Nloa, but these figures are limited to drainage within 
Sierra Leone. Almost half the Moa basin lies outside Sierra Leone's 
boundaries - mainly in Guinea, but partly also in Liberia. 
36. Perhaps the most spectacular of these rapids are about 3 miles from 
Kailahun, at the point where the river is nearest the town. This place 
is called Yid 
Lee 
Abraham, A., and Isaac, B., "A Further Note on 
the History of L awa Chiefdom in Sierra Leone Studie (n. a. ) No. 24 
(3an. 1969) p. 72J. n nd is the setting for Sarif Easmonto short 
story Bindeh s Gift in African WiTa (Mphalele, E. (ed. ), 
Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1967, pp. 9-79 . 
37. Clarke, J. I., op. cit., p. 16, suggests "river levels may vary by 50 to 60 ft". From rough observations taken at the MMannowa Ferry through 5 
years, the present writer would estimate the seasonal fluctuation of 
the Moa in the Luawa area is about a quarter of these figures. 
38. Ibid., pp. 17 and 27. 
39. An average day's journey is here reckoned as. 15 miles. Some men from 
Luawa might have been able to double that average. 
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1+0. Ibid., p. 21. Cf. Nelsons Sierra Leone Atlas, p. 3, to indicate how, as 
a result of inadequate statistical information, serious discrepancies 
may occur in the plotting of isohyets. Such discrepancies are not, of 
course, confined to rainfall maps. The present writer has largely 
followed the maps provided in Clarke's Sierra Leone in Mans. The only 
map (in the books under consideration) to indicate that rainfall in 
the south-west of Luawa is significantly greater than in the north-east 
of the Kissi Chiefdoms is to be found in Church, op. cit., p. 323. But 
the fact of the difference in rainfall may be established by noting the 
failure of cocoa or coffee to do well in Kissi country. Cf. Clarke, J. I., 
op. cit., pp. SO-81: "The cocoa belt is delimited by the 100 in. isohyst 
in the north-cast". 
41. Ibid., p. 21. See also Church, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 
42. Clarke, J. I., op. cit., p. 21. 
43. Church,, op. cit., p. 43. This comment is also based on the present 
writer's personal observation. 
44. From personal observation in the late 1960s, it was clear that over 
90% of the male working population of the Luawa area was primarily 
engaged in rice-. farming. 
45. The great problem for the Luawa farmer is when to begin his shift- 
cultivation farming by clearing the chosen area of its undergrowth and 
most of its trees. This 'brushing' must not be done too early, other. 
wise the bush will not have dried out enough since the previous rainy 
season; but it must not be left too late, otherwise the new rainy 
season may already be setting in. The point of having the bush as dry 
as possible is that the whole farm area must be burnt of its under- 
growth, and if the burning is not done effectively it is virtually 
impossible to raise a good rice-harvest. Fluctuations in the time 
when the rainy season begins from year to year introduces a relatively 
serious element of risk into annual farming activities. 
46. For the importance of the rice-farm, see Little, K. L., Th MeA2gf.. 
Sieri a Leave (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, revd. ed. 1967) pp. 77-82. 
47. Clarke, J. I., op. cit., pp. 22-23. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid. See also Church, op* cit., p. 24. 
50. Ibid., p. 25. See also Morgan and Pugh, op. cit., p. 183. 
51. See map opp. p. 7 of this thesis. 
52. 'Kissi country, within present-day Sierra Leone may roughly be defined 
as the three Kissi Chiefdoms of Kailahun. District; though the-area 
round Mano-Sowalu and Yibema, together with the viüages down the Mano- 
Sewalu to Kailahun road, is predominantly Kissi-speaking. 
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53. Llldridge, T. J., The Sherbro a{ H era (Macmillan, London, 
1901) pp. 207_2I0. 
54. See the . Me. p r,, , L. opp. p. ? of this thesis. 
55. In a rare error in Clarkels Sierra Leone in the Kissi Mountains 
are mis-named the tJojoima Hills pp. 14-15 . The mistake presumably 
arose by confusing the name of Jojoima, a village in near-by Malema 
Chiefdom, with Jojina, the name of the highest Kissi mountain (2803 
feet according to the 1969 Co M, 2792 feet according to 
Nelson's Sierra Leone Atlas). 
56. Kangama was then, and still is, the Chiefdom headquarters town of 
Kissi Tong. 
57. Migeod, op. cit., p. 106. 
58. C0267/389/239; Crooks (Ag. Gov. ); 19.5.91; enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, 
Bonthe. See photo opp. p. 2o of this thesis. 
59.2304 feet is the height of Mamba according to the S rra Leone-Y%13 
, pub. D. Survey, 
Ministry of Defence, U. K. (1968). series G442 LGSGS 
3921,7, Edition 7- GSGS, Sheet Sierra Leone, scale 1: 500,000, 
hereafter referred to in this thesis by the short title, 1968 Wall-Mar,. 
60. This description would fit any of the present-day main roads in the area: 
the Pendembu-Kailahun-Buedu-Eoindu-Nongowa road; the Kailahun-Mofindor- 
Sambalu road; the branch roads to Baoma, Mende, Mano-Sewalu, Sandialu, 
Bewabu, Nyandehun, Dawa and Sandia. 
61. The present writer has avoided the term 'tribe', since it has no agreed 
definition, it encourages the oversimplification of tremendously complex 
socio-political issues in the Luawa area, and it has perjorative over- 
tones for the contemporary African and European reader. These points 
are all illustrated by definition 3 under 'Tribe' in T ho S ortet % ord 
English D M, tionary (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 3rd ad. 1944): "A race of 
people; now applied esp* to a primary aggregate of people in a primitive 
or barbarous condition under a headman or chief". See also Colson, E., 
"African Society at the time of the scramble" in Gann, L. H., and 
Duignan, P. (eds. ), Coi 1870-1960, Vo1. Is The Ho 
and Pc 0- (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 
1969) pp. 28-31. 
62, ME eblcis1 is the term by which Mende people would. refer to themselveo 
in their own languages this is the definite plural, the indefinite 
plural being _Mcn4e a- 
though the distinction between the two plural 
forms appears to be slowly disappearing. See Innes, G., A Mende Qrr ,r (Macmillan, London, 1962) p. 26. K to is the term by which Kisai 
people would refer to themselves in their own language. There is no 
such word in the Mende language as 'Mondes' or 'Mendiss (see Abraham, 
Tra4ition Leaäershin, p. ix). - The indiscriminate adding of 'a' to 
words in order to produce an anglicized plural has produced similar 
results to the indiscriminate use of the word 'tribe' (see Note 61 above). 
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The only possible definition of the 'Mendist (as the term was used 
by the first colonial officials) is 'that group of people to whom 
British officials chose to apply the word "Mends" with an "a" added 
to it'! The adding of 'a' to produce plurals also led British officials 
to create non-existent 'tribes'. For example, several early officials 
invented the term 'Luawas' to refer to Kailondo's 'tribe', and used the 
term with apparently no sense of incongruity. 
63. There is no river, mountain range., or vegetational boundary separating 
the Mendebleisiza and Ki. saiA. 
64. The term 'peoples' suffers in the same way as 'tribe' from lack of 
clear and agreed definition. It is used here simply as the beat 
available word., being preferred to auch alternatives as 'national 
or 'groups'. 
65. In 1896, Cardew (presumably with the help of the local people) was 
able to mark out quite clearly the boundary between the Mendeblrisia 
and Kis aia so that it could be mapped (C0267/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96). 
That he marked out a real boundary, and was not just drawing a boundary 
existing in his own imagination, is indicated by the fact that his boundary 
line even in the 1960s represented fairly accurately the division between 
predominan, gy Mende-speaking villages and predominantly Kiaa%speaking 
villages see map by Dalby, T. D. P., "Language Distribution in Sierra. 
Leone" in The Sierra Leone Language Review, No. l (1962) 
66. See the map inside the front cover of Ajayi, J. F. A., and Espie, I., 
A Thousand Ye of W His (Ibadan Univ. Press and 
Nelson, London, 1965). Mende is one of the Mande group of languages, 
whereas Kissi is among the West Atlantic group. 
67. See map opp. p. q of this thesis. 
68. The terms 'one-third' and 'two-thirds' are placed in inverted commas 
because they refer to east-west linear distance, and not to area. The 
situation as regards language-distribution which is described here is 
roughly the same as that suggested by Cardew's map of 1896. Cardew's 
proposed new boundary line had, he stated., "the great advantage that 
it follows ... tribal boundaries"# and the limits of Mende-speaking Luawa and Bombali were decided "by actually perambulating the roads 
forming those limits on the Kissi side" (C0267/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 
7.4.96). The 1931 Census reported what seems a very similar situation: 
there were estimated to be 3,965 Kissi people Luawa Chiefdom, and 
530 "stranger tribes" in the Kissi Chiefdoms R 14-- Lem 2f 
Census 1931 (Govt. Printer, Freetown, n. d. 1931 
t's 
p. 15 . The 
situation had not changed much by 1963, when there were just over 
6,000 Kissin living in L wa Chiefdom, and about 680 Me ea living 
in the Kiesi Chiefdoms puulation Qersu ofSiam ne, Vol Is 
Number of Inhabitan (Central Statistics office, Freetown, 1965), p"i4,7" 
See also Clarke., J. I., op, att., p. 37. 
69. For example, at least some of the Banya family in Kailahun in 1972 
would have described themselves as 'Kiasi people', though they spoke 
only the Mende language, and knew , only a 
few words of the Kiwi language. 
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70. Clarke, F estion of Luawa, p. 6; Gorvie, op. cit., p. 40; Abraham, 
Traditional. Leaderahig, P-59. Rev. Clarko, in Kst1ondot the story 
of a warrior of Siva Leone, p. 5, noted that Kailondo's father was 
"Dowi Komei a Kissi of Lukono in the Wunde country in Guinea, and 
his mother was Kafue Mambo of Komalu". 
71. Int. 15. This piece of evidence may be used in two different ways 
either to indicate a westward movement of groups of Kiste qr to show 
that for a considerable time the Kissia had formed a wedge on the 
southern side of the Moa valley stretching into Mendeland. 
72. Murdock, G. P., Africat its o ee and he a (McGraw. 
Hills New York, 1959)o pp. 260.261. Murdock's figures of almost one 
million for the Mcndeblcisia and 200,000 for the Kim seem to be 
over-estimates. Clarke, J. I., op. cit., p"37, suggests a Mende 
population within Sierra Leone of 672,831 and a Kissi population of 
48,954. The heart of Kissi country lies in Guinea, and some Kis-elft 
also live in Liberia. The present writer has not been able to find 
accurate population figures for the peoples of Guinea and Liberia, but 
would estimate the total number of Mendeblr-isia and Kissia respectively 
may be 750,400 and 150,000 around the year 1970. 
73. The only known factor which may have affected the relative size of the 
two peoples was the possibly greater incidence of trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) -a fatal disease - among the sa than among 
the Me ebleisia (see Chap. 6 of this thesis, pp, S51-3 below). 
74. See map opp. p. 11 of this thesis. 
75. Cardew noted that is 891 Nyagua's Mende polity " xtends on the East 
as far as Taninahun L near present-day Gandorhutjand on the South oins 
that of Chief KAILUNDU't (C0267/409/131j Cardew) 17.4.94, from Waima'). 
Northwards from there, at least as far as Waima, Cardew implies that 
the country belongs to the "Saug Konnos". Gandorhun is still on the 
administrative boundary of southern Kono District. Cardew also noted 
that "Kai Lundu is in a state of chronic war with K&FFARA of upper 
GESE". In many reports over the next 15 years, Kafula's country was 
defined as being north of the Moa and east of the Meli, centred on the 
town of Kissi Kenema. See Chaps. 2 and 4 of this thesis, passim. 
76. See Unwin, A. H., Renogt o the ob ems i Sem 
oe (Waterlow and Sono, London, 1909). p. 23s "Strictly speaking the 
Gola is the name of a distinct tribe, who iriginally inhabited the land 
on the left bank of the Morro river and from there to the Mano, and 
beyond into Liberia .... Many years ago, from all accounts, the Mandis 
attacked the Gola people, and drove them back across the Mano, so that 
now only the old foundation of the houses, and the Cola trees they planted, 
mark the sites of their towns, which must have been quite numerous". 
The 119 CoDt2MX M Map marks the , 
Gola Forest extending so far north an 
to cover the eastern edges-of, Malema Chiefdom. 
77. Alldridge, writing in 1891 of Yandahun, some 6 miles south-east of Gbandewulo, noted that "HANDLE being the next country, a great many 
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persons from there were to be seen at this town and the Bande language 
was freely spoken" (C0267/389/239; Crooks (Ag. Gov. ); 19.5.91, enc. 
Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe). Cf. Rodney, W., A History the e 
Guinea Coast 1545 to 1800 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970) p. 57, where 
the Gbande people are misnamed the 'Grandes'; and Gann and Duignan, 
The History and Politico of Colonialism 1870-1914, map app. p. 26, where 
they are misnamed the 'Goandes'. Such mistakes have introduced some 
confusion into the complex subject of the definition and distribution 
of the various peoples of the area. For example, McCullock, M., 
Poe plea of Sierra Leone (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, International 
African Institute, London, 1950), p. 101, noted the three Kissi Chiefdoms 
as 'Koranko Chiefdoms' in 'Tonkolili District'; and on the map at the 
back of the book, the whole of the Gbande people, together with an 
inexplicably detached group of Kissi people, are misplaced far to the 
south of their actual homeland. 
78. See map opp. p. 9 of this thesis. Hollins, "Short History", p. 13, 
gave the fullest list of representatives at the Gbondou Conference, and 
Clarke, Fu tion of_Luawa, p. 8, added several more. Other sources are 
indicated in Notes 81 to 95 below. 
79. The possibility musst be faced that this list, anachronistically, indicates 
the people who later became gº racisia, keiugbaniza and k koi a under 
Kailondo (and the places be later closely controlled) rather than 
providing an accurate statement of the people who were really present 
at Gbondou. Insofar as the list is accurate, presumably it was virtually 
the same group of leaders who confirmed Kailondo as ruler a few weeks 
later in Ngiehun. 
80. See Note 15 above. 
81. Gorvie, op. cit., p. 42, mentions only the name of Bundu (he spells it 
'Gbondo') among all those leaders who attended the conference, as 
does Clarke, "Foundation of Luawa", p. 248. 
82. Int. 19. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 67, says Bundu came from 
Mofindor, and it is likely that Bundu had influence there, since Mofindor 
and tanyahun are in the same 'section', and are less than 2 miles apart. 
83. It is difficult to find an English synonym for the Mende word k akois a, 
which has the general meaning of 'the important people of the area'. 
The title kc would be given to any rich man or landowner, or to a 
person who by one means or another had gained a position of respect. 
Sometimes, too, it could be used to distinguish a man of maturity and 
dignity from 'youngsters'. In many situations the words kcal oigia and 
mahanncisia could be used interchangeably, as general titles of respect, 
but the latter carries a strong element of., politica1 leadership in its 
meaning which is not necessarily the case with the former. 
84. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 8. Hollins, "Short History", p. 13, records 
the name of Boa of Ganduhun, who was presumably the same person (in the 
Mende language Ing' mutating to 'y'). 
85. SLGi, Pendembu District Intelligence o k, p. 79. Ngobeh was PG of Luawa 
between 1916 and 1923. 
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86. Int. 28. 
87. SLGA, Pendembu District Intelligence Book, p. 79. Sagba was one of 
Kailondo's "sub-chiefs" who made his mark as a witness on the 1890 
Treaty with the British: "Saagbeh of BORBCRB00" (C0267/3W182; Hay; 
3.5.90, enc. Treaty made at CANRAY LAHOON). Mýaa ad James Kailondo 
put Sagba first among the counsellors of Kailondo after Fabundeh 
(Int. 19). It is likely that the most influential counsellors and 
closest confidants of Kailondo were Bundu, Fabundeh, Ngobeh Kahunla, 
and Sagba. 
88. Hollins, "Short History", p. 13. 
89. Ibid. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 8, noted that Mbapu came from 
Sandialu, and Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 67, agreed with this, 
but Hollins gave the name of Koliwa as the-representative from Sandialu. 
Quite possibly both Mbapu and Koliwa attended the meeting from 
Sandialu ." there seems to have been no formal arrangement that each 
town should be represented by only one person. 
90. For Kpawo Bundu, see Pendem u District Intelligence Book, p. 79, and 
Hollins, "Short History", pp. 12-13. 
91. Ibid. See also Clarke, Foundation of LRawa, p. $, and Abraham, Tradi- 
tional Leadership, p. 671 both refer to Bondo Foryoh of Dia, but Hollins 
does not mention him. Hollins spelt Ngegba as 'Gegbo'; but 'Gegbo' is 
not a Kissi name, whereas Ngegba is quite common. On p. 19 of his "Short 
History", Mr. Hollins referred to apparently the same person as 'Gegba'. 
92. Hollins, "Short History", p. 13. Yamandu is marked on many of the maps 
accompanying British officials' reports in the 1890s and early 1900s. 
93. Ibid. p. 13. See also Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 8, and Abraham, 
Traditional Leadershiß, p. 67. 
94. Konia is the only one of all the villages, mentioned in the list of 
Gbondou Conference representatives, which cannot-be traced on either 
old or present-day maps. 
95" SLGA, P emb Diotrigt YB, p. 79 if. Pa Langama 
(Int. 20) believed that Ndawua of Konosu was 1 of Tengea at that 
time, 
96. Possibly Ndawa made Ngiehun his headquarters because he had some 
support there. 
97. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 8. Cf. Abraham, Traditional Leadershitt, 
p. 66, where Ma. njakewa and Jobo are spoken of as coming from Ngiehun. 
Kpawo died before the end of the war. 
98. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 10; Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.? 1. 
99. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 12. 
100. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. is-Tq below. 
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101. See, for example, Chap. 5 of this thesis, pp. l4Z-3 below. 
102. See Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p. 199, where Kailondo'a burial 
is related to what 'almost all Mendis' believe. 
103. See Note 70 above. 
101. The present writer estimated about U of the mahanneieia were of 
Ktssi origin, and 13 were of Mende origin. 
105.1963 Population Census, Voll, p. 4. 
106. Thomas, N. W., "Who were the Manes? " in The Journal of the Royal 
scan Society, XIX (1920), ppal76-188. 
107. For a fuller discussion of sources of evidence for this period, see 
this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 1, pp. ai, ii below. Dr. P. E. H. Hair 
has suggested that enthusiasm for "source-material other than 
European written records" has arisen partly because the wealth of 
material in European written records is not appreciated. But Luawa 
must be far from the only area where na written records exist for 
earlier than the late nineteenth century; it is therefore a 
matter of using oral traditions or nothing Hair, P. E. H., "Ethnol. 
inguistic Continuity on the Guinea Coast" in The Journal of African 
History, VIII, 2 (1967), p. 2683 
108. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p. 112, and Hollins, "Short History", 
p. 1], both agree that Kailondo's ancestors in order from the earliest 
known ancestor were: - Fawiai, Fakpala, Bauwe, and Ndowe Komeh who 
was Kailondo's father. Hollins inserts the additional name of 
Faiyinda between Fawisi and Fakpala. Cf. Abraham, T ttiona1 
Leadershiti, p. 28* "Of all the traditions collected by the author, 
the longest genealogies do not exceed five generations". This would 
mean that genealogies start, at the earliest, in the late eighteenth 
century. Cf. Person, Y., "Ethnic Movements and Acculturation in 
Upper Guinea since the Fifteenth Century" in AM can Historic l Studies. 
IV, 3 (1971), p. 669: "Oral traditions seldom go back beyond the 
eighteenth century among stateless societies". Even so, oral tradi- 
tions in the Luawa area indicate nearly 200 years of continuous 
settlement and are not at all "sagas of unrelenting migration", 
"relieved only by lists of rival units exterminated (Hair, 
"Ethnolinguistic Continuity", p. 247) 
109, The Kiasi 'homeland' in the 1970s might be described as the three 
Kissi Chi fdoms of Sierra Leone, ' a small area in the north-west of 
Liberia 
£see 
Liebenow, J. G., L rjAt the Evolution 
(Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, USA, 1969)j pp. 31-32; and Gnielinski, 
S. von (ed ), L-iberia-in Man. (Univ. of London Presse London, 1972), 
pp. 38.. 4]j and the old French c2rel6a of Kissidougou and Gueekedou 
in the Republic of Guinea (see Pauline, D., Leo Gene du rims KiggL 
Hu-t Franc g (Libraire Plon, Paris, 1954). map on 
pp. 40-41 . 
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110. Rodney, Histor-r of the üC, p. 9. See also Kupp P., 
A History of Sierra Leone JAOO--1787 Cambridge Univ. Press, 
Cambridge, 1962)p rather confused maps on pp. 136 (for c. 1600) and 
137 (for o. 1800). 
111. Person, "Ethnic Movements", p. 673. 
112. Rodney, Hiss gf &ha tpp@r Guinea Coastst pp. 504.51. 
113, Kup, op, cit., p. 152. 
114. Quoted ibid., p. 157. 
115. Most writers on the subject of Mende origins, from Migeod and Thomas 
to Rodney, seem to the present writer to rely too much on the reports 
of early European travellers had the limitations of (i) observing 
events from coastal 'factories' (ii) being unacquainted with local 
languages and culture (iii) being centrally interested in the 
commercial possibilities of the area, not its history and politics. 
116. Hair, "Ethnolingutstic Continuity", pp. 275-276. 
117. Kup, op. cit., p. 130: "It was, in fact, about 1564 that the Mani 
invasion began in earnest". See also ibid., pp.: L46,153. 
118. Ibid., p. 156: "Major Laing .. o in his map of 1824 clearly marks the 
area at present occupied by the northern Mendel as being part of 
Koranko country, so that the latter nation must have preceded the 
Mondes as settlers in Sierra Leone". 
119. Rodney, His tar-ýr of the Urmet C }inea Coast, p. 53. 
120. Ibid., p. 59. See also the map on p. 57, which seems to suggest a 
different conclusions namely, that the Mcndebleisia were already living 
just east of their present homeland around 1545. 
121. Ibid., p. 60. 
122. Ibid., p. 58. 
123. Whether or not this description includes Luawa depends on the precise 
mileage which is understood in Rodney's phrase "at some distance 
inland". 
121,. Rodney, "A Reconsideration of the Mane invasions", p. 237. 
125. Person, "Ethnic Movements", p. 685. 
126. The present writer has found no evidence to indicate that in those 
days the Kissi and Bullom people spoke the Mandenyi language. M. Person 
does not give his sources for his comment. Murdock, op., ait.,, p. 265, 
noted the Mandenyi people as part of the Baga, "linguistic cousins" 
to the 'West Atlantic' peoples°of Sierra Leone, among whom are included 
the Kasai and Bullom (Sherbro) peoples. 
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127. Rodney, History of the Urnior Guinea Coast, p. 58. 
128. Ibid., pp. 58-59. The basis for this statement seems to be Little, 
The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 28; but Prof. Little gives no documen- 
tation for his assertion. 
129. Cf. Abraham, A., "Some suggestions on the origins of Mends Chiefdoms" 
in Sierra Leone Studies (n. s. ) No. 25 (July 1969) p. 36t "'The arrival 
of warriors from the north' ... is a theory that leaves much to be 
desired. The only northern factor known to me is the mori-man factor". 
130. See "A Note on the Secret Societies" in Vol. 2 of this thesis, pp. (n- Esq. 
131. D'Azevedo, W. L., "Some Historical problems in the Delineation of 
a Central West Atlantic Region" in The Anal of the New York 
Academv of Scienoa, 96 (Jan. 1962), map on p. 513. 
132. Migeod, A View of Sierra eon, pp. 203-211 
133. Ibid., p. 211. 
134. See map one. C0267/425/Conf. 22; Cardew; 7.4.96. Cardew does not 
express himself precisely in these words, but he set down on the map 
the boundary between tLuawa proper' and Kissi country. He found that 
Guabu was the easternmost Mende village, and eastwards from there was 
Kissi country. 
135. Hair, "Ethnolinguistic Continuity", p. 256. 
136. Kß, 2 or t2 in the Mende language can mean north or east, or 'up-country', 
depending on the context. It should be noted, however, that there is 
a clear distinction between Kao-Me de and Komende (see Migeod, AView 
of Sierra Leone, p. 1141 cf. McCullock, op. cit., p. 4 esp. Note 3; and 
Little, The Mende of Sie ra_Leone) p. 76). 
137. Mr. Abraham nowhere stated precisely what period his conclusions 
referred to, but his note that genealogies only go back five genera- 
tions at the most would suggest he is refering largely to the century 
before the beginning of the colonial period (see Note 108). 
138. Abraham, Traditional Le erehi, n, p. 22. Cf. Prof. 'Little's views on 
"the invasion of Mende country by conquering peoples from the north", 
probably before the sixteenth century: "all tradition agrees that these 
invaders forced their way into the country and waged war against anyone 
opposing their right to settle there" (The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 28). 
Prof. Little does not, however, give any reference as to where or from 
whom this tradition was collected. As regards Luawa, the scraps of 
tradition which exist for the centuries before the nineteenth would 
not all agree that such an invasion from the north ever took place. 
139. See Note 136 above. 
140. Abraham, "Origins of Mende Chiefdoms", p. 32. 
58 
111. British colonial officials in the Luawa area during the 1890s often 
referred to 'Sulu traders' in Luawa: but possibly these might more 
accurately have been described as Mandingo people. Officials, 
Creole clerks, and Frontier Police officers seemed easily confused 
about 'tribal labels'. 
142. Int. ]4. 
W. Mi is the def. sing. of mahan eisig (see Note 13 above). 
144. Int. 15. 
145. at. 10. 
146. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p. 1)3: "There was formerly only a 
very small population in this country, which began to develop after 
Kailundu came into what was really Mende country". See also Hollins, 
"Short History", p. 12t in Luawa, just before Kailondo's day, the 
population "was not as great as now. Towns were therefore set more 
widely apart". 
117. Sulu-Banya, op. cit., pp"1-2. 
148. Ibid., p. 3. 
1.49. Ibid., p. l+. Wotay was the great-grandfather of Jue Siangay, one 
of the favourite wives of Momoh Banya, son of Kailondo. 
150. Clarke, foundation of Luawa, p. 5s "Kailundu (or Kai as the people 
mostly call him) was the son of Dowi Komci of Lukono in the Wunde 
country across the River Moa, and Kefue Mambo of Komalu, near Mano 
Sewalu. Dowi Komzi had left his birthplace Lukono and had settled 
down with his wife's people at Kornalu". Governor Cardew noted that 
Kailondo's "grandfather SERI was a native of Bombali, but his father 
DUKONE left that district and settled in Kissi where Kai Lundu was 
born of one of his wives, named WUE, a native of MANO in Luawa; 
Kai Lundu resided in Kissi till his father having been murdered he 
went over to Luawa" (C0267%Gonf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from 
Kailahun). See also Report of Blakeney and Atkins concerning trouble 
between Luawa and Wunde, in which they state that Kailondo "was a 
Kissi by birth" (C0267/445/]. 0; Cardew; 16.1.99, enc. Blakeney and 
Atkins). See also Int. 19. 
151. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p. 108. 
152, Int. 10. 
153. Int. 22. 
154. KDOA, Pendembu District NW 87/1920: Subject; Claim to villages 
of Baiama, Tangobu, Potema, + Yabaima. Kissi Teng, Kissi Kama, and 
Luawa all claimed Tangobu: concerning the other villages, the dispute 
was between Kissi Tong and Luawa. 
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155, The administrative divisions or 'sections' (g is in the Mende 
language) of Luawa during the colonial period were apparently 
similar to the divisions which Kailondo adopted in ruling Luawa. 
These 'sections' may have been largely the same as the various small 
areas controlled by the different petty mahan¢Qis a who ruled in the 
area before Kailondo's accession. Gbeila section was one of the 
largest divisionst it contained the large villages of Gbalahun and 
Sandialu, and its headquarters town was Dodo-Cotuma (Int. 16). 
156. KDOA, Pendembu District NAMP 87/1920, enc. min. Bowden, 17-20.3.29, 
Petema Camp. Bowden's opinion is to be respected, because the elders 
of Luawa in 1972 seemed to remember him as the colonial official who 
best understood the area, and who gained more knowledge of it than 
perhaps any other European. By 1929 he had over 20 years experience 
of Koo.. Mcruie. 
157, int. 22. 
158. Joanna, T. E. relative of P. C. Ganava of Kissi Tang, in conversation 
at Kangama, April 1972. 
159. Mahawui in the Mende language has no exact synonym in English, 
although during the colonial period, and since, it was used to 
translate the English term 'Chiefdom'. MMah w may beat be under. 
stood as the area occupied by people who have given their allegiance 
to one particular mph ; or, more generally, polity, country, or 
political unit. 
160. &12 in the Mende language means little ('k' mutating to 'w' in 
the Mende language). 
161. Abraham, "Origins of Mende Chiefdoms", p. 32. 
162. See map opp. p. jq in this thesis. There are four villages in 
Kailahun District called Mendekelema. 
163, Morgan and Pugh, op. cit., pp. 178-179: "Many West African peoples ... 
have a tradition of movement towards the south-west". 
164. See this chapter of the thesis, Chapel, p. 16 above. In a recent paper 
Dr. Hair suggests that "the geographical distribution of languages 
along the coast has remained, in the main, unchanged in the documented 
centuries" - that is, since 1450 
/Hair, 
P. E. H., "The Contribution of 
Early Linguistic Material to the History of West Africa" in Dalbyýy D. 
(ed. ), Lan ua and Hi story' in Africa (Cass, London, 1970), r . 55- It is possible that the Mende-Kissi. linguistic boundary was established 
in approximately its present geographical position far earlier than the 
mid-nineteenth century, and we may suspect as inadequate and sometimes 
inaccurate "the writing up of moderately recent West African history in 
terms largely of distant 'tribal origins' and Völk2jjSnderu=" (ibid). 
But this does not invalidate the conclusion that in the Luawa area, in 
the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth, there was 
considerable movement of ma groups of peoples (often of those 
already settled in the area) over short distances. 
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165. For example, Sgt. Major Bangali Jibateh of the Kailahun Court 
Messenger Force migrated from Bamako to Kailahun in 1907, and 
returned again to Bamako in 1945 (Ints. 13 and 21). 
166. Person, "Ethnic Movements", p. 674. In the paper referred to in 
Note 164 above, Dr. Hair was fairly clearly criticizing the work, 
among others, of M. Person. In his article on "Ethnic Movements", 
M. Person replied to some of these criticisms. 
167. Commenting on one of Alldridge's 1890 despatches from Kam-Mende. 
Governor Hay regretted that "on none of the maps can If any of 
the countries in question 
( Luawa, Mando, Bambara, Damaj, but that, 
I take it, is no extraordinary as hey have probably never been 
visited before L i. e. by Europeans-/ " 
(C0267/38182; Hay; 3.5.90). 
Descriptions of pro-1880 Mende society, such as that in Little, lba 
Mende of Sierra Leone, pp. 25-30, are largely undocumented. Dr. Wylie 
believes that the ival in Iuawa of the first inhabitants "is not 
hard to imagine" lie, K. C., The Rglitira at s 
Indirect Rule-in Mende and AnA A unpub. Ph. D. thesis, Michigan 
State Univ., U. S. A., 1967 , p. 77 s but there is 
little in oral 
tradition and nothing, virtually, in written records about that 
arrival. 
168. One such extrapolation, which has seriously impeded an understanding 
of Luawa's history in the nineteenth century, may be cited as an 
example. Most writers on the history of the area have assumed that 
since the area beyond Luawa's northern and eastern boundaries was in 
considerable turmoil in the late nineteenth century, therefore war 
had been throughout the area' from time immemorial' an essential part 
of the peoples' way of life. This deduction seemed to be strengthened 
by the fact that on the coastal plain nearest to Luawa, in Sherbro and 
the Gallinas, 'trade wars' disturbed the peace throughout much of the 
nineteenth century. Yet there is not a shred of clear, specific 
evidence to demonstrate that in the area later ruled by Kailondo there 
was much warfare between c1800 and c. 1880, and the little evidence 
collected by the present writer rather points in the opposite direction. 
Historical extrapolations in the history of KoiL-&. Odq 
during the earlier nineteenth century have, moreover, often used the 
generalised testimonies of the first British visitors as their starting 
point. But these first British officials may be unreliable witnesses, 
because they were so preoccupied with extending the area occupied by 
the Freetown Government, and with a 'civilising mission'. Also, most 
of them were ignorant of the Mende language, and many were experiencing 
for the first time the 'culture ahock1=of meeting a society with an 
organization and set of values different from their own. Even 
T. J. Alldridge, who was relatively detached and objective in his 
writings, on occasion made serious factual mistakes in his reports 
(see Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 101-103 below). 
169. Atherton, 3. H., and Kalous, M., "Nomoli" in The Journal of African 
Hjg2U, XI, 3 (1970), pp. 3O3-317. The footnotes refer to most of the 
previously published articles on the subject, although the co-authors 
tend to treat the comments of observers like Thompson, Alldridge, Beatty 
and Anderson as unquestionably accurate. 
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170. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 1, pp. i3,31 above. 
171. Kup, op. cit., p. 122. 
172. Mr. Kup quotes a number of sources on this point (ibid., pp. 154-156). 
See also Trimingham, J. S., A History of Islam West r ca (oxford 
University Press, Oxford) 19,70). pp. 166-169, for the . 
Uhad in the 
Iota Djellon in the eighteonth century. Ibid., pp. 177-186, for the 
development of Muslim states in the Upper Niger basin in the nine- 
teenth century. 
173. M, ibia is the name used in the Mende language to describe Muslims 
in general. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 1, pp. 40"4I below. 
174, Kola-nuts and alcoholic drinks were widely used as stimulants in 
Luawa by the time of Alldridges there is little evidence that Muslim 
teachers seriously objected to these habits, although they contra- 
dicted koranic teaching. 
175. Fyfe C., Sierra Leone Inheritance (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1964), pp. 161-162. "Gallinasn was used to describe the area round 
the estuary of the Moa River, and the river itself was on occasion 
given the same name. 
176. Ibid., pp. 162-165. 
177. Rodney, History of the UAA9r Guinea-Coast, p. 259, quoting Atkins. 
Dr. Hair has argued that the considerable ethnolinguistic continuity 
on the Guinea Coast, for at least the last three or four centuries, 
contrasts with the impression which is often given that the 'Slave Trade' 
and 'Imperialism' produced "wholesale disturbance" in the area 
("Ethnolinguistic Continuity", p. 247). But Dr. Hair's views seem to 
presuppose that 'continuity' and disturbance' are antonyms, which in 
the context does not seem to be the case to the present writer. 
178. In 1894, Cardew noticed slaves being taken north-westwards from 
the Luawa area. "The chief market is the SUSU country", he wrote, 
but he did not indicate whether the slaves remained in Susu country 
or were later transported elsewhere (CO267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, 
from Waima). 
179. Person, "Ethnic Movements", p. 687. 
180. Kai is an affectionate di utive of the name Kai lor, dö. 
181. Clarke, "Foundation of Luawa",, p. 250.. 
182, KDQL, Pendembu District WAMP 87/1920. 
183. In an interesting article, Dr. Crosby argued that there vas a close 
link between the fnstitu ions of polygamy and slavery 
. 
in, the eoononics 
of upland-rice farming [ 
Crosby, 
K. H., "Polygamy in Mends Country' 
in Africa, %, 3 (July 1937), pp. 2/+9-264]. 
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l84. Komaha in the Mende language means war-leader, or Commander-In-Chief 
185. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa. p. 6. 
186. From a number of the interviews and conversations which the present 
writer had in the Luawa area, it seems that in 1927, when the British 
proclaimed the freeing of all slaves in the Protectorate, about half 
the freed slaves opted to stay with their former masters. If this 
was true in 1927, there is little reason why it should have been less 
so half a century earlier. 
157. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 3; Hollins, "Short History",, p, 12; 
Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp. 59-60. 
188. Mahanga is the indef. pl. of mahangggisia (see Note 13 above). 
189. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 3. 
190. Tam E in the Mende language means ruler or leader of a town. 
See 'Note on Political Terminology',, pp. 6etow. 
191. Int. 19. Regarding the way in which towns were established and villages 
expanded outwards into the surrounding countryside in Mendeland, see 
Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, ps. 26-27: his account accords well 
with Maada James Kailondo's description of what happened in Luawa. 
Yet another similar account is given in Fenton, Outline of Native raw 
in Sierra Leone, p. 3. 
192. KenE in the Mende language is roughly equivalent to the English 'Mr. ', 
though in some contexts it would better be translated as tSirf. It 
is a term of respect used in speaking to a mature man. 
193. Sewa, F., in conversation at Mano-Sewalu, April 1972. 
194. Int. 15. 
195. For a more detailed description of this development, see Chap-3 of 
this thesis, pp. 2m"S below. 
196. Rev. Lamb was apparently a Methodist missionary at Tikonko near Bo 
in the two decades before the Second World War. 
197. Lamb, A. C., AnýAnthr_ogo_1ogtca1.3uurve of the Mexi e Peorle of Sierra 
Ph. D. thesis, Univ. ofsLeeds, 
01946 
, p. 71. 
n ro e Pub, 
198. This is clearly the inference to be drawn from the comments of Rev. 
Clarke and Maada James Kailondo (see Notes 189 and 191 above). 
199. 'Largest human settlements' refers here to size of population (see 
Note 203 below). 
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200. Hollins, "Short History", p. 14" Of the towns mentioned in this list, 
only Gbalahun and Sandialu were o recognized later as 'headquarters 
towns' of a A&l or 'section'. 
201. int. 14. 
202. Int. 15. See also KDOA, loose papers relating to the election of a 
P. C. in Kissi Tungi, 1942, "Kai Tungi's claim", concerning the 
founding of Gbandewulo. 
203. The four 'missing' towns are Kailahun itself, Koindu, Baoma, and 
Bewabu. The other five towns were Buedu, Sandialu, Gbalahun, Ngiehun 
and Nyandehun. These nine towns all had over 1,000 inhabitants in 
1963 (1963 Census, Vol. 1, p. 16 - Nyandehun is misspelt and misplaced 
on the attached map). 
201.. Fakaigi in the Mende language means hamlets or small villages. 
205. For example, the 1_931 Census recorded for Kailahun District that 
farming "occupies almost the whole population. A number of other 
occupations are shown, but are of little importance" (p. 155). 
206. Church, op. cit., p. 99. See also Fyfe, C., "Peoples of the Winward 
Coast A. D. 1000-1800" in Ajayi and Espie, A Thousand Years of Wept 
African History. 
207. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, p. below. 
208. See Note 167 above. 
209. Clarke, Foundation of Luara0 p. 8. 
210, int. 14. 
2I1. Kulu-Banya, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
212. quoted Kup, op, cit., p. 182. 
213.00267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alidridge, 16.3.91, Kailahun. 
214. Int. 16. 
215, SLGA., Pan Bd um D ictss Io about aia Ch edm 
end Towns, 1906, p. 46- 
216. Alidridge, TheSherbro, and its Hinterland, p. 215- 
217. See Note 254 below. 
218. Int. 15. Perhaps significantly, all, these places wore in Kissi country. 
219. Clarke, Fodation of Luawa, p. 3. 
220, zeta. 14,15, and 19. 
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221, C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. A1ldridge, 16.3.91, Kailahun. 
222. The present writer was given several examples of Kissi pennies by 
various elders in Luawa, but they were rarely more than 12 inches long. 
223. C0267/389/239; Crooks (ag. Gov. ); 19.5.91, enc. A1ldridge, 24.4.91, 
Bonthe. 
2224, Alldridge noted the value of a single seven-pound package of salt 
as being "twenty irons, equal to is. 8d. in English money" (The Sherbro 
and its Hinterland, p. 217). However, since English currency had not 
been seen in the area up to that time, there was no established 'rate 
of exchanger, and the Travelling Commissioner's estimate must have 
been fairly notional. 
225. Ibid., p. 216. 
226. C0267/389%23 9; Crooks (Ag. Gov. ); 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, 
Bonthes "I was informed and so far as I could gather correctly that 
the Iron which forms the currency far inland was procured and smelted 
in KAWMEND and brought down" (pp. 55-56). 
227. Int. 10. 
228. Perham, M., Lu : The Years o Adventure 1858-1898 (Co]. l. ing, 
London, 1956 , p. 75. 
229. See Note 1 above. 
230. Various interpretations have been given to the word 'Kpove'. Rev. 
Clarke noted that the "word 'Kpovegoi' is derived from the words 
'Kpo' 've' and 'go' meaning, 'War of the dung pot', for into this 
cowardly warriors were wont to be cast" (Foundation of Luawa, p. 6). 
Combey, op. cit., p. 9, agreed with this, as did Hollins, "Short History", 
p. 12. Kulu-Banya suggested the name was given because frightened 
warriors tried to hide themselves in large earthern pots (op, cit., p. 14). 
Abraham, Traditional Leadershio, p. 63, largely accepts Clarke's 
explanation, but notes the possibility that cowardly warriors were 
forced to carry the dung-pots on their heads (Note 19, p. 88). Another 
su gestion is that the cowardly warriors were smeared with excrement ISimpson, 
D., "A Preliminary Political History of the Kenema Area" 
in Sierra Leone Studie_s (n. s. ) No. 21 (July 1967), p. 561 
231. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 6; Gorvie, op. oit., p. 42; Abraham, 
Traý onal Leader shin,. pp. 63-64. 
232. Kugbei is the def. sing. form of 1ko u ba (see Note 4 above). 
233. See Clarke, Foundation of Luawg, p. 6 and Hollins, "Short History", p. 15. 
The fullest description of Ndawa'a early life is to be found in 
Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp. 61-64. See also Little, 2]2e-Mende 
of Sierra Leone, pp. 75-76. 
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234. Abraham, Traditional Leadership. p. 63; Little, The Mende of Siege 
Leone, p. 75; Gorvie, op. cit., p. 50, Hollins, "Short History", p. 15. 
235. Simpson, op. cit., considered that the war lasted at least 6 years, 
and possibly a decade or more altogether. 
236. Gau is a 'section' in present-day Luawa Chiefdom, and contains the 
villages of Sengema, Jengba]1u, and Batwoma. The headquarters town 
of the section is Bewabu (see Note 155 above), 
237. Guma country lay south of the Magowi River, south of Gau in Luawa. 
Its chief town was Hornalu in present-day Dia Chiefdom (see Information 
about varioas Ch AmT, p. 46: "Domaru. Capital of 
Guma Chiefdom" 
238. KDU, Pendembu District 128/1927; Subject: Transfer of Pendembu 
District H. Q. to Kailahun, enc. Petition from P. C. Momoh Banya to 
His Excellency the Governor - re. the moving of District Headquarters 
to Kail. ahun. 
239. Simpson, op. cit., Note, p. 55: "Accounts of Darwah's war at Bandajuma 
may be found in colonial office Despatches 205 and 331 (1886)". 
240. Clarke, Foundation of Wawa. P. 7s ".. 9 they set out to drive Gbenya. 
from Lowoma in Kono, burning and ravaging the whole of the country". 
241.. Many traditions suggest that Benya of Blama raided the territory of 
Makavoray of Tikonko, just vest of the Sewa, and that this prompted 
Ndawa to begin the Kpove War by replying in kind (Abraham Tg itton 1 
Leadership; p. 64; Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 75). 
242. Kat1ondo kce Nd. awa, p. 30, for Ndawats fight against Ngevau of Malema. 
243. Int. 19. 
244. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 1 4 below. 
245 A1ldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p. 182. ALtdridge was 
considerably less extravagant in his opinions than some of his 
contemporaries. Cf. Wallist C. B., The . AdvAnre of our West rAfica,, Empire (Unwire, London, 1903), passim. 
246. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 1, pp. 36.31 below. 
247. The written records and oral traditions suggest that Ndawats only 
fixed base was the town of Wends (or Wunde) west-south-west of Tikonko, 
and north-east of Bandajuma, close to the Waanje River (see Note 234 
above). This was resumably the same town which was destroyed by 
Garrett in 1889 
see 
Fyfe, C., AHo5e eon (Word Univ. 
Press, Qcford, 1962), pp. 483-48 
248. Simpson, op. cit., pp. 55-56, indicates that the Kpove War was by far 
the worst war of all those remembered in oral tradition in the Kenema 
area. 
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249. For a fuller discussion of the presuppositions of the British officials 
who visited the Luawa area in the 1890s, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, 
pp. q5 - ioo below. Whatever reasons were officially given in London 
and Freetown for the extension of British control in the Sierra Leone 
hinterland, the men on the spot who actually made the Treaties with 
the mahananisia and established the'Protectorate saw their own efforts 
as part of a civilising mission. 
250. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 28. 
251. Wylie, "Mende Chieftaincy", p. 297. 
252. Malcolm, J. M., "Mende Warfare" in Sierra Leone Studies (o. s. ) No. 21 
(Jan. 1939i. 
253. Cf. the disproportionately large part which memories of the Two World 
Wars played in the storytelling of older Euro-American men in the 
1950s and 1960s. 
254. For extracts from officials' reports, and some comment on the situa- 
tion, see Fyfe.. Sie ra Leong Inheritace. Chap. 12, "The Era of the 
Trade Wars", pp. 226-252. 
255. This is the sort of 'traditional' warfare described by Rev. Clarke, 
Foundation of Luawa, pp. 4-5, and by Mr. Malcolm, "Mende Warfare". 
256. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinteremd, p. 182. 
257. Ibid., p. 166. 
258. Fenton, aAtlina of Native Law in Sierra Leone, p. 1. 
259. Clarke, Faundation of Luaus, p. 3. 
260. Admittedly oral traditions concerning events before 1880 are very 
scanty about all subjects, but presumably a serious war would at least 
have received a mention. 
261. Ibid., p. 7. See also Gorvie, op. cit., p. 42; and Abraham, Traditional 
Leadership, pp. 65-66. 
262. Hollins, "Short History", p. 12; Int. 19. Some of the differences 
between the Clarke account and the Hollins account are mentioned by 
Abraham, A. And Isaac, B., " "A Further Note on the History of Luawa 
Chiefdom" in $ieý Leone Studies (n. s. ) No. 24 (Jan. 1969), pp. 69-74. 
263. So many narrative accounts of Kailondots accession have been published 
that the present writer felt it was unnecessary to add to them, but 
has concentrated rather on an analysis of the reasons for Kailondo's 
accession, and the manner by which he came to power: these points 
have not previously been considered. 
264. Gorvie, op. cit., p. 42, suggests (though he does not precisely state) 
that the initiative for the whole conference came from Bundu. 
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265. Clarke, Foundation o Luaw , p. 11s "Kaits great friend, Bondo, the spokesman of the other chiefs at Gbondo and Ngiyehun8'. See 
also Abraham, Tradi onal Leadereh4 , p. 67. 
266. Gorvie, op. cit., p. 1+2. 
267, Int. 19. 
268. Fabundeh succeeded Kailondo as Mahawai of Luawa with British 
approval in March 1896. Sanjiggi is not a Mende word at all, but 
comes from the Temne language see A1ldridge, A Transformed Coles 
(See 
, London, 1910), p. 191; and Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, 
p. 26J Sjjntizpi referred to the Mm's chief adviser and deputy 
and is represented in the Morde language by the word Lavale. 
Presumably S 
, 
ii was introduced into the Luawaarea by British 
officials who had previously worked in Temneland (see 'Note on Political Terminology'). Ngobeh Kahunla himself became Paramount 
Chief of Luawa in 1916. 
269. SLGA, Pendenibu Dist gt Int fligenee Book, p. 79. Hollins., "Short 
Histoxy", p. 12, agrees that the initiative in calling the meeting 
came entirely from Kailondo. The various accounts of how the Gbondou 
meeting came to be called are summarized by Abraham, Traditions]. 
Leadershit,. p. 67. 
270. The present writer would, in general, take the Clarke account as the 
most accurate of all the written records. 
271. The natural word in the Mende language to use at this point would be 
kpakoisia, meaning 'the important people of the area'. Unfortunately, 
imakoisia has no accurate synonym in English (see Note 83 below). 
272. Sakabu was the village which stood on the site of present-day lailahun (see Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 10). 
273. Kulu-Banya, op. cit., p. 12. 
274. Combey, op. cit., p. 10. 
275. Mahaw in the Mende language may be translated in'English by auch 
words as overlord, supreme ruler, great leader. YA in the Mende 
language means large or great (see 'Note on Pol. itioal. Terminology'). 
Dr. Wylie noted that Bundu of 'Uanyahun was a Adomaha, and that. 
Kailondo was the r, hei of Luawa ("Mende Chieftaincy", pp. 303-304). This is a serious anachronism. The present writer could find no 
evidence in either written records or oral tradition that ,, mated was used as a title before the colonial period. M James Kailondo, 
in conversation with his own son James and with Moiwo Lahai, noted 
that the term }ldp" m was not employed before the colonial period (letter to the present writer from Lahai, M. A., 19.9.81, Freetown). 
, 
Rev. Clarke also agreed that this term was. not. in use-in Luawa before 
the arrival of the British (Int. l). 
276. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 1, pp. U-34. above. 
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277. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 75; and Abraham, Traditional 
Leadership pp. 61-63. 
278. In a reconstruction such as this, there is bound to be a degree of 
conjecture, and a number of unanswered questions. For instance, was 
there any other warrior in and around Luawa who would have been 
willing and able to lead the combined forces of the area against 
Ndawa? But the interpretation given here seems reasonable, and is 
consistent with the known facts. 
279. Combey, op. cit., p. 10. The Combey NS is at many points, probably, 
unreliable, but at this point it 'rings true'. See Clarke, Foundation 
o Law , p. 7, for previous connections between 
Ndawa and Kailondo. 
280. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 67, quoting the late Pa Gbimottor. 
281, Int. 19. 
282. Dr. Wylie has attempted a direct comparison between Samori's Empire 
and Kailondo's Luawa ("Mende Chieftaincy", pp. 3 03,3 07). But Samori's 
Empire was much larger., with a far more highly organized bureaucracy, 
than Kailondo's Luawa. The two polities were also in different 
geographical natural regions. Samori placed considerable reliance 
on his mounted sofas, whereas the vegetation of Luawa limited the 
usefulness of horsemen, and the area was unsuitable for horses since 
sleeping-sickness was endemic. For a brief outline of Samori's career 
and his Empire, see Person, Y.., "Guinea-Samorin in Crowder, M. (ed), 
West African-Resistance: 
--the military response-to colonial 
occupation 
Hutchinson, London, 1971), pp. 111-143. 
283. For examples of how close the oýfas came to Luawa, and their possible 
influence on events in Luawa, see Chap. 2 of this thesis, ps. 
below. 
284. AUdridge, A Transformed Colony, pp. 177-180, for eome details about 
Nyagua. See also Vivian, W., MtrLdIland Memories. Reflections and 
Anticipations (United Moth. Pub. Ho., London, n. d. , pp. 144.53 and 
Simpson, op. cit., pp. 54-58. The best account so far of Nyagua'o 
Panguma is to be found in Abraham, Traditional Lead rsh , Chap. V, 
pp. 92-118. 
285. The great influence of Mendegla was noted by A1ldridge (CO806/325/248; 
Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90; quoted in Fyfe, Sierra Leone 
Inheritance. pp. 246-248). 
286. Easmon, M. C. F., "Madam Yoko, Ruler of the Mende Confederacy" in 
Sierra Leone Studies (n. s. ) No. 11 (Dec. 1958). The best account of 
Madam Yoko's polity is to be found in Abraham, Traditional Leadership, 
Chap. 6, pp. 119-163. 
287. Edward Blyden once visited Bopolu and wrote a full description of the 
polity. 
288. Alldridge, TheSherbro and its Hinterl , pp. 227-234. 
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289. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 1, pp. 14-21 above. 
290. See Note 263 above., and also Note 1 above. 
291. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp. 8-9; Hollins, "Short History", p. l4, 
Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 68. 
293. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 10; Hollins, "Short History", p. 15; 
Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp. 70-71. Dr. Wylie, "Mende Chief- 
taincy",, pp. 3 C1-302, introduced one or two erroneous details: Ngiehun, 
which he spells as 'Geihun', is ngt now known as Mende; the latter is 
a village about 4 miles east of Ngiehun. Ndawa's forces were driven 
back to Folu, near the River Moa, not to Baoma: the details of the 
manoeuvres make it unlikely that they reached Baoma. Concerning the 
details of Ndawa's retreat, the Clarke and Hollins accounts again 
differ slightly. Rev. Clarke believed Ndawa was driven across the 
Moa River near Manowa, not near Folu, and also noted that Ndawa later 
returned and there was more fighting before Ndawa begged from Kailondo 
his wife and son who had been held as hostages. Mr. Hollins made no 
mention of this further fighting, but says "Dawa then went back to 
Wunde, south of Blama and troubled Luawa no more" after he had made a 
request for Kailondo to return his wife and child, to which Kailondo 
agreed. 
294. Gorvie, op. cit., p. 50s "he was ... more spoken of in the Kpove Goi 
than any other warrior". Abraham, Tradition Leadership, p. 61, 
quoting Kallon, Y. H., an informant, stateds "Ndawa was again greater 
than Nyagua". Nyagua on his own never achieved his desire of destroying 
Ndawa'e stronghold at Wende. 
295. See, for example, Wylie, Politics of Trans ormation, p. 95, where he 
stated that Kailondo "was ruler of Luawa because he was a military 
leader". 
296. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp. $, 10; Hollins, "Short History", p. 15, 
mentioned only the ceremony at Ngiehun, but noted that oaths of 
allegiance were sworn at Gbondou. Gorvie, op. cit., pp. 42-l4; Abraham, 
Traditional Leadership, pp. 69-71. Maada James Kailondo (Int. 19) 
believed the second meeting was held at Nyandehun, and not Ngiehun. 
297. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 8, 
298. Hollins, "Short History", p. 15. 
299, Kulu_Banya, op. cit., p. 7. 
300. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp. 3-4; Int. 1. See also C0267/38/133; 
Hay; 15.3.91, enc. AUdridge, 12.2.91, Kailahuns Momo Babawo and 
Kailondo settled a dispute by shaking hands "together in front of me 
over a piece of white cloth, country-fashion", While being aware of 
the danger of far-fetched parallels, it seems worth comparing this 
use of white cloth with a custom of the Mane invaders during the third 
quarter of the sixteenth centurys "when the Manes appeared before a 
given village, they would send an embassy bearing cloth and arms. ' To 
accept was to recognize Mane suzerainty" (Rodney, "A Reconsideration 
of the Klan invasions", p. 225). 
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301, Kailondo kee Ndawa, p. 30- 
302. Simpson, op. cit., p. 56. 
303. Combey, op. cit., p. 10; Hoollins, "Short History", p. 14. 
304. Mr. Hollins (ibid. ) noted that they were shut up in a house for 
seven days, but Rev. Clarke (FQundation of Luawa, p. 8) mentioned 
seven Muslims for an indefinite period. This suggests an error of 
translation in one of the accounts. Abraham, Traditional Leadersh , 
p. 67, follows Hollins. 
305. Rangs-aoi in the Mende language has also been translated as 'the war 
of those who refused' i. e. those who refused to swear allegiance to 
Ndawa (Hollins, "Short History", p. 14). Kama can mean 'rebellion' 
or 'refusal to obey'. 
306. Mr. Hollins (ibid. ) noted it was the Muslims who made the ceremony 
with the snake, which suggests syncretism between Islam and traditional 
religion. See also Clarks, Foundation of Luawa, p. 8; and Abraham, 
Traditional Leadershiu, p. 67. 
307. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. l, ppan"idabove. 
308. See, for example, Alldridge, "Wanderings in the Hinterland of Sierra 
Leone" in The Geo _ranhical 
Journal., IV (1894). 9 pp. 136-137; and 
The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp. 103-105. See also Wallis, The 
Advance of our West African Empire, p. 232. 
309. See Innes, 
_Mende. 
EnplishDictionarv, p. 87; also Int. l. 
310. See Note 172 above. 
311. See Note 282 above. Bisandugu, the first capital of Samoriss Empire 
was only about 200 miles north of Luawa. 
312. See Chap. 5 of this thesis, PF . 321 -'3%4 below. 
313. The information summarized in this Note on Political Terminology came 
from a large variety of sources, but particularly helpful wore the 
interviews with Rev. W. R. E. Clarke (Int. l) and with Maaaa James 
Kailondo (Int. 19). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
KAILOIJDO'S LUAIIA, 1880 TO 18961 
EXTERNAL SECURITY. 
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Luawa's peace, integrity and prosperity were threat- 
ened several times during Kailondo's reign by external farces. In his 
response to these threats, far from indulging mindlessly in warfare "for 
its own sake" (1), Kailondo consistently sought the welfare of his own 
people. The Luawa people were affected between 1880 and 1896 by four main 
external sources of tension. In roughly chronological order these weret 
disturbances following the Kpove War; penetration of the area by Samori 
Toure's sofas; the arrival of Europeans, both French and British; and 
Kafula. 's rebellion in Wunde. Of these four threats, the last three began 
to affect Luawa almost simultaneously about the year 1890 (2). 
Kailondots handling of 'external affairs' during 
his fifteen-year reign suggest that he worked on two fairly fixed principles, 
possessing a definite external policy. These two principles weres a deter- 
mination to maintain peace within the borders of his own polity (3); and a 
desire to develop alliances with strong surrounding polities. While almost 
any territorial ruler would make the first principle a point of external 
policy, Kailondo seems to have pursued his objective with more than ordinary 
tenacity. In an oath taken at Ngiehun at the time of his accession, he had 
promised not to remain idle while war was near the people of Luawa (4), and 
he kept this promise with great seriousness. The second principle was not 
always easy to apply, because at different times during his reign, Kailondo 
had to face provocative behaviour from the rulers of Gaura, Upper Bambara 
and Mando (5). If Kailondo had been intent on purposeless, continual war- 
fare, these polities would have suffered the brunt of his raida$ they were 
easily within striking distance; they gave him good cause to attack them; 
and also they presented him with no great military problem. He was more 
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militarily powerful than any other leader in Ko-. Mende, with the possible 
exception of Nyagua. (6); Upper Bambara and Mando, if not Gaura, were 
puny by comparison (7). One of the best proofs that Kailondo did not 
wage war indiscriminately, and that warfare was not his "principal form 
of activity and institution" (6) is to be seen in Kailondo's virtual 
refusal to direct his forces against Upper Bambara or Mando (9). If he 
did fight against Mendegla of Gaura, the peace treaty which was soon 
agreed between them was never broken thereafter (10). 
Kailondo sometimes took a necessary diplomatic 
initiative (11), undertook a war of conquest (L2), or engaged in a 
prophylactic raid (13). On the one hand, it would be incongruous to 
consider such actions as part of some 'master plan' which Kailondo had 
evolved concerning external affairs (]4); but on the other hand these 
. were not simply purposeless acts of a ruler who engaged in war for its 
own sake, nor were they mere reactions to external pressures. If he deli- 
berately involved his people in any fighting, he generally had clear, 
limited, attainable objectives, and his actions squared with the two 
considorations which underlay his external policy. 
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1,, THE AFTERMATH OF THE KPOVE WAR . 
The crisis produced by the Kpove War in the Luawa. 
area had brought Kailondo to power and he had to consolidate his position 
within Luawa during the aftermath of that war. In the disturbed post-war 
period, there was a connection between external threats from various 
Kpove War leaders and attempts at rebellion by some minor Luawa k, aalcoi i. 
This connection was most clearly seen in the Gbande War which by all 
accounts was the most serious and wide-ranging war fought by Kailondo (15). 
Unfortunately the chronology for this period is uncertain: Rev. Clarke 
suggested that the Gbande War took place only a matter of months after 
Kailondots accession (16), but Mr. Hollins gave a date of c. 1889 (17). 
The present writer has largely followed the Hollins chronology (18). 
Mr. Hollins indicated that the first serious incident 
involving Kailondo after his accession was a war between Upper Bambara, and 
the people of Mando and Gaura (19). Pendembu, the headquarters town of 
Bambara, was burnt and many of its people were carried off by Mondegla and 
Bubu, the Gaura leaders (20). he Momo Babahu of Bambara appealed to 
Kailondo for help, and the latter advised Mendegla.. to return the captives, 
which he did. This diplomatic victory of Kailondo meant there was no 
fighting, and he returned to Kailahun (21). A different' account, given 
by P. C. Momoh Banya, clearly stated that this whole incident was part of 
the Kpove War, and suggested Mendegla`only withdrew after'-fighting with 
Kailondo (22). Yet another account showed Mendegla. and Kailondo acted as 
allies in later years, although it stated that there had &merly "boon "a 
dispute between them: Kabba Sei, N1 he of'Mandö, -had peacefully settled=' 
this dispute (23). Whether the help Kailondo rendered Mömo Babahu was ý< 
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purely diplomatic, or was military as well, the Mahe, of Upper Bambara 
was so grateful that he gave Kailondo his daughter as wife (24). From 
then on, until after the death of Kailondo, Upper Bambara was virtually 
a satellite of Luawa (25). Momo Babahu was pleased to have the protec- 
tion of Kailondo, and gained concessions from his powerful neighbour 
such as permission to cross the Keya River and build towns on land which 
had previously belonged to Luawa (26). 
This incident shows how the ruler of Luawa used 
the disturbances of the post-Kpove War period skilfully to build up the 
strength of his polity. By giving help to a weak neighbour, Kailondo 
placed him in a position of moral obligation. A marriage alliance (27) 
and a grant of land sealed the friendship; but from Homo Babahu's viewpoint, 
the relationship was more one of vassalage than friendship. Quite possibly, 
all this was achieved without Kailondo involving himself in any war. On 
other occasions, too, he extended his power and influence in this way with- 
out recourse to warfare. For example, Kai Kai, who was a Mahl with 
influence in present-day Kissi Tungi, and lived at Gbandewulo (28), came 
peacefully to the Luawa }ahci and "agreed to sit down under him" (29). 
On numerous occasions, Kailondo was called into neighbouring countries 
as an arbiter to settle disputes between two mah , because he was such 
a respected and powerful leader that both sides would=accept his advice 
(30)9 Presumably in the aftermath of the-Kpove War there was much need 
for such a figure, and his role as arbiter would naturally give`him consider- 
able influence in the territory concerned. 
Kailondo did, not oxtend his authority , by peacotui. 
means alone. He made war on Towei of Tongas, and compelled that country 
to recognize his suzerainty-, -which--it continued to do until his-douth (31). 
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Towei had attended the Gbondou conference (32) but had, it seems, subse- 
quently refused to accept Kailondo's overlordship, thus provoking the 
latter to wage war on him. Likewise, Kailondo's influence in southern 
Kono was established by means of a war which started as a raid against 
mahei Manye of Walihun. Presumably this was fairly early in the former's 
reign, since both Clarke and Hollins mentioned it as one of his first 
wars (33): according to P. C. I omoh Banya's account, this was was in fact 
one of the Kpove Wars (31+). Whether Manye first provoked Kailondo or 
vice versa is not clear (35), but in either case Kailondo seemed ready 
to take a military offensive. He drove Manye out of his own country, and 
soon after, the latter died. Kailondo later saw the opportunity to 
extend his control over a large portion of the southern Kono people (36): 
he captured Manyo's successor, Kapeta, and held him prisoner at Bobobu 
near Kailahun (37). Kapeta remained a prisoner for more than four years, 
and was only released in mid-1895 (38) after Governor Cardew had pressed 
Kailondo to do-so (39). Soon after Kapetats capture, Nyagua and Kailondo 
met "at Beru in the Bane Chiefdom and the two divided Kono country, betwoon 
them as far north as the Bafi River" (40). ý, 
Kailondo's actions in Kono country provido,, a; good . a. 
example of how he combined war and diplomacy in a -fairly. careful. and, -: h ;_ 
disciplined way. In the war against Manye and the capture., of Kapeta, 48 ;,.. 
achieved a definite self-imposed and limited goalt,. hoý, eat£tblishod hip-,.. 
military supremacy in south-east Kono, thus, decreasing the possibility--, `. 
of Luawa being disturbed by aggression from-that dirootion. ,. i But -, 
this 
created a new political situation in, which, there,. was increaced; 'possibility 
of conflict with Nyagua, whose influence was ; supreme. 
in, south-wost Kono 
(41). He therefore reached agreement-withz'_Nya, gua on tsphoraa; of.. influence' 
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in the area, and thus initiated a period of fruitful co-operation with 
the other most powerful leader in Ko-Mende (42). Likewise, before the 
war began Kailondo had made sure that friendly relations existed between 
himself and mahei Gobe of Pe je (43). Pe je lay just west of Luawa, and a 
surprise flank attack could easily have been launched from there against 
Kailondo while he was preoccupied with the war against Manyo. 
The co-operation between Kailondo, Nyagua and the 
other established rulers of Ko-rude lasted not only through the post- 
Kpove War period, but to the end of Kailondo's reign (44). There were 
occasional disagreements between Kailondo and Nyagua, as in 1892 (45); 
and by about 1895 relations between them had grown somewhat cold (46). 
But right up to the time of Kailondo's death the alliance was not broken 
(47), and Nyagua. may have attended Kailondo's funeral ceremonies (48). 
"Up to. the time of the Treaty (with the British in 18902, the three 
important chiefs of the Upper Mondes were Nyagua, Kabba Sei, and Kailondo. 
The general desire to acquire new lands and extend their influence bred 
ill-feeling among them at one time or another. They never, however, came 
into actual conflict with each other, and the differences between them 
were easily settled and did not develop into feuds" (49). Such would seem 
to be an accurate description of political relationships, except that the 
next most powerful Mahei in the area after Nyagua and Kailondo was probably 
not Kabba Sei but Mendegla of Gaura(who was succeeded in 1891 by Kpate 
Kaka (50)]. The peace and good order which Mendegla attempted to introduce 
in 1890 into the land lying between his territory of Gaura and the Atlantic 
coast (51) were already established between himself and the other principal 
rulers of Ko- de. 
In the mid-1880s (52), the good effect of these 
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peaceful relations between the established rulers of the area (53) began 
to be felt, and, as the Kpove War disturbances began to subside, the 
ordinary people were able to return to a more settled way of life. This 
is illustrated by the return of mahe Fabe (54) to his own country. He 
was mahe of Lingo-Bongo country (55) - sometimes known as Upper Koundou 
(56) - north of Wunde 
(57), but had fled to the area round the Mafissa 
River when Ndawa and Kailondo invaded Kono country early in the Kpove War 
(58). The Mafissa people objected to the presence of Fabe, and some of 
his followers were enslaved. So he appealed for help to Kailondo, who 
came and burned the towns of Mafissa country, forcing the inhabitants to 
flee eastwards across the Mafissa River (59). Possibly this alliance between 
Fabe and Kailondo, and the return of the former to his homeland, was 
associated with simultaneous fighting between Kailondo and the people of 
Wunde Tungi (which was sometimes called Upper Wunde (602. Kailondo and 
Fabe, having driven their enemies across the Mafissa River, followed them 
as far as -place called Yarokuru before returning to their homes (61). 
Fabe, once again established in Lingo-Bengo, "presented Kai with mazer 
gifts" (62), suggesting that he recognized Kailondo as overlord (63). 
Ultimately, then, the outworking of the Kpove Wars 
produced the conditions for settled peace in Kz-Mcndes several organized 
polities developed (notably Nyaguass Panguma and Kailondo'a Luawa), and 
their leaders were ready to co-operate with each other in the maintenance 
of law and order throughout the area. Unfortunately, for a number of years 
their attention had to be directed mainly towards resisting external 
aggression. One main aggressor was Mbawulomeh (64), who had entered the 
country as one of Ndawars warriors in 1880 (65). Thereafter he settled at 
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Ngiehun in Guma, south of the River Magowi (66), and from that place caused 
considerable trouble, taking advantage of disturbed conditions east and 
south of Luawa (67). Therefore, the war which Kailondo and his neighbours 
had to wage against him may be considered an extension of the Kpove War 
disturbances. This war against Mbawulomeh was generally remembered as the 
Gbande War (or occasionally as the Mbawulouioh War). It began when, about 
1889 (68), Mbawulomeh entered the Gag area of Luawa, burning among other 
places Gondama (69), Talia (70), and Nyandehun (71). At Nyandehun he 
killed Bundu of tjanya. hun, who had been spokesman at the Gbondou Conference 
(72). This was the only time between the accession of Kailondo and his 
death in 1896 that there was serious fighting within Luawa (73). Mbawulomeh 
was invited to enter Luawa by Manjakewa. and Jobo of Gierna, and Fagbandi of 
Sakabu, who in 1880 had sided with Ndawa against Kailondo, and had apparently 
never been entirely reconciled to Kailondots rule (74). Kailondo had these 
traitors executed (75), whereafter he set off in pursuit of Mbawulomeh. 
Before setting out after Mbawulomeh, Kailondo made 
sure he had the support, or at least the neutrality, of those rulers whose 
mahawuisia were closest to Mbawulomeh's town of Ngiehun - the rulers of Dia, 
Malema, Mando and Upper Bambara (76). The Luawa Mahei was assured that they 
would not oppose him, and in fact Mahangcisia Pambu and Ngevau even joined 
Kailondo in his attack on Mbawulomeh (77). Mendegla of Gaura may also have 
given some support (78). This provides another illustration of Kai]. ondo'u 
attitude to warfare: far from being a haphazard affair, easily and frequently 
embarked upon, war involved careful calculations. His response to Mbawul, o- 
meh's assault on Gau was to drive the raider out of the area - and if he 
could have caught Mbawulomeh he would no doubt have killed him - because, 
like his former master Ndawa, Mbawulomah lacked a strong territorial base (79), 
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and seemed ready at anytime to engage irresponsibly in raids for the 
plunder he might gain. There seemed only one way to deal with such a 
freebooter. Yet how could Kailondo be cure of not antagonizing neighbour- 
ing rulers ? His answer was to concert his own actions with theirs. 
When Kailondo destroyed Ngiehun, Mbawulom©h fled 
through Vahun in Guma to Gbande-speaking Vassa, country, where mahe Teye 
of Kamat'ahun gave him shelter (80). When Teye refused to hand over 
Mbawulomeh, Kailondo attacked and conquered Vassa. Mbawulomeh and Teye 
then fled to mahp-i Fobewuru of Jene. Fobewuru also refused to give up 
Mbawulomeh, so he in turn was attacked, and was himself killed in the 
fighting (81). "Having buried Fobewuru.. Kailundu sot out yet further 
on his chase and crossed the rivers Loffa and Langlira (St. Paul's ?) and 
so reached Lanbumbu in the Gbele country, where the people were cannibals. 
Bau-wuru-me fled again to the Peje country, where the people too ate 
human flesh. Then Bau-wuru-me gained the Buyama. country in the heart of 
Liberia and here the long hunt ended since all further trace of Bau-wuru-mo 
was lost" (82). 
On his homeward way, a number of Gbande mphanc cisia 
gave some sort of allegiance to Kailondo (83), and he "made Fabanna Farra. 
Chief over Massa, Kelfa over Popalahun and Molifo over Botemba" (84). In 
the mahawuisia immediately south and east of 'Greater Luawa' the Gbande War 
gave Kailondo virtually direct control. For example, in 1892 Alldridge 
noted that Jenagure of Kambahun in Mando Javaiama (85) was, as a result 
of the Gbande War, "indebted to Ki Lundu for his position in the country 
today" (86). For some time after the War, Jenagure acknowledged Kailondo 
as overlord, and these two, together with Jama Poto of Upper Gola "had 
sworn not to put war on each other" (87). Since the Luawa Mahei had just 
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proved his military supremacy in the area, the oath was taken, presumably, 
at his own initiative. Thus Ka. ilondo used his victory, to secure the 
adoption of a limited 'peace treaty' (88) aimed at preventing future 
war. 
In summary, then, the Gbande War led to greater 
hopes of peace in the area east and south of Wawa (89), because the 
disturbing presence of Mbawulomeh had been removed, and Kai. londo's peace- 
able political influence had been extended. The latter also materially 
increased his possessions, gaining "wives, slaves, cattle, many cloths 
and a carronade" (90). an this expedition, Kailondo travelled further 
afield than on any other, and not surprisingly it is better remembered 
in oral tradition than any other incident of Kailondo's reign before the 
arrival of the Europeans (91). The fact that he could move in war a 
hundred miles from his base (92) demonstrated his military power; it also 
indicated the stability he had built up within Luawa in the decade since 
his accession and the security of his relations with neighbouring rulers. 
Military strength, internal, stability and external security were closely 
linked. Internal stability largely arose from the Luawa peoples' awareness 
that they would not be attacked by surrounding rulers, and that those rulers 
would not support rebellion within Luawa. But surrounding rulers respected 
and avoided attacking Kailondo's Luawa partly because of his military 
strength. Hence Luawa knew peace; and even though in the immediate hinter- 
land of Freetown and Bonthe "the country at large" was "in a very disturbed 
state" (93), that description was not true of Kailondols Luawa. 
Two years after the Gband. e War (94), around 1891, 
Kissi Tengea was invaded by mahoi Sungba of Luangkoli, a mmh wui east of 
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Luawa. Towei of Foya, mmhF of Kissi Tengea (95), and Ngegba of Buedu 
(96) asked Kailondo for help. He defeated and killed Sungba, with the 
result that the people of Luangkoli - (97) accepted Kailondo is overlordship, 
and their land became part of 'Greater Luawa' (98). It would seem likely 
that this war was related to the disturbances caused by Mbawulomeh, because 
the war occurred at roughly the same time and in the same area as other 
fighting provoked by Mbawulomeh after the Gbande war (99). By this time, 
too, any fighting to the east of Luawa would probably involve the Kpandeme 
'oal (100), and there were also in the area several komaanRa who were 
operating independently of both Luawa and Kpandem© (101). 
Although Mbawulomeh had been defeated and deprived 
of a territorial base in the Gbande War, he was still at large in the 
hinterland of Monrovia. He never again crossed Luawa's borders during 
Kailondo's reign, but the Luawa Mahei was involved in a number of minor 
wars - raids might be a better description (102) - beyond Luawa's boundaries 
which occurred partly because of Mbawulomeh's activities. The *Gbolo' 
people (103), at Mbawulomeh's instigation, carried war into Gbande country, 
planning to go on to Luawa; but the Gbande mahe Fagbalfa received Kailondo's 
help in driving the Gbolo people away. Many people were killed in this war, 
possibly because much of the fighting "was done with guns" (1Q4). It would 
be tempting to read into this last comment a reference to the spread of 
firearms in this area, with all the socio-economic implications that might 
follow. But one isolated comment, unsubstantiated by other evidence, is 
an inadequate base for extensive theorizing. 
The Kissi and Gbande people reported to Kailondo 
that the Gbolo people had been helped by the 'PNdama' and 'Jewelehu' 
peoples. So the Luawa armed forces raided both these areas and subjugated 
83 
them, though at the cost of numbers of Kailondo's own men (105). The 
subjugation of Ndama was not, however, permanent. Kailondo left some 
of his own kpakoiaia there, including Langama, Koi Bundor and Bundor 
Foryoh (106). Before long the people of Ndama prepared a counter-attack 
in which the small detachment of Kailondo'a men was driven out and had 
to flee for their lives (107). This illustrates the difficulties of 
developing a large proto-state in this area without a fairly strong 
bureaucracy. Lines of communication with places more than about thirty 
miles from the centre were almost inevitably inadequate for the ruler to 
deal personally with a sudden military or political emergency (108). The 
disturbances beyond Luawa's eastern boundaries continued for a number of 
years (109), but by 1894 Kailondo was beginning to suffer from some 
serious sickness (110), and was unable to go on the raid against Jewelehu, 
which may have occurred late in 1895 (111): he probably died in the early 
months of 1896 (112), 
Right to the end of his reign, than, Kailondo had 
to remain on guard against the disturbing aftermath of the Kpove War. 
These disturbances involved Kailondo in a considerable amount of fighting, 
in order that he should maintain the peace of Luawa. He was, in fact, 
successful in keeping his polity at peace and outside the influence of 
these disturbances, except for one brief incursion by Mbawulomeh in 1889 
(1)3). Because of Kailondo's vigilance, and his good relationships with 
surrounding strong rulers,, the people of Luawa experienced a settled peace 
within their territory which freed them to concentrate on the development 
of agriculture and trade (114). 
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THE PENETRATION OF 3AMORI'S SOFAS. 
Around 1890, Kailondo began to feel, pressure from 
three powerful new military forces: Samori's so s, the French with their 
tirailleurs (115), and the British with their Frontier Police Force (116). 
In discussing the influence of Samori's sofas on Luawa, the historian has 
to depend largely on the reports of the first British officials in the 
area. 'Sofas' was a term generally applied to members of Samorita cavalry; 
and there were some oa stationed to the east and north-east of Luawa 
in the early 1890s (117). But up to the death of Kailondo, the sole 
British official to travel far east of Luawa was T. J. Alldridge, and he 
only did so once, in 1891 (118). Despatches from Freetown concerning the 
sofas and their activities east of Luawa were therefore based on vague, 
second-hand information. Also, the term tsofast was used by British officials 
and Frontier Force NC Os (119) without any clear definition. C. B. Wallis, 
one-time District Commissioner in the Sierra Leone Protectorate (120), wrote 
in 1910: "Sofa is a native word meaning a collection of different peoples" 
(121) : Any disturbance to the east or north-east of Luawa in the 1890s 
was liable to be labelled a' war' - especially if any horsemen were 
involved. 
The leading authority on Samori has noted that the 
Mandinka ruler possessed "essentially an infantry army, even though its 
members bore the paradoxical name 'of sofa (horse father') .... There 
were bands of cavalry in his army by 1881, at the siege of Kankan, and 
their number increased steadily up to the great crisis of 1888. After- 
wards, when Samori completely altered his military methods, he diminished 
their part in the army in favour of an infantry based on European models"(122), 
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British officials, however, applied the name so not so much to members 
of Samori1a army as to any armed force east of Luawa, containing one or 
two horsemen, whether or not connected with Samori's Empire. In particular, 
the armed forces of the town of Kpandeaie and its surrounding district were 
all considered to be 'sofas' (123). If the people of Kpandemo were ever 
part of Samori's Empire (124), their links with him must have become 
increasingly tenuous as his contracting Empire moved westwards after 
1888 (125). Cardew, more precise than most of his colleagues, may have 
got near the truth when he described the ors fas operating to the east of 
Luawa as "Former adherents of SAMADU 
(i. e. SamoriJ who have settled in 
the Bandemeh district in Liberian territory and are constantly raiding on 
adjacent tribes" (126). No doubt the distinction between sofas settled 
in Kpandeme and the Kpandeme people themselves quickly disappeared. Yet 
even in the early years of the twentieth century, after Samori1a Empire 
had been destroyed and he himself had died, some British officials were 
still referring to 'sofa' activity east of Wawa (127). 
British reports, although confused and exaggerated, 
were, however, undoubtedly correct in refering to some sofa activity east 
of Luawa`in the early 1890s. The famous 1893 tWaima incident', which 
occurred when both French and British forces wore in touch with a party 
of ofa led by Porekere (128), took place only about forty miles north- 
north-west of Kailahun (129). Porekere's stronghold at this time was 
Tekuyema in southern Kono, little more than thirty miles from Kailahun (130). 
Pore k ere was probably operating under the loose control of Kemo Bilalg, 
one of Samori's 'generals' (131). The latter had lost Heremanko early in 
1893 (132), and as a result his Heromanko-Falabs. -Port Loko trade route to 
Freetown had boon out (133). 1 trade route to Freeto n was a necessity 
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since that entrepot was the source of Bilal6's arme supply (134). The 
serious Pofa advance into Kissi and Kono country in 1893 represented an 
attempt to open a new road to the Sierra Leone Colony through Koranko 
and Kunike, and, possibly, the town of Senehun (135). 
Both oral traditions (136) and written records (137) 
suggest that the sofas first entered the Luawa area three years earlier, 
almost simultaneously with Aldridge (138). The British official 
described , 
[probably with exaggeration (3,39) 2 the effect of cavalry on 
the people of the Luawa area: tt'The people from beyond who rode upon 
horses' - so they were described - were naturally dreaded by those who 
had scarcely ever seen a horse. The quickness with which they passed 
from place to place, to people who had never heard of cavalry, seemed 
almost supernatural" (140). The Was were first in evidence in Wunde, 
north of the Moa, in 1890. This sofa intrusion into Wurde cannot bo 
discussed without reference to one of the most difficult historical questions 
of Kailondo's reign. Did the sofas enter Wunde at the invitation of Kafula, 
mahe of Wunde, having allied themselves with him against Kailondo ? Or did 
the sofas invade Wunde, with the result that Kafula sent for help from 
Kailondo in order to drive them away ? There is evidence to support both 
propositions (141). However, whether the sofas helped or opposed Kafula 
is of little significance for their influence in the Luawa area, because 
by 1895 they had ceased to be a serious factor in Wunde, and the attacks 
the sofas mounted against Kailondo came from the Gbande east, not the Kissi 
north. Despite the Waima. disaster, the British expedition in late 1893 
(142) together with similar French action (143), prevented the sofas from 
permanently occupying Kono and Wunde. The Battle of Tungea, in which 
Porekore was killed, was the decisive engagement (144). If Kafula. allied 
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with anyone against Kailondo in the last years of the latter's reign, 
it was with the French rather than the sofas (145). 
Aggressive sofa activity due east of Luawa, centring 
on the town of Kpandeme in "Bunde country" (146) presented a much more 
permanent and serious threat than a few wandering bands of horsemen in 
Wunde. It is not clear whether this sofa aggression from Kpandeme was 
linked with the 1893 attempt by Bilale to find anew trade route to Free- 
town (11.7); but the Kpandeme threat to Luawa began before 1893, and lasted 
for a number of years after that. Possibly the people of Kpandeme were 
ruled by op fas in the 1880os certainly there were units of Samorits army 
operating in the area at that time (1l. S). The Kpandeme warriors may have 
learnt new techniques of war - especially the use of horses - from the 
sofas, and thus possessed a military advantage which enabled them to 
challenge surrounding polities like Kailondons Luawa. Since there was 
a strong connection between the people of Kpandeme and the sa the 
Kpandeme threat to Luawa will now be treated as an incident in the gofa 
penetration of the area (149). 
There is no evidence as to whether the aa at 
Kpandeme had presented a threat to Kailondo before 1891, but in Gbande 
country by the end of that year they were causing disturbances of which 
Kailondo had to take account. In November 1891, the sofas took the town 
of Kolahun, where Ngombu Yese was mahe (150). The Gbande mshtniycisia 
(151) requested that Kailondo should "go and settle the matter for them so 
the SOFL war will return" (152). In other words, they asked the Luawa 
Mahe to act as peacemaker so that the sow would cease to make war and 
would go back to Kpandeme. By January 1892, the situation was becoming 
increasingly complicated and dangerous: Kabba Sei of Mando, Fabanns of 
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Vaasa, Pambu of Malema, Yanga Feme, of Guma, Gando of Baiwali (Dia) and 
other mahanaeisia had formed a military alliance to wage war on Jama. 
Poto, ruler of Upper Gola. During the fighting, the allies also turned 
their forces against Quauma of Lukasso and Jenagure of Kambahun in Mando 
Javaiama, with the result that the war spread to Gbande country, just 
west of sofa territory. Jama. Poto called for help from the ofa 
apparently supported by Jenagure. Fabanna. of Vassa got himself involved 
in double-dealing with both sides in the conflict, which so annoyed his 
Vassa subjects that they turned him out of the mahawu (153). 
In accoxdance with the principles of his essentially 
peaceful external policy, Kailondo took no part in all this fighting (154), 
and advised the surrounding rulers not to go to war either (155)1 but he 
was unable to stop the sofa war, and the surrounding rulers ignored his. 
advice (156). Their refusal to accept Kailondo's advice was presumably 
partly the result of a disagreement between Kailondo and Kabba Sei, the 
latter being one of the war-leaders (157): the Luawa Ma hei reported to the 
British Governor that Kabba Sei was encouraging the mahanneisia in Gbande 
country to forsake their allegiance to him (158). Inevitably the war soon 
began to affect Luawa. On 21 January 1892, the sofas werd fighting at 
Gbandewulo (159) in the extreme south-east of Kailondols polity. Later, 
Sembe Fawundu, mahe of Tungi, who lived at Gbandewulo, explained that 
he had no quarrel with the sofas, but they had raided his land, "burning 
up many of his fackais (160J, and much rice which was stored in thora" 
(161). This was just part of a general sofa offensive against Kabba Sei 
and the others. The sofas. possessing largo numbers of guns (162), were 
able to drive the war-loaders on both sides out of Gbande country and 
back down to Baiwala. in the present-day Dia Chiefdom (163). 
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In Apri2 1892 T. J. A1ldridg©, knowing about the 
sofa menace, made his third visit to Luawa. Far from boing able to create 
that pcx Brit. nnica which elsewhere he emphasized as the main benefit of 
British rule (164), he simply suggested that Kailondo should take the 
initiative in using force to drive out the p_2fa invaders (165). The 
British official held a large meeting at Pendembu in Upper Bambara 
mahawu , where he met, among other mahaneeisia, Kailondo, Nyagua, Kabba. 
Sei and Homo Babahu (166). Altogether there were between 800 and 1,000 
people present, and Alidridge tried to find out the cause of the 22f q war. 
Nearly two decades later he described it in A Transformed Con, 
xv as 
"one 
of the most memorable up-country meetings. This meeting extended over 
three days and was convened in a groat open space, known as the Kot r'a , 
between the three fenced towns, in front of a large and curiously shaped 
cotton-tree .... 
The occasion was one of vital importance to those 
people, much of whose country had been destroyed by constant wars, and who 
were even then in perpetual dread of a sofa invasion on a larger scale than 
ever" (167). This later account of conditions in the area contrasts rather 
strikingly with the report, written by Alldridge near the time of the meeting, 
that "with the exception of this most unfortunate Sofa war, there is, I think 
no doubt as to the prosperous condition of this part of the country" (168). 
In his book, the Travelling Commissioner infers that the meeting playod a 
large part in the establishment of "peacable conditions" (169) in the area. 
In fact, he did little more than endorse Kailondo's suggestion that the 
Luawa Mahci "in conjunction with Nyagwa might go against the Sofas and 
endeavour to drive them out of the country" (170). Alldridge agreed with 
Kailondo and Nyagua's estimate that they could muster the necessary military 
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strength, and when he left, they were about to meet together to plan 
operations (171). In the abstract, it was easy for Alldridge and his 
colleagues to generalize about how the extension of British rule was 
"pacifying the various tribes" (172), and how the colonial government 
was taking measures against "the sofa invasion" for "the securing of 
peace" (173). But when faced with the realities of a, specific situation 
involving the sofas, the British official could do no more than agree 
with the views of the local mahanccisia, and leave them to get on with 
the job of ejecting the invaders. 'Pacification' was undertaken by 
Nyagua and Kailondo, not by the British Commissioner, and this they were 
already prepared to do in any case (174). The presence of Alldridge was 
coincidental, and hardly helped at all. 
Quayle-. Tone, the temporary Administrator of the 
Colony, and J. C. E. Parkes, Superintendent of the Department of Native 
Affairs, were the two Freetown officials most concerned with Alldridgo's 
reports in early 1892. They did not approve of the way Alidridge had 
encouraged Nyagua and IKailondo to fight the sofas (175); but neither did 
they seem very disturbed by the prospect of severe fighting in the area. 
Presumably they, too, could offer no alternative solution. In reply to 
Alldridge's request for three more constables to be stationed at Kailahun, 
Parken calmly noted that "it would not be prudent to expose euch a small 
force of police to a possible attack which they will not be able to resist 
the more so as now Kie Ludo 
(aie. J and the other chiefs have been advised 
to get the Sofas out of the country as soon as possible they will boldly 
enter into war and their towns may not be able to hold out against the 
Sofa's advance" (176). 
Through united action by their armed forcoc, Kailondo 
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and Nyagua did in fact drive the sofas out of Vassa and Gbande countries 
in 1892 (177), but were either unready or unable to launch an attack on 
the town of Kpandeme itself (178). Governor Cardew later suggested that 
Kpandeme remained untaken because Nyagua failed to give "sufficient 
assistance" to Kailondo (179). Possibly as a result of Nyaguats failure 
some disagreement developed between the two mahani cisia (180). Kailondo 
requested help from Freetown, but in August, Parkes wrote to Kailondo 
stating that "this Government cannot give you any armed support to drive 
the Sofas from BANDEMN but that endeavours are being made to restrain 
your antagonists by moral influence" (181). It is hard to imagine that 
the Government could in fact exert any influence in the country east of 
Luawa. When Alldridge visited Kailondo early in 1893, the latter was 
still at war with the ofa : "moral influence" was obviously not working 
(182). 
The next recorded incursion of the Kpand®e ' og fas' 
westwards towards Luawa came almost simultaneously with Cardew'a first 
visit to the area. In mid-March 1894, the sow advanced on Kailondo's 
Greater Luawa, burning down several towns and killing three of Kailondo's 
sub-chiefs (183). Cardew, while at Waima, received a report of this 
through Fabundeh, Kailondon right-hand man, in April. The Governor acted 
with his usual firmness, in support of the Luawa Mnhe z "I have given 
orders for the Police post at Kanre Lahun to be reinforced to 20 men, + 
also to give him material as well as moral support" (184). However, he 
directed Fabundeh to tell Kailondo to remain strictly on the defensive. 
The extra police no doubt strengthened Kailondo's hand, but did not prevent 
the people of Kpandeme from troubling him: in January 1895, Kailondo sent 
his emissary Ngobeh Kahunla (185) all the way to Freetown, partly to 
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report that Foya in Kissi Tenoea had been attacked three times and though 
the attacks had been repulsed, he was begging for further Government 
assistance (186). The Government apparently did nothing, and in March 
Kailondo reported to Cardew (who was visiting Kailahun on his second up- 
country tour) that the Kpandeme people had "within the last three months 
taken and destroyed three of his towns named respectively KONDEHWAI. LA, 
TINDON, and SUNGIANA which were situated to the Eastward of FUYA and the 
farthest town of which was only a day' a march from BUDEMEW' (187). 
The Governor's estimate was that by this time "the 
opposing factions in this war" had become "very mixed" (188). The main 
protagonists were Homo Dukori, Nahe, of Kpandeme, and Kailondo of Luawa 
(189), but there were a number of other semi-independent k1mghal a (190) 
making war to the east of Luawa: these latter, who had no fixed political 
allegiances, included Mbawulomeh and "MC O BAROMI, the chief of B& DEH" 
(191). As a result of his 1895 visit, Cardew decided to place four 
constables in each of the towns of Balla, Nyandehun and Sandialu 
(192); 
but on his return to Freetown he realized these places were all probably 
in Liberian territory, and so he withdrew his order (193). Late in March 
1895, after Cardew had left Kailahun, Kailondo's town of Foya was attacked, 
and though the invasion failed, Kailondo was eager to be sent still more 
Frontier Police (194). However, the situation was probably not as serious 
as Kailondo seemed to believe, for Samori'3 control of the lands immediately 
north and east of Luawa had been broken. The 's2faa' of Kpandeia wore 
probably making in 1894 and early 1895 a last all-out effort to break 
Kailondo's power (195); but it was an effort which came nowhere near to 
success (196). After March 1895, no further reports were made about 
serious 'sofa' activity from Kpandeme against 'Greater Luawa'. Kailondo 
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had achieved a limited victory in keeping the sofas out of his heartland, 
and that was his own achievement. Although he was clearly grateful for 
the 'moral support' of Frontier Police in Kailahun, the 'constables' had 
not taken part in any of the fighting and the Freetown Government had 
done very little to help him (197). 
in 1896, at the time of his death (as in 1892) there 
was ttno doubt as to the prosperous condition" of KailondoIs Luawa (198), 
despite the sofa war. There had boon some fighting as close to the Luawa 
heartland as Tengea and Wunde countries, and on one occasion the war had 
affected the Tungi border; but in general the Luaw'a Ma hec had maintained 
peace in his heartland despite the serious disturbances, caused by his 
aggressive neighbours, immediately to the east of 'Greater Luawa'. 
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3. THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH. 
In 1890 (199) T. J. A, lldridge became the first 
European ever to visit Luawa (200); and until Cardow's 1895 visit 
Alidridge was probably the only European to enter Kailondo's territory 
(201), making visits in 1891 (202), 1892 (203) and 1893 (204). He 
accompanied Cardew on the Governor's first tour in 1894, when the party 
got as far east as Bandajuma Yawei, Gandorhun and Waima (205), but did 
not enter Luawa. Alldridge was not a member of the Governor's 1895 
and 1896 expeditions (206) which did reach Kailahun, and in fact it seems 
that Alldridge did not visit Luawa between 1893 and 1905. (In tkn years 
between 1905 and 1908 he made at least one visit to Luawa during which he 
collected some of the material for A Tran ormed Colony 
Z-207,7. ) 
Before Kailondots death possibly the only other British officials to visit 
Luawa were Captains Tarbet and Fairtlough of the Frontier Police (the former 
being Inspector General), and they both entered Luawa only after Cardew's 
visit (208). It seems that no Freetown Creoles penetrated as far up-country 
as Luawa in the time of Kailondo (209), so that until 1895 Kailondo and his 
people obtained experience of the British only through a single representative 
- Travelling Commissioner Alldridge, whose attitudes and behaviour were 
therefore crucial. 
A1ldridg© arrived in SierraLoono in 1871 and worked 
in the Sherbro area as an agent for one of the Fires, (210). He transferred 
to Government service only in 1890, when he was appointed-a Travelling 
Commissioner to "Upper Mendi" (211), his job being to "enter into treaties 
.., with tho paramount chiefs" 
(212), However, A, fldridge lo understanding 
of what he was doing, and why, did not coincide with his Freetown employers' 
understanding. Governor Hay stated that the object of Alldridges travels 
was "mainly to prevent any Foreign Power from further surrounding and hemming 
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in the Colony, and that the. sphere of British influence should be extended 
as far as possible consistently with the due observance of the Anglo- 
French agreement", and with respect for the rights of Liberia (213). The 
only 'Foreign Powert which was threatening further to hem in the Colony 
was France. But A7. ldridge, both in his despatches and his two books, 
hardly mentions the French 'threat'. In his second book he spends two 
whole chapters on developments which led to the creation of a Protectorate 
(214), but in this space he only once mentions the French, and there only 
brieflyi(2l5). Elsewhere Alldridge frequently insists that the expansion 
of British rule in the Sierra Leone hinterland was essentially a civili- 
zing mission and a trading venture: "it became very apparent that in 
the interests of the people, and for the development of the country's 
bountiful indigenous wealth, the Government must take definite steps 
towards, pacifying the various tribes and establishing a new state of 
things in which, under British protection, the people would be able to 
enjoy life and be free from that shocking terrorism which was the perpetual 
condition of their existence until the creation of the Protectorate in 
189611 (216). 
There was a real difference between the concerns 
of Aildridge $on the spot' up-country, and the Government officials in 
Freetown. This difference was accentuated by the rare degree of freedom 
from central government control which Alldridge enjoyed when he was in 
Upper Mendeland, thanks to poor, over-extended communications. The result 
on at least one occasion was disapproval in Freetown of Audridge's actions 
in the Luawa area (217). In 1892 Alldridge advised Kailondo to "get the 
Sofas out of the country as coon as possible" by the use of force (218). 
This seemed to the British official the only way to rid Luawa of a serious 
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menace to the development of trade and the spread of tcivilizationt. 
But Quayle-Jones and J. C. E. Parkes in Freetown were much more worried 
by the thought of armed clashes in the British-protected area, and possible 
collision with the French. They therefore favoured a 'peace at any price' 
policy, and disapproved of A1ldridge's advice to Kailondo (219). Yet 
Kailondo and the people of Luawa never heard about that disapproval: as 
far as they were concerned in 1892, the Travelling Commissioner (and in 
later years the local Frontier Police Officer, the W. A. F. F. Officer, or 
District Commissioner) was the official and absolute voice of British 
power. It follows that, in studying local history (220), only limited 
value is to be derived from analysing the attitudes, policies and actions 
of officials in the European capital or in the West African coastal capital. 
The officials to whom attention must be paid are those 'on the spot', up- 
country (221); but, as yet, little detailed work has been done on the 
behaviour of local British officials in Sierra Leone (222). 
Alidridgo, whom the Mende people nicknamed "Bolowa" 
or "Big Neck" (223), displayed a curious ambivalence in his attitude 
towards them. He was favourably impressed by a number of his experiences 
of life in the Luawa area; for example, by the orderly way in which large 
political meetings were held in the townºsk bF (224), and it struck 
hire that "many a lesson might be gathered from the dignity, the courtesy 
and the general friendliness which these tribes showed, - not only towards 
a 'stranger' but in their every-day life towards each other" (225). The 
Gbande markets made him reflect that "these up-country people are not at all 
in the wretched condition often pictured by the European imagination" (226). 
I 
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The Travelling Commissioner, in summary, found Ko$4cnde in a "state 
of tranquility'", with the people concentrating on "extensive farming 
operations" (227). 
In other sections of his writings, however, he 
presented a picture of up-country Mendeland which is almost the complete 
opposite of . 
"state of tranquility". It may be significant that this 
opposite picture is to be found mainly in his two published books, in 
which he was generalizing about the Protectorate area, and making out a 
case in favour of British rule (228). Often, his favourable reflections, 
contained in his official reports, sprang from immediate reactions to 
specific data (like those noted above), whereas his published comments on. 
the miserable life of the people before 1896 tended to be deductions, made 
after the lapse of a decade or so, from the principle that British rule 
inevitably meant improvemont. 
This deductive method may best be seen in Chapter 30 
of A Transformed Colony, entitled "The Need for a. Protectorat©n. In this 
chapter he deals with the question of a ttsneerer"s "What land was ever 
annexed by England except for that land's good? " (229). In trying to 
refute this accusation, he refers to the "terror" (230) inspired in up- 
country territories by the go fas and to the "traffic in human beings" which 
affected the area because in Samori's land "was the market of the slave- 
dealer" (231). He then makes the unsubstantiated statement that this 
traffic in human beings "lay at the root of most of the misery among the 
natives of the Hinterland" (232). This statement also enlarges the area, 
in which "war was always going on" (233) to include, presumably, all the 
country later known as the Protectorate - although his own despatches 
from Luawa in the early 1890s clearly depict a state of peace and prosperity 
98 
in the area ruled directly by Kailondo (234). Alidridge's description of 
the terrible devastation caused by a slave-raiding expedition (which 
follows next in his Chapter 30) is probably accurate, but instead of 
giving specific dates and places, he implies this was the condition of 
the entire "Hinterland", and that it had been "going on from time 
immemorial; there was no security of life or property" (235), since the 
rulers of the country "were simply preying upon each other and upon their 
people" (236). This statement does not tally with his earlier remark that 
the sofas - who had certainly not been operating "from time immemorial" -. 
were the main cause of the war, terror, and slave-trading. The Travelling 
Commissioner concludes Chapter 30 by noting that by 1890 the up-country 
peoples were "in worse disorder than ever" (237), and so steps were taken 
which led to the establishment of a Protectorate. 
This description of the rulers and their peoples is 
clearly in conflict with &1ldridge's own assessment of Kailondo and 
Mendegla in 1890= "from what I have seen myself of the way they govern the 
extensive territories under their jurisdiction, I gladly endorse the high 
opinions which I am convinced the masses generally entertain towards the 
Chieftains" (238). 
Alidridge himself did not apparently notice any 
dichotomy in his writings between two irreconcilable viewpoints, He did 
not seem to see the incongruity of the fact that at one time he censured 
"the European imagination" for believing the up-country people live in a 
"wretched condition" (239), while at another time he himself wrote of the 
"shocking terrorism which was the perpetual condition of their existence" 
(240). His 'shocking terrorism' style of writing about pre-1696 conditions 
is mainly found in his later, second book (241), which was written after 
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the impact of the 1898 Hut Tax War had been felt, and after he had perhaps 
experienced anti-imperial criticism in England (242); his earlier writing 
gives a generally more favourable estimate of the state of things before 
the Protectorate was declared (243). Therefore, this explanation of the 
dichotomy in Alldridge's writing implies that his later view is less 
spontaneously authentic, and less reliable, than the earlier view. 
Whatever his later views, Aildridge's own descriptions, 
of his relations with both the mahanaeisia and the ordinary people of Upper 
Mendeland suggest that he had considerable respect for their way of life 
and their political organization. He maintained a, proper decorum even 
towards Nyagua of Panguma who obviously irritated him (244). He clearly 
looked upon Kailondo with admiration, writing of him as "every inch a chief, 
with immense power and influence" (215), and he was genuinely proud that 
Kailondo was always "a true friend" (246). Kailondo was allowed to satisfy 
his curiosity about the British official's possessions such as a compass 
(247) and a teapot (2,48); and the Mahei returned this respect by paying 
frequent "complementary visits" (249) to . tlldridge while the latter was in 
Kailahun, and giving him a large number of valuable presents (250). In his: 
relations with other rulers, too, the Travelling Commissioner showed much 
patience in situations where many Europeans might have lost their temper 
(251). When, for example, some of the mahtn; eisia in 1893 were making an 
sorts of excuses for not journeying to Bandasuma. to meet the Governor, 
Alidridge realized that it was "'no use getting out of temper; it was no 
use doing anything more than offering one's sympathy and hoping that the start 
would be made the next day" (252). He also treated the ordinary people with 
good humour; when the people of Luawa wore eager to come in largo numbers 
to look at him, he made arrangements for them to 'view' him (253). By such 
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a gentle, dignified and understanding approach, the British official was 
able to encourage rulers like Icailondo to sign a Treaty of Friendship 
with the Freetown Government. 
The ruler of Luawa, for his own part, was apparently 
quick to see the advantages to be gained from friendly relations with the 
Freetown Government and a European power. For example, Alldridge could 
act as an impartial arbiter to whom disputes could be referred for settle. 
ment, just as Kailondo himself was used to arbitrating in disputes between 
surrounding mahandeisia (254). In this way a fair settlement could be 
arrived at without costly war and without loss of prestige for anyone. 
A common, customary way of deciding intractable disputes was to call on 
the help of a disinterested third party. For Kailondo to do this meant, 
no doubt, that he was accepting the presence of considerable British 
influence in Luawa; but almost certainly the luawa Mahet. did not feel he 
was in any way subjecting himself to Alldridge or British power by asking 
for the Travelling Commissioner's services in this way. 
The first dispute in which Kailondo asked for 
Alldridge's arbitration was with Momo Babahu of Upper Bambara. The dispute 
was reaching a crisis at the time Alldridge first entered the area in 
March 1890; it was caused by a "combination of grievances" (255), though 
ostensibly arising out of the action of Kai Woni, a kadu, -ba of Momo Babahu 
at Pendembu. Kai Woni, about the year 1886 (256), had seized several 
people and various precious ornaments belonging to Kailondo (257). The 
seizure may have included several of Kailondo's wives, and even of hin 
head-wife, Golei (258). Although Nlomo Babahu had reason to be grateful 
for previous assistance given to him by Kailondo (259), and although his 
polity was militarily far inferior to Luawa (260), yet apparently the 
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Bambara mahe took the side of Kai Woni, and behaved in such a way that 
Kailondo at length decided to wage war on him. When Alldridge first 
reached Kailahun on 3 April 1890 (261), he found "Kie Lunduts town was 
packed with his war boys, whom, the Chief informed me, but for my timely 
arrival, would have carried war to Bahbahoo in three day's time" (262). 
Alldridg©'s descriptions of how he became involved 
in the dispute suggest some far-reaching conclusions. Writing less than 
two weeks after the signing of the Treaty with Kailondo (263), Alldridge 
explained how he heard of the dispute. "Nothing of this matter had been 
mentioned to me by Bahbahoo, and until I saw Kie Lundu I was in entire 
ignorance that any dispute existed between the Bambara and Luawa people" 
(264). In a despatch a few weeks later, the Travelling Commissioner 
explained how Kailondo, "before signing the treaty and taking upon himself 
the obligations contained therein" (265), had told Alldridge of his griev- 
ance against Upper Bambara. Kailondo apparently realized that according 
to the terms of the Treaty, he would be forbidden from going to war with 
Homo Babahu. The British official promised to place the grievance before 
the Governor, and the Luawa Mahei promised that meanwhile "all warlike 
operations should cease until at all events the next dry season" (266). 
This first account by Alldridge portrays Kailondo taking wise diplomatic 
initiatives: although Luawa's ruler probably possessed the power to destroy 
Momo Babahu (267), he deliberately sacrificed this opportunity in favour of 
developing real friendship between himself and Alidridge (268). Kailondo 
referred the whole matter to the Travelling Commissioner, and by this act 
demonstrated the genuineness and seriousness of his commitment to the 
British official's Treaty. This was not the behaviour of a ruler who was 
planning war because he "liked it for its own sake" (269). 
N2 
When Alldridge published an account of this 1890 
incident in his first book, however, the details were so altered as to 
give the whole affair a different complexion (270). Probably he did not 
introduce deliberate falsification: possibly he was confusing the events 
of this 1890 visit with a subsequent visit (271). According to the 
published account, Momo Babahu took the initiative at the time the 1690 
Treaty was signed in Kangama (272) in telling Alldridge of the dispute 
between himself and Kailondo. "He said how very glad he would be", 
Alidridge wrote in his book, "if I could intercede and act as a mediator 
between them .... I left the town of Kangann, with the full intention of 
finding a. peaceful solution to the difficulty" (273). Kailondo, after 
signing his Treaty in Kailahun, stated that he would not now go to war 
against Momo Babahu, and would disperse his own kocugbanna (274). "I 
mentioned to him that Chief Momo Babahu had asked me to intercede on his 
behalf to try to settle their long-standing dispute in an amicable way. 
I talked the matter over with him, and finally arranged to act as arbitrator 
between them, when I next visited the country" (275). L year later, in 1391, 
Alldridge held a meeting with the two mahan, reig a in the kcba za at Ngiehun, 
and there "the whole matter was threshed out, before a vast number of people 
from both countries; with the result that an amicable arrangement was come 
to. The old friendship between the chiefs was re-established, their 
people fraternising as they had not done for many yearn" (276). 
This published description of the 1891 meeting accords 
closely with Alldridge's official 1891 despatch on the subject (277). But 
for events in 1890, it is impossible to reconcile his despatches with his 
later published (and hence more widely-read) account. In his despatches 
he showed that Kailondo took the initiative, whereas in his book 41ldridgo 
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himself takes the centre of the stage and the impression is given that 
the British official was mainly responsible for settling the dispute. 
By implication, Alldridge presents himself in his book as the determined 
defender of the weaker Homo Babahu against Luawa, 's ruler. The Travelling 
Commissioner describes how he wisely restrained the powerful Kailondo who 
had been preparing for war. The readers of the book might be led to think 
that Kailondo was eager for a- bloody fight; never to guess that (according 
to Alldridge's original despatches) it was Kailondo who took the first 
steps to ensure that there was no fighting (278). 
In many ways the Kailondo-homo Babahu dispute is a 
fairly minor matter, but considerable space has been spent indicating the 
discrepancies between Atldridge's two accounts because those discrepancies 
have serious implications. Alldridge's writings are the only documents. on 
Luawa. penned before 1895, and are thus bound to form a substantial part 
of the evidence on which historical statements are based. His books have 
been taken as 'standard works' on Mendeland in the 1890ss successive writers 
have uncritically accepted his comments as 'fact' (279). And certainly by 
comparison with such writers as Blakeney, Fairtlough, d'Arcy Anderson and 
Wallis (280), his writing shows a high degree of careful observation, 
factual detail, and little distorting prejudice or highly charged emotive 
comment. Yet in the above instance, Alldridge is inconsistent on quite 
basic matters of 'fact' (281). 
Securing iUdridge' arbitration to settle an 
involved dispute was one immediato advantage Kailondo gained by welcoming 
and establishing good relations with the British official. Another advantage 
was having Frontier Police stationed in Kailahun. The Frontier Police Force 
1Q4. 
had only been established in January 1890. The officers (none of whom was 
ever stationed permanently at Kailahun, though there was one permanently 
at Panguma from 1895 onwards) were Europeans or Creolea.: the NCO0 stationed 
at Kailahun were, it seems, mainly literate Creoles (282); the 'constables' 
were either Creoles or up-country people, at least some of the latter being 
Mende-men (283), The Force was originally 280 strong, and its primary duty 
was to keep the peace within the British-protected area in the hinterland 
of Sherbro and the Colony of Sierra Leone (284). By 1894, there were 563 
Officers and men, and the 'constables' were becoming increasingly involved 
in the administration of the protected area (285). The Force was set up 
on military lines. and was armed, so that it could play a semi-military role 
in peace-keeping; but slowly the duties of the 'constables' proliferated to 
include almost anything an up-country Government official might require to 
have done (286). In 1894 the largest Police Company, with 104 Officers and 
men, was stationed at Mbngheri (287), and this was the nearest Company 
headquarters to Luawa; but in 1895, this Company headquarters was trans- 
ferred even nearer, to Panguma, which was only about 50 miles west of 
Kailahun (288). 
In his first encounter with the Travelling Commissioner, 
the Luawa Mahei expressed the wish that the Governor "would be pleased to 
station some constables at Carray Lahoon" (289). He was, noted Audridge, 
"the first up-country chief to ask the Government through me that Frontier 
Police might be stationed in his town" (290). Kailondo may have heard from 
Nyagua. of Panguma about the Colony policemen who accompanied Garrett on his 
Wende expedition early in 1889 (291); or he may have heard of the 'constables' 
from some other Mahai nearer the coast than himself, like Mendegla of Gaura.. 
Possibly though, Kailondo's request was simply a result of the good impression 
105 
which the uniformed constables in AlldridgeIa 1890 party made on him, with 
their blue serge uniform, shining buttons, red fez, waterbottle and brown 
blankets (292); but most impressive to Kailondo perhaps, this was an armed 
force (293). He was serious about his request for police, for the messenger 
he sent with Alldridge to convey his greetings to the Governor was instructed 
to say that ruler of Luawa "would like to have police at his town" (294). 
The Governor's first reaction was negative, as he 
was concerned not to over-extend the responsibilities of his new forcer 
"for the present at least, I think we must confine ourselves to an occasional 
police visit" (293). In his reports on his second, 1891 visit to Luawa, 
Alldridge did not mention Frontier Police for Kailahun; but he did report 
on the threatening activities of Kafula of Wunde against Kailondo (296). 
This led to a Government order that "3 reliable constables who could speak 
the 2ENDI language" (297) should be stationed there, because their presence 
"would no doubt have a good moral effect upon any of the neighbouring 
smaller chiefs" (298). This was presumably just the sort of advantage 
Kailondo had expected to receive from his 'alliance' with the British, and 
by November 1891 he had constructed - it seems quite eagerly - two houses 
for the constables (299). From then onwards these houses were occupied as 
the permanent 'barracks' of a Kailahun Frontier Police detachment (300). 
The Mahci built these houses or barracks at his own expense (301) in the 
Kailahun k ban a, following the advice of the NCO in charge (302), on the 
site of the present-day N. A. Court Barri and Office (303). 
The disadvantages of alliance with the British were 
not immediately apparent to Kailondo, partly because of Alldridge's caution 
and diplomacy, partly because it was only in 1895 that tho British began to 
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exercise any real authority in Luawa (304). However, by 1891 the first 
signs were appearing of those political changes which, though they did not 
much affect the everyday life of ordinary people, were radically to alter 
the position of the Mahe.. For instance, Kailondo signed, the 1890 Treaty 
with the British on behalf of "LUAWAH PK(}BAI GISSI and BANDI countries" 
(305), but when Alldridge met "the Paramount Chief of BANDE chief BC GOI" 
in the following year at Kolahun, the latter asserted that Kailondo "was 
not the Chief of BANDE and that he had no permission to have so signed - 
that some time ago KILtTNDU had been called in with reference to some war 
disturbance but that beyond the assistance which he then rendered he had 
nothing to do with the BANDE country" (306). Probably in the presence of 
Kailondo, Gbongoi would have been less vehement in his assertion; but , 
leaving aside such a probability, Gbongoi's argument about sovreignty in 
Gbande country turns on the sense given to the word 'chief'. The fact that 
Kailondo had been "called in" is virtually an admission that he held some 
influence in the area; and the presents which were customarily given in 
return for such assistance could easily be termed 'tribute'. Yet almost 
inevitably, Kailondo's authority around Kolahun was less than around 
Kailahun at the heart of Luawa; and on the peripheries of his polity there 
was a gradual diminution of his authority until one could better speak of 
Kailondo's 'considerable influence' rather than his 'direct control'. 
Gbande country was probably part of this periphery to the east, as was 
southern Kono to the north, and Guna. to the south (307). Only in the west 
was there a fairly distinct boundary to 'Greater Luawa', the Moa and Mali 
Rivers acting as a divide between Nyagua's and Kailondo's spheres of 
influence (308). 
Until the advent of the British, disputed about the 
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nature of the authority of different mahn sisi, a within one particular area 
were probably rare. Possibly both Gbongoi and Kailondo were content with a. 
situation in Gbande country in which each recognized that the other possessed 
his own degree of influence. The extent of their individual influence was 
probably indefinite, and they may have differed in their opinions of how 
much authority the other possessed in the area. Such a situation did not 
produce conflict because political power was a matter of personal allegiance, 
not of territorial possession: the seeignty of a piece of land cannot 
easily be shared, but it is quite possible to offer a degree of allegiance 
to several different individuals at the same time. Since the power of a 
maha might vary from year to year, depending on such factors as the number 
of konugbanga he could muster, so also the extent of his influence would 
vary. The political situation was therefore very fluid (309). One particular 
mahei would be involved at any one time in a complex of allegiances (some of 
which might even be conflicting) and the success of any minor mahei would 
depend partly on his ability to judge accurately whore his supreme political 
allegiance should lie at a particular moment. 
k British official like Alldridge, used to the idea of 
fixed geographical boundaries demarcating coweignty, was interested only in 
where ultimate sovereignty lay in a particular area, and his insistence that 
the local ruler should make his mark on a Treaty with the British presented 
the mahanpcisia with a previously unknown problem. It is possible that 
Kailondo was right to sign the Treaty as 'overlord' of Gbande country, 
while Gbongoi was right to insist that, if Aldridge required to mark of 
the 'chief' of Gbande country, he alone was in a position to do so. The 
confusion in this case may have been created - there were other cases in 
which such confusion certainly was created (310) - not because of disagree- 
ment between Gbongoi and Kailondo, but because of M. i. ldridge's introduction 
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of alien and inapplicable political concepts into the situation. 
This confusion also no doubt led the British official 
to sign a Treaty in 1891 at Gbandewulo (311) with mahe Sembe Fawundu of 
Tungi (312), son and successor of Kai Kai (313). There seems little doubt 
that Kailondo was 'overlord-with-direct-control' in Tungi country, and in 
1890 he had in fact signed for this country as his own under the heading 
'Gissi' (314). Alldridge thought that Fawundu was one of the largely 
independent "paramount chiefs" (315). Kailondo, for his own part, may 
have thought Alldridge was eager to make a Treatywith the mahe of Tungi 
simply because Fawundu was a local ruler, even though he was not independent 
but recognized Kailondo as overlord. This latter suggestion is given support 
by the fact that Kailondo may have actually encouraged Sembe Fawundu to sign 
a separate Treaty with Alldridge (316). If Kailondo had understood that the 
British traveller believed each 'treaty chief' was an independent ruler he 
would surely never have given such encouragement to a mah who was under 
his own authority. 
It is also noteworthy that at first A7. ldridge suggested 
to the Governor that Samba Fawurxlu be paid £7 annually, whereas £10 was paid 
to Kailondo and others - an indication that Alldridge himself realized that 
Fawundu was not in the same category as the Luawa Mahd. Later, however, 
Alidridge revised his judgement, and suggested that Fawunda be placed on the 
same footing as all paramount chiefs in the MENDE country and that he should 
receive a yearly stipend of Ten pounds" (317). The reason for this alter- 
ation was largely that Fawundu had showed "so much desire to become more 
closely allied to the Gover nment" (318). One sees here the beginning of 
a set of political values which, within a decade, was to become firmly 
established among British officials. A Chief was not judged on merit, on 
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Itraditionalt status, or on the number of people he controlled, but rather 
on his attitude to the Government. If his attitude pleased the officials, 
he might be rewarded by being given greater political recognition, and since 
the British were steadily gaining ultimate . eignty in the area, this 
really meant greater political power for the Chief who was favoured. If 
his attitude displeased the officials, he was in danger of having his power 
reduced, as in the case of Kabba Sei of Manndo (319), or even of being 
altogether deprived, as in the case of Nyagua of Panguma (320). So no 
Chief could afford to ignore this new criterion by which his rule was to 
be judged. 
Yet it was only in later years that these deeper 
consequences of the Treaty with the British became apparent to the Mnbanisisias 
even as late as 1896, at the time of his death, Kailondo may not have been 
aware of the full implications. Alldridge's pre-printed Treaty form of 1890 
contained nothing to which a ruler of Itailondo's stamp would take exception. 
"I was always extremely particular that the obligations should be clearly 
understood"., wrote Alldridge, explaining what happened at meetings between 
himself and a Maha who was about to sign a Treaty, "and I was satisfied in 
going through the country afterwards, that every chief thoroughly knew 
exactly what these obligations were from the remarks that they made to moll 
(321). There is no need to doubt Alidridge's word as far as Luawa was 
concerned, for there was nothing objectionable to Kailondo in the Treaty, 
nor anything which he wanted to abrogate. The Treaty stated that: 
1. there should be peace between the people of Luawa and 
British subjects who should be allowed free access into 
Luawa provided that they kept the laws of the land 
2. these rights "guaranteed to British subjectst" should 
not be extended to an7 other people without the consent of 
the Governor 
no 
3. peace should be maintained within Luawa by the 
reference of any serious dispute between Kailondo 
and his "Headmen's to arbitration by the Governor 
4. Kailondo should "not enter into any war or commit 
any act of aggression on any of the Chiefs bordering 
on Sierra. Leone'' 
5. the roads in the area should be kept in good repair 
(322) 
For Kailondo, to accept this Treaty was merely to 
continue existing 'external policy'. Internal peace for Luawa had always 
been Kailondo's first aim. Usually, he had as far as possible avoided 
war with other powerful mahangeisia, prefering to enter into alliance with 
them; and at the time he signed the Treaty, Kailondo voluntarily referred 
to Alldridge a dispute between himself and a subordinate male (323). The 
Luawa Mahe was already on friendly terms with the two most powerful rulers 
in his area -. Mendegla of Gaura and Nyagua of Panguma - who were willing 
to accept alliance with him for mutual, defence and well-boing. If Alldridge 
did no more than make sure Kailondo "thoroughly know exactly" what was in 
the Treaty, but said little about its wider implications, then quite likely 
the ruler of Luawa did not see this 'alliance' as any different in kind from 
his alliances with surrounding mahan eisig, except that . llriridge was a 
sumo (324), and represented a much greater political power. For Kailondo, 
the 1890 Treaty must simply have marked an extension of the same 'external 
policy' which he had been following for the previous decade. 
ui 
!. KAFULVS REBELLION IN WUND:, 1890 - 1596 
Before Kailondo had time properly to explore the 
implications of the new political dimension introduced in the person of 
Alidridge, he was caught up in the affairs of the area known as Wunde, 
just north of Luawa across the Moa River (325). Up to about 1890, Kafula, 
the Kissi mahl of Wunde, ruling in succession to his father, was subordi- 
nate to Kailondo (326). There are two different and apparently irrecon- 
cilable accounts of what happened next. Rev. Clarke's story is that Wunde 
was invaded by the sofas, and Kafula naturally called upon Kailondo for 
help (327). The subsequent fighting was fairly inconclusive, since 
Kailondots men had no experience of dealing with cavalry, but the sofas 
were unable to use their horses to advantage in the dense undergrowth of 
the area. Eventually the sofas retired and re-directed their attack against 
the Kono people (328). Kailila was grateful for Kailondo's help, and was a 
loyal maha to the end of Kailondo's reign. When the latter died early in 
1896 (329), Kafula played a large part with Fabundeh, Kailondo's right- 
hand man, in the burial ceremonies (330). Kafula tried to make sure that 
Kailondo was buried in Wunde, his father's homeland, though in the end the 
body was brought back to Luawa by Fabundeh's people (331). 1iich oral 
tradition supports this account (332), and records that only after the 
death of Kailondo did disagreement arise between Luawa and Wunde (333). 
However, events as recorded in British officials' 
despatches appear very different. "KILUNDU has very recently been attacked 
by one of his sub-chiefs", reported Alidr3dge in February 1891, "named 
KAFAR& KENAM of WUNDE, in (LESE, who inveigled him up there under the 
pretence of assisting in a war in the interior (334,,,, 7, and who according 
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to KILUNDU'S statement, deceived him, placed his war-boys in the pathway 
and killed many of KILUNDU'S people, very few escaping - KILUNDU hid 
himself and managed to get back to his town" (335). Later, Kailondo 
explained that it was the "SUSUWAU poeple" who attacked him in Wunde 
(336). Nyagua of Pangwna. also lost some people at the same time, and met 
Kailondo so that they could "combine and carry war back to SUSSUWALA country" 
(337). Possibly the Susuwala and the sofas were one and the same (338): 
almost certainly this was the beginning of the disturbances which culminated 
in the Waima. incident and the Battle of Tungea (339). It is difficult to 
see how these reports can be reconciled with Rev. Clarkets account of 
Kafula's actions - difficult, but not impossible. Before suggesting a 
solution, however, it is best to complete the story of Kafulats relations 
with Kailondo. 
Further official reports indicated that Alldridgets 
1891 despatches were not mistaken, nor was Kafulats opposition to lailondo 
the result of a transitory, if serious misunderstanding between the two 
rulerß. In early 1894, ilidridge wrote that to his own knowledge, Kailondo 
had been having trouble with Kaft. ]. a for the previous three years (340). 
Corporal Wilson of the Kailahun Frontier Police detachment wrote in January 
1894 that Kafula had twice before waged war on Kailondo, but the situation 
was now more dangerous because Kafula was in league with the French who had 
been seen in Wunde (341). Kailondo, worried lest the French moved into 
Luawa. (342), had asked that Kafula should be captured and exiled (343). 
Two months later, in another despatch, Wilson warned of a. threatened attack 
from the sofas, and added that Kafula. was "directing the Sofas and joined 
them too" (344). Several of Kailondots villages north of the Ma had 
recently been destroyed, presumably by the Wunde mahc (345). Wilson's 
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letters seem the work of a rather confused and frightened NCO, and Kafula 
would have had difficulty in maintaining an alliance with the French and 
the sofas at the same time (346). Yet Cardew, during his first up-country 
tour in April 1894, confirmed that there was "a state of chronic war" 
between Kailondo and Kafula (347), and repeated the suggestion that the 
latter was receiving sofa assistance. Shortly afterwards Ksfula was 
reported to be threatening the Kono people at Waima (348), and Cardew 
posted 20 Frontier Police constables at Kailahun and another 20 at Daru 
(349), partly with the object of *? supporting the Police post at KAt LMIUN" 
(350). These new postings were partly to guard against the sofa menace 
from Kpandeme, but also partly to strengthen Kailondo's hand against 
Kafula (351). 
Worries about Kafula's alliance with the pofas gradually 
disappeared from official despatches, but the evidence for his alliance with 
the French increased. In January 1895, Kailondo sent Ngobeh Kahunla to 
Freetown with a message for the Governor stating among other informtion 
(352) that Kafula was on friendly terms with a French post about six days' 
Journey north of Kailahun (353). Cardew believed the post was Mara, and 
consisted of a Lieutenant, two sergeants and some local soldiers (354). 
Later the Governor himself reported that there was also a French post at 
Kissidougou (355). By March he could state (in a despatch from Kailahun 
itself) that Kaflila was "restrained from attacking FAILUNDU by the French" 
(356). However, if Kafula's alliance with the French had much reality, it 
did not on this occasion last very long (357). In late 1896, after 
Kailondo'a death, Captain Fairtlough (Officer Commanding the Frontier Police 
in Panguma) received information that the French had organized an expedition 
against the mahe of Wunde "in consequence of his having turned out the 
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French soldiers who had up till recently been stationed in his town" of 
Kissi-Kenema (358). The attack was made in October 1896 "by the French 
soldiers and some Sofa friendlies 
(: J on KEIMMAL and two other towns in 
GISSE" (359), and was apparently successful: though that was far from the 
end of the story of Kafula's relations with the French (360) 
A thread of meaning may be found in these confused 
and conflicting reports (361) if one assumes that Kafula was a person of 
volatile and explosive temperament. In his relations with the o the 
French and the British, as well as with Kailondo and Fabundeh 
(362), he 
seems to have been far from settled in allegiance. As late as 1908 he 
was still threatening to "cover his war-drum with the skin of a white mane 
(363), long after events had proved that an 'exterminate-the-white-man' 
policy would yield no political profit (364). Kafula was probably an 
opportunist (365), looking for immediate political advantage, but sometimes 
allowing his own likes and dislikes to overrule his political judgements 
and the situation north of Kailondols Luawa in the early 1890¬ provided a 
rare opportunity for someone of Ktxfulata disposition. If he was dissatis- 
fied with one ally or overlord, there was a selection of others to choose 
from, and the urge to play off one against the other may well have been 
irresistible. If this is accepted as an accurate s1 tch of Kafulais 
situation in the early 1890s, then most of the evidence coheres. 
About 1890, Kafula may have asked for Kaifond 's 
help against a pofa invasion; but soon afterwards, recognizing so a power, 
he turned against Kailondo, and a second request for help was merely a ruse 
to assassinate him (366). In 1894, Kafula was still associated with the 
remaining fragments of the g fa force, but was moving towards allienco 
115 
with the French who were penetrating the area. By 1895, convinced of 
French superiority, his alliance with them seemed firm; but early in 
1896, despite his previous violent break with Yailondo, he attended the 
latter's funeral. Perhaps Kafula was moved by genuine sorrow, even remorse, 
over his previous actions (367); almost certainly he hoped to succeed 
Kailondo as M hawai of the whole area (368). Unsettled by this ambition, 
he quickly came into conflict with his new French tmasters1, and before 
the end of 1896 was fighting against them (369). 
There seems little doubt that in late 1890 (370) 
Kafula did, in fact, turn violently against his overlord Kailondo. Since 
Kafula's rebellion began only months after Kailondo's Treaty with Alldridge, 
and since, apparently, relations between the Kissi mahe had been cordial 
until then, it is tempting to posit cause and effect. Pa Langan of Buedu 
noted that "when Kailondo brought the white m©n, Kafula was not pleased. 
Therefore the agreement between Kafula and Kailondo was spoilt, and Kafula, 
supported the French. Kailondo wanted the English. Because of that the 
friendship broke down" (371). Presumably, then, Kafula would have preferred 
armed resistance to the British when Kailondo chose alliance. Dater, when 
the European presence became strongly established beyond hope of successful 
resistance, Kafu. a. preferred a commitment to the French rather than the 
British. This was natural because, given that Kailondo was in favour with 
Alldridge and that the rift between the Lu. awa Mahe and Kafula. was irreparable, 
the latterts only chance of political gain lay with the French, 
Up to the time of Alldridge'o : irrt visit to Luawa, 
Kailondo would almost certainly have dealt quickly and severely with Katula's 
rebellion. His success in the Gbande War showed that ho had the military 
power (372), and in 1894, Alidridge believed that there was "no reason 
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why Kai Lundu and his powerful subchiefs should not be able to deal with" 
Kafu]a (373). But by the terms of the 1890 Treaty, Kailondo was forbidden 
from going to war against his "Headmen" (374); and it seems that Kailondo 
deliberately took no action against Kafula until he could report the whole 
matter to Alldridge on his second visit to Luawa in February-March 1891 
(375). In his despatches from Luawa, in 1891, Alldridge implies that his 
own attitude to Kailondo's statement about going to war against Kafula, 
was non-committal (376). In general, both in 1891 and 1892, Alldridge 
seemed less concerned by the thought of Kailondo going to war than was the 
Luawa Mahei himself. Perhaps partly because of A1ldridgets imprecise 
reaction, Kailondo wrote to the British Governor in mid-. iugust 1891 about 
going to war. The reply was unequivocal. Kailondo was instructed to 
remember his promise made when Alldridge was in his country (377) that he 
would not become involved in any "war palaver. You must know", the reply 
continued, "that to be at war is to bring misery and trouble on yourself 
and people and now that Police are in your country there will be no harm 
done to you as long as you obey the Government orders" (378). In September, 
still sticking rigidly to the terms of his 1890 agreement with the British, 
Kailondo requested permission from the Governor to build a war-fenco at 
Kailahun, an essentially defensive measure (379). Permission was refused 
(380), and in November the NG0 in charge of the Kailahun Frontier Police 
detachment confirmed that Kailondo had complied with the Government's 
demands and had not rebuilt the fence (381). So with hardly any exception 
(382) Kailondo carried out the terms of the 1890 Treaty and obeyed Government 
instructions. He continued faithfully on this course, at least until late 
1895 (383); and Kailondo's successor, Fabu deh, consistently followed the 
sane policy throughout his reign (384). But events between 1891 and 1911 
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proved conclusively how fallacious was the statement that ''no harm will 
be done to you as long as you obey the Government orders" (385). 
Even before the death of Kailondo, the strip of 
IAiawa in the Moa valley just south of the river was being disturbed by 
fears of raids by Kafula's forces, which situation would have been unthink- 
able in the earlier years of Kailondo's reign (386). The British presence 
was producing anew peace in the Luawa area only in the imagination of 
Alldridge and his colleagues (387)t near the Moa River, the ordinary people 
were in fact experiencing a new unrest. As the situation became more 
serious in 1891+ and 1895, so the Government under Cardew became more 
insistent that Kailondo should remain "strictly on the defensive" and that 
the police at Kailahun were to be used only "for the defence of the town" 
(388). Cardew was worried by the fact that neither the dnglo-French (389) 
nor the Anglo-Liberian (390) frontiers had yet been delimited. He did not 
want another 'Waima incident', and as late as March 1896 he was not even 
sure whether Kailahun was officially in the Protectorate or in Liberia (391). 
The ordinary people of Luawa living on the left bank 
of the Moa had to live with constant fear of attack as a result of Cardewis 
cautious and (as regards the border areas) passive policy; and this new 
possibility of being attacked was probably for them one of the first 
appreciable results of the Anglo-French imperial advance in the area and 
the signing of the 1890 Treaty. "Kai Lundu I believe is quite capable of 
resisting these attacks on his territory",, reported Captain Tarbet in April 
1895, uat which he is more annoyed than afraid" (392). Tarbet was referring 
especially to disturbances on Kailondo's eastern boundary, and those presented 
a more serious threat than any which materialized from Wunde: Kailondo 
could have even more easily dealt with Kafula's attacks. Presumably the 
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Luawa rNahci, faithful to the 1890 Treaty, was being restrained from 
decisive action by the continual Government advice "not to carry war 
anywhere" (393). 
Kafula, on the right-bank of the Moa, was ultimately 
even worse off than Kailondo as a result of the European advance. The 
former rose to power too late to achieve his presumed aim of carving out 
his own little independent polity. Kailondo had been allowed fifteen 
years to develop and organize Luawa, and at the time of his death the 
British Protectorate had still not been officially proclaimed (394). But 
by the time Kafula. was in a position to emulate Kailondo, the British 
Protectorate had been established in all but name, the French were in 
Kissi-Kenema (395), and temporarily the time of independent African 
polities had gone. And Kailila, unlike Fabundeh across the Moa, was 
temperamentally unsuited to dealing with the complexitites of the new 
post-independence politics (396). 
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ý, XAILONDO AND CARDE'W, 1895 - 1896 
Until late 1895, Kailondo was remarkably faithful 
to the letter and the spirit of the 1890 Treaty; and in many ways remained 
so until his death. Yet from soon after the signing of the Treaty a 
latent anti-Government, 'anti-white' feeling had been growing among the 
people of Luawa. Perhaps the most serious source of this feeling was the 
obnoxious behaviour of the Frontier Police, who pressed hard upon the 
ordinary people. "One constable in this town would make everybody alarmed", 
recalled Maada James Kailondo. "He would find you and ask you to give over 
your wife to him so that he can sleep with her. There was nothing you 
could do. People used to run away into the bush and leave their wives" 
(397). Kailondo himself was not disturbed in such ways, presumably because 
the constables feared his power, but he was obviously concerned for the 
welfare of his people. The situation was improved when he told the constables 
that he would provide them with women so they need not disturb his people 
(398). Probably in Luawa as elsewhere., the Frontier Police interfered with 
domestic slavery (399), practised extortion, and instituted a limited 'reign 
of terror' (400). Although people in the Luawa area came from miles to see 
Alidridge (401), they would run into the bush at the appearance of a 
constable (402: and these constables were, before the death of Kailondon 
the only representatives of British power with whom the ordinary people of 
Luawa had any close contact (403). 
Probably by 1895 Kailondo also had his own misgivings 
about the value of constables in Kailahun, although as late as April he was 
requesting reinforcements (4Q4). Possibly this request represented Kailondo's 
last desparate bid to secure from the Frontier Police that phy-oical help 
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against his enemies which he had no doubt always expected from them: 
larger numbers of constables in Kailahun might encourage then finally 
to take the offensive against the Kpandeme 'sofas'. On several previous 
occasions he had specifically requested such help for an offensive (405). 
It had never been forthcoming, nor was it on this last occasion: a few 
extra men were sent (406), but they were to be used only to defend the 
country round Kailahun and not in any way to attack Kailondots enemies 
(407). 
The number of constables in Kailahun slowly increased 
from three in 1891 (408) to twenty in 1894 (409), but there is no indica- 
tion that they ever gave positive military help to Kailondo (1x. 10). Rather 
they were a hindrance to him when, for example, they prevented him from 
rebuilding his war-fence round Kailahun (411) and reported unfavourably 
on his behaviour (412). The patrols undertaken by Frontier Police round 
Kailahun (413) may also have been a nuisance to Kailondo in preventing him 
from taking decisive action against his enemies, for Cardewts specific 
instructions about the Police were that they should stop uintertribul wars" 
(414), and that both the Chief and the constables should remain "strictly 
on the defensive's (415). In practice this meant waiting until enemies 
had actually penetrated Iiawa before taking action against them. This was 
an idea altogether alien to Kailondo's political principles* up to 1890 he 
had always tried to take action before an invasion could get under way 
against Luawa in order to ensure that the polity's, internal peace was never 
disturbed (416). 
As the novelty of being in alliance with the white 
men (417) wore off, a, number of other disadvantages, apart from the behaviour 
of the constables, became incroasingly apparent. The demands of the British 
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slowly increased. They insisted on the constant clearing of roads (418), 
and tried to stop slave-trading (419). In 1893, Alidridge expected 
Kailondo to make a hundred-mile journey south to meet the Governor (420). 
In 1894 Cardew summoned the Luawa Mahei to meet him at Laoma (421), and 
in 1895 at Vahun (422). Entertaining visiting Europeans must have become 
rather a burden for Kailondon as both the number of visits and the size 
of the parties increased. In 1890 A11dridge's party contained only about 
forty men (423), but when Cardew visited Luawa in 1895 he had about four 
hundred and fifty people with him (1.24). By the terms of the 1890 Treaty 
Kailondo realized that before taking any major decision it would be necessary 
to consult the Freetown Goverment, which meant in many cases sending a 
special emissary all the way to the Colony and back, with consequent expense, 
delay and general inconvenience. He sent messengers to Freetown in May 
1890 (425), March 1891 (426), April 1894 (427); and January (1128), June (429) 
and August 1895 (430), and perhaps on other occasions too. He also wrote a 
number of letters to Freetown, using the Frontier Police NCO at Kailahun 
as his amanuensis (431). It would seem that in every single case except 
one, Kailondo's requests were not met in the way he wanted or, more frequently, 
not met at all: the exception was the establishment of a Frontier Police 
station at Kailahun (432). 
Despite all this, Kailondo showed no hint of 
annoyance with the British until Cardew's visit to Luaws, its 1895. late 
in 1894 or early in 1895 (433) the French sent a message to Kailondo through 
Dikeh, a mahe in Gband© country, suggesting he should ally with them (434). 
Pitifully underestimating Kailondo, they sent him some tins of beef" along 
with the message (435), apparently hoping that their present would tempt 
Ytzµti; 
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him to break his friendship with the British. Kailondo reacted by seeking 
first to maintain correct relationships with Freetown. He sent Ngobeh 
Kahunla to the Colony to report the matter in January 1895 (436). If he 
had wanted at this stage to turn back on his 1890 alliance, he could have 
expected material support from the French, for "French soldiers" (437) - 
presumably Senegalese tiraiUleurs (438) - were occasionally penetrating 
into Luawa itself at this period. But it was only after Cärdew'a visit 
to Luawa in February-March 1895 that Kailondo showed any resentment against 
the British and any readiness to renounce his alliance with them. The 
evidence in the despatches of both Cardew himself and of other Government 
officials clearly suggests that the Governor's behaviour during his 1895 
visit to Kailondo caused a change of attitude towards the British in the 
latter. Cardew's behaviour virtually forced Kailondo to begin to view the 
1890 Treaty in a new and less favourable light (43 9). 
Travelling up from Freetown, Cardow reached Daru in 
February 1895 (440), and then, instead of taking the direct route to 
Kailahun, he went to Vahun, south of the Magowt River (441). There he met 
Mono Bahomi and Mbawulomeh, the latter being the most persistently trouble- 
some of all Kailondons enemies. Even before consulting Kailondo, Cardow 
seemed to take a sympathetic view of the position of these disturbers of 
Luawa's peace (442), and concluded that Kailondo was innot so desirous of 
peace as they are" (443) -a truly remarkable conclusion in the light of 
previous events. The Governor promised the Mahan eisig at Vahun that he 
would "restrain KAILMMU from attacking them" (444), and would favourably' 
consider Mbawulomehis request to be allowed to "settle in British territory 
and rebuild the town of GEHUN" (445). This was the town from which 
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Mbawulomeh had raided Luawa, and from which Kailondo had dislodged him 
at the beginning of the Gbande War (446). The Governor also sent 
Kailondo instructions to come to Vahun (447). 
According to Mende etiquette, the British official 
by this behaviour was being deliberately impolite to the ruler of Luawa. 
By failing to travel directly to Kailahun in order to greet Kailondo, 
Cardew was disparaging the Ma. hei's political powers by pronouncing on 
a dispute without investigating Kailondo's grievances, he was discrediting 
the latter's side of the arguments by sending for Kailondo to come to 
Vahun (instead of going to meet the Luawa Mahet at Kailahun), he was 
implying that Kailondo was in a position of inferiority and subjection. 
As Alidridge discovered in 1893, a Mahsi would not easily leave his own 
mahawu at the request of anyone except s. recognized overlord whose 
suzerainty had been demonstrated by military conquest (448). Kailondo 
had no overlord, he was himself the supreme political power in the area, 
and he did not go to Vahun, pleading sickness: but whether or not he was 
really sick (449), it was doubtful if he would in any case have obeyed 
Cardew's summons. 
His own official reports suggest that Caxdew arrived 
in Kailahun somewhat predisposed against Kailondo - an attitude which the 
Luawa Mahnt would undoubtedly have quickly sensed (450). In his first 
interview, the Governor "censured" Kailondo for not 'bob©yingtl his 
"instructions" (451) - the words are Cardewta, and suggest the tone he 
must have adopted. For the first time, Kailondo saw how the Governor 
himself interpreted the 1890 Treaty. Llldridge in his attittdos and actions 
had indicated that the Treaty was an alliance between equals. The British 
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Commissioner no doubt explained it in this way since he wrote of making 
"friendly treaties" (452) with the chiefs,, and this understanding of the 
Treaty was reinforced by a personal friendship between the Kissi-man and 
the Englishman (453). Overbearing behaviour by the constables in Kailahun, 
or the strangely peremptory tone of some Government letters over the five 
years after the signing of the Treaty (454) may not have worried Kailondo 
unduly. But the actions and attitudes of the Governor himself could not 
be overlooked, and there could be little doubt that he thought of Kailondo 
as a minor subordinate with only a small margin of political independence. 
In a. later interview Cardew went out of his way to underline the master-. 
servant relationship which he considered to exist between himself and 
Kailondo. Almost certainly Kailondo had been angered by the way Cardew 
had behaved at Vahun, and as a result, it seems, had began to reflect on 
how little the Government had done to protect him from external aggression. 
He had started to say that if the Government did not help him fight the 
Kpandeme people 'the would cause the police who are stationed at KA tELAHUN 
to retire from his country by not allowing- them any supplies, and further 
would hand back his stipends and reclaim his country'' (455). 
This last remark highlights the extant to which 
Kailondo's understanding of the situation was different from Cardew's. 
Kailondo was thinking of himself as a free agent, in a position to withdraw 
his patronage from the British, and to insist that they should leave his 
polity if they failed to give him political satisfaction. The Governor, 
with plans for establishing a Protectorate worked out and in coma respects 
already in operation (456), was thinking in terms of dismissing recalcitrant 
chiefs who did not show a sufficient degree of obedience. "I pointed out to 
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him', Cardew recorded, "that if he offended the Government and they in 
consequence withdrew their protection from him his position would become 
untenable environed as he was along the border by numerous enemies" (457). 
This argument probably had little effect upon Kailondos he had enemies 
on his borders partly because of British so-called protection which 
forbade him from driving his enemies away (458). Perhaps realizing that 
he had made little impression, Cardew resorted to the military-wants 
arguments Kailondo's position would become especially untenable, he said, 
"if the Government were to bring the pressure of the Frontier Police to bear 
against him" (459). For Kailondo, that may have been a moment of truth. 
Cardew had summarized in one sweep his unconcern with the wishes of the 
Luawa people, his disregard for their political institutions, and his 
indifference to the person of their ruler: his primary interest was to 
achieve submission to British rule and obedience to his own commands. 
Kailondo in 1895 was mistaken to believe he could 
turn out the British at will: he underestimated the strong desire of the 
nuubleisia (460) to be rulers, and the degree of military force they could 
bring to bear. But Cardew was mistaken too: he underestimated the strength 
of local resistance among both the mahl naeis1a and their people to their 
being forced into a subservient role (461). Within five years he had 
disqualified himself from further office even in the eyes of his own masters 
in London (462), and his Protectorate lasted little more than half-a-century. 
However, the immediate result of Cardew1D talk with 
Kailondo, according to the former, was that "supplies for my carriers, of 
which sufficient had not been forthcoming, were readily brought in" (463)ß 
and the Governor apparently left Kailahun with no qualms about the situation, 
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When Captain Tarbet, the Inspector General of Police, wont to Kailahun 
in April 1895, he too was satisfied (464). Kailondo was pleased at least 
to see Frontier Police reinforcements arriving, and reported to Tarbot 
that Mbawulomeh was being secretly supported by Kabba Sei of Mando who 
had given Mbawulomeh the town of Vahun (465). Kailondo requested a meeting 
with Kabba Sei in front of the Officer Commanding at Panguma, "in order 
that it might be shown that what he said was true, and with a view to 
putting an end to these invasions into his territory" (466). Unready to 
act precipitately, yet annoyed and disappointed by Cardew's obvious lack 
of sympathy, the suggestion of a meeting at Pangwnaawas perhaps Kailondots 
final attempt to got his own point of view considered. 
Nothing was done about Kailondo'a suggestion (467), 
though in mid-May Captain Fairtlough, the Officer Commanding at Panguma, 
made a visit to Kailahun. Fairtlough decided that Kailondo was a liar (468)z 
the Luawa Mahe 's statements about Kabba Sei and others were "only a flying 
report" (469) circulated by Kailondo to draw the Commanding Officer's 
attention from more important matters. Moreover, reported Fa rtlough, 
"I believe the whole story of his boing in a state of war with KISSI is 
made the pretext for keeping up a largo body of armed men for the purpose 
of making incursions into his neighbourts territoriest". This British 
official was noticeably less sympathetic to Kailondo's difficulties than 
Alldridge or oven Cardew. Fairtlough was apparently ignorant of Ka ula's 
rebellion, and seemed very eager to make his own authority felt. He asked, 
'Should Kailondo be "allowed to continue this war 7"' (470)' - are, was clearly 
eager to take action himself against the Luawa Ifahe . If the reports of 
Alldridge, Cardew, Tarbot, and. successive Frontier Police NCOs at Kailahhun 
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are accepted as reasonably accurate (471), Fairtlough was standing reality 
on its head. "The fact of numbers of his 
(Kailondo'aJ war-boys moving 
up and down keep the country in a state of unrest', wrote Fairtlough, "and 
only provoke reprisals from Chiefs outside the Protectorate" (472). 
Actually it was raids (unchecked by the British) from outside , +hnn which 
made It vital for Kailondo to maintain the strength of his ko uýbania. 
Yet Fairtlough may have been right to regard Kai]. ondo, 
shaken by the behaviour of Cardew, as a rather unreliable ally by this time. 
Certainly Fairtloughts overbearing attitude seemed to be the last straw for 
both the ruler and his people. Firm evidence is lacking, but it seams 
likely that Kailondo was by now ready to repudiate his agreement with the 
British, as he had threatened to do three months earlier (473). Ten days 
after Fairtlough's visit, the 1100 in charge of the Kailahun Frontier Police, 
M'Cauley, wrote a rather garbled and contradictory report (474) on events 
in Luawa. It contained the statement that Kailondo "sent 9 heads of money 
C475J to Chief KEFALL& (476Jto ask the French Government to assist him 
to war, that the English Government make a fool of hin" (477). Also., ' on 
22 May a large number of people assembled at Mofindor to drive away the 
Police from Kailahun, "as they want no Police in their district and the 
Governor makes them a fool" (478). Such reports need to be treated ccopti- 
cally: a Frontier Police constable with a personal grievance against a 
Mahal could all too easily make a false or exaggerated report against him. 
But in this case there was almost certainly a kernel of truth in the report 
that Kailondo was thinking of severing relations with the British. Cardow 
and the officials of the London Colonial Office apparently aecop tod M'Cauley'a 
comments as fairly accurate, and indeed themselves aympathixod with Kailondons 
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predicament: it was natural that when Britain did not adequately protect 
Luawa, Kailondo should threaten to "throw off all allegiance or connoction" 
(479). Late in 1895 (480) the Luawa Mahei took a step which was, for him, 
exceptional: he started a war in Liberia against his external enemies 
without seeking either the help, advice or permission of British officials 
(481). This was probably a furthor sign of his increasing distrust of 
his British tfriends'. But Kailondo was by this stage a very sick man, 
and did not himself go on the war (482). Within a few months he diod. 
The date which has generally been accepted for the 
death of Kailondo is 7 April 1895 (483), and Mr. Arthur Abraham seeng to 
be the only person who has noted the difficulty concerning this dato: 
"archival records show the Governor writing to Kailondo in the summor of 
1895, informing him of His Excellency's proposed visit of 1396" (484). 
Mr. Abraham believes that "Kai probably died late 1895 or early 1896", and 
evidence discovered by the present writer supports that conclusion. Kailondo 
was apparently in reasonably good health when Captain Fairtlough mat him in 
mid-May 1895 (485); and M'Cauley's report, written on 26 May concerning 
action taken by Kailondo, has already been mentioned (486). In Juno and 
August 1895, J. C. E. Parkes in Freetown sent letters to Kailondo in reply 
to recently-received communications from the Luawa Mahr. (487). On 
1 November 1895, Parkes again wrote to Kailondo stating that news had 
reached Freetown "that you have been fighting on the Liberian side of the 
country", and advising him "not to carry war anywhere" (483). The earliest 
possible date for Kailondo's death, therefore, is late 1895. 
Between September 1895 and March 1896 there wary 
virtually no reference to Luawa in Government d©spatchlos from Sierra Loon 
(489). The first mention of Kailondoto death was in correspondence from 
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Cardew during his 1896 Protectorate tour. The Governor reached Kailahun 
on 5 March, and reported that Fabundeh had been chosen by the people of 
Luawa as successor to Kailondo, a choice which the Governor confirmed on 
10 March (490). Cardew noted that «the customary fiction in West Africa., 
as probably elsewhere, is that a King never dies, so Kai Lundu is always 
spoken of as being sick and it is only when his successor is nominated 
that his funeral obsequies will, be hold and his absence officially mourned 
for" (491). No other evidence has been found in written records or oral 
traditions of the Mendebieisia or Kissia of Luawa to validate the existence 
of this "customary fiction" (492). Presumably Cardew himself first heard 
of Kailondo's death when he reached Kailahun (493), and the "customary 
fiction" was the Governor's rationalization of his failure to gain earlier 
information about the death. 
Unfortunately, there is no way of discovering the 
precise date of Kailondo's death. With a variety of external political 
pressures threatening Luawa in early 1896, it seems doubtful whether the 
polity would have remained leaderless for longer than was absolutely necessary 
- perhaps two or three months. Yet the task of completing the funeral 
ceremonies and arranging a meeting of the leaders and scattered mahann inia 
to approve Kailondo's successor must hav© taken woeks rather than days. 
Most probably, therefore, Kailondois death took place between December 1895 
and February 1896. 
'What would have happened, it is tempting to welt, 
'if Kailondo had lived longer ? How would he have reacted in 1893 at the 
time of the Hut Tax War V But auch questione have no place in a historical 
study. Clearly though, from the time of Cardewra 1895 visit to Luawa, 
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Kailondo acted increasingly as a ruler who had lost confidence in tho 
good faith of his main ally. Still sure of his own military power and 
his control over his own people (4914, he was disillusioned with his 
British connection and bewildered by the political changes which were 
enveloping his polity (495). 
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33. Clarke, Fou Iation of Luaw, p. 12; Hollins, "Short History", pp. 16-. 17, 
34. See Note 22 above. 
35. See Hollins, "Short History", p. 16 and Clarke. Foinca n off, 
p. 12. They tell substantially the acme story, but Mr. Hollins. 
emphasizes that mahnt, Manyeled' an armed bard into Kailondo'e territory, 
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thus provoking war; while Rev. Clarke emphasizes that before this 
happened, Kailondo had refused to return to Manys a wife who had 
run away, thus making Kai largely responsible for the war. P. C. 
Momoh Banya's account puts the responsibility wholly on Many.. 
36. Cardew called this area "the Saus, Konno country" (C0267/409/331; 
Cardew; 17.4.94, at Waims. ), but it is difficult to discover whether 
this title was generally accepted by the people of this area. 
37. Hollins, "Short History", p. 17. 
38. Kailondo's capture of Kapeta did not take place very near the time 
of the raid against Manye, but perhaps as much as a decade later, 
around the year 1890. In June 1895, J. C. E. Parkes (Superintendent 
of the Department of Native Affairs in Freetown) sent a letter to 
Kailondo, thanking him "for having released Chief G1NBU KEPATL 
[SLGA, NADL (11.5.95 - U. 5.96) 289/1895; Parkes, 29.6.957. 
39. In March 1895, Governor Cardew noted that the area between Banda juma. 
Yawei and Waima (near Kainkordu) must have once been "a populous and 
thriving district", but Kailondo had raided the area, and its mhcL 
Gumbo Kagbatta had been "taken prisoner by him over four years ago .... 
I hope to be able to induce K&ILUNDU to release him" (00267/417/Conf. 15; 
Cardew; 7.3.95, at Waima). 
40. Hollins, "Short History", p. 17. 
1+1. Cardew noted that the territory of Nyagua "extends on the t as 
far an Tan i4" L near present-day Gandorhun on the Segbwema-Sefadu 
motor r and on the South joins that of Chief KAILUNDÜ" (C0267/ 
409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, at Waima). 
42. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. 89-9lbelov. , 
43. Hollins, "Short History", p. 17. 
44. See reference in Note 42 to the account of the way Nyyagua and Kailondo 
co-operated in an attack against the people-of Kpandeme. 
45. Alldridge, A Trangforinod Co1onv, p. 179. In the 1892 meeting of the 
Ko, mahanacisia, held to discuss the j9" threat, Nyague was 
apparently annoyed by Kabba Sei and Kailondo in some unstated way, and 
wanted "to fine his two brother chiefs six slaves and one cow each". 
He hoped A1ldridge would enforce theme fine, but the British official 
refused to do so. 
46, "At one time Chief NUGWA appears to have co-operated with KAILUNDU 
against KAFAAA and the Sofaa'but it is'stated that he and Xiii Lundu 
have since fallen out" (04267/409/165; Cardew; 15.6.94). 
47. Even if Kailondo and Nyagua did '. 'fall out' to some extent, - they both 
apparently realized the political advantages of avoiding conflict. 
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48. Hollins, "Short History", p. 21. 
49. Comber, op. cit., quoted in Little, The }ende of Sim Leone, p. 179. 
50. See AAlldridge, The She bro and its Hinterland,. pp. 241 . 245. 
51. C0267/325/248; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, describing the 
attempts of Mendegla to establish peace in the coastal districts 
(quoted in Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, pp. 246-214). 
52. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 13, noted that the following incident 
concerning ma e Fabe occurred four or five years after the Ndawa 
and Kailondo campaign in Kono country; and the latter took place 
c. 1880. Hollins, "Short History", p. 17,, noted that the Fabe incident 
took place two years after the Kono War against Mane. Clarks calls 
the incident the Mafias-woma-goi (War beyond Mafissa), while Hollins 
calls it the Wunde War. 
532. 'The area' in this case could include virtually the whole of present. 
day Kailahun and Kenema Districts. Nyagua was supreme over the area 
how covered by Kenema District north-west of the Nora, while Mendegla 
was the hhavai in what is now Kenema District mouth-east of the Moa. 
Alldridge thought Mendegla's influence reached as far south as the 
Moa estuary (see Note 51 above). Kailondo was the most powerful 
Mahd in present-day Kailahun District (and for sosse distance to the 
north and east of it), the next most powerful rulers after him being 
Kabba Sei of Mando, and Ngevau and Pambu of Malema. By the mid 
1880s, relationships between all these mahanteieia were founded on 
peace and co-operation. 
54. Hollins, "Short History", p. 17, spells the name 'Fobs'. 
55. 'Lingo. -Bengo' is the form used by Paulme, Lea Gene du Rix, pp. 40Q. 41. Hollins, "Short History", p. 17, gives the spelling 'Leudo-Bengu'. 
56`. Clarke, Fundation of Luawa, p. 13, uses _' 
IIpper. Kondo' . Nelson's Sierra Leone Ate, p. 2, gives the name 'Koundou' to the chief town 
of Lingo-Bengu country which is usually known as Kiasi-Kenema. Hollins, 
"Short History", p. 17 calls Ube 'Chief Fobi Kundu'. 
57. See map opp. p. 13 in this thesis. 
58. See Chap. 1 of this themiaf p. 3k. above. 
59. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 13. 
60. Hollins, 'Short History", p. 17. ý The . 
map_ iii Paulite, op. cit., PP. 4O 41, 
shows Tongi country north-went of Wunde,. just east of the, Mali River, 
with Fangaa ndu as its chief town. 
61. Clarke, Foundation or LUM, p. 13. Of Hollins, "Short History", p. 17. An interesting detail, which had obviously stuck in the minds of the 
old warriors who spoke to Mr. : Hollins and Rev. Clarke-' was that at 
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Yarokuru, Kaiiondo'a enemies took refuge in a big cave. Kailondo 
tried to smoke them out, but was unable to do so, and while making 
this-attempt, three of his own men were killed, including Kangbara, 
Kailondo's full brother. It may be a significant comment on the 
limited destruction caused by these 'wars' that the death of three 
men was considered so serious that it was recorded in oral tradition. 
M James Kailondo (Int. 19) noted that at the time of this Mafiasa" 
woma War, Kailondo also fought with the people of Lokoma, who lived 
east of the Mafiasa River, fairly near to Gbgkbdu. 
62, Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 33. 
63. Possibly Fabe was the father of Kaf ula of Wunde. Kaf la came to rule 
Wunde Tongi, Lingo-Bcngu and Wunde proper, and it was noted that 
about 1880 "Kafura's father was chief of the Wunde country North of 
the Moa River" (SLGA, Pendebu District Inteüigenoe nook, p. 79). 
At least until 1890, Kafula recognized Kailondo as overlord. 
64. Mbawulomeh is made up of the Mende words _ rice; o little; 
and = eat. 
65. Hollins, "Short History", p. l5; Clarke, F ationQf LRawa, p. 33. 
Abraham, Traditional Leadershiv, p. 74, noted that Mbawulomehlo invasion 
of Luawa was organized by his former leader Ndawa, but the present 
writer has found no evidence of this. 
66. Hollins, "Short History", p. 15. The town is sometimes called Ngiehun 
Tomago (Little, The Mende of SL as p. 31). M-aada James railondo 
described the town as Ngiehun Tokweima Int. 19). 
67. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. $T-%% below. 
68. See Note 18 above. 
69. KD , Pendembu District NAMP 27/1924; Subjects Luawa-Upper Bambara 
boundary, min. Bowden (Commissioner, Central Province), 11-12.9.25, 
Ngiehun. 
70. Int. 19. 
71. Hollins, "Short History", p. lg; Clarke, FouMation of Lmawa, p. 12. 
72. Ibid. 
73. Here reference is made to lailondota Luawa as defined in Chap. l of 
this thesis., pp. i-2. above. There may. have been occasional skirmishes 
on the very borders of Luava during: Kailondo'e reign (e. g. in 1892 
at Gbandewulo); but auch fighting, was' short-lived, and affected very 
few of the people of Luawa. 
74. Clarke, Foundation ofý, g p. 12. ' The elders of Giema (Int, 14) noted 
how the brother of Kpawo was killed in Kailondote time 
because he invited the Gums people to come and wage war. 
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75. Abraham, A. and Isaac, B., "A Further Note on the History of Luawa 
Chiefdom" in Sierra Leone Studies (n. s. ), No. 24 (Jan. 1969), pp. 72.. 73. 
They suggest that this action, and Kailondo's subsequent campaign 
into Gbande country as an example of "the terror that lailondo 
inspired and the ruthlessness with which he dealt with all opponents 
and personal enemies". But these three mshausteie a had opposed 
Kailondo by military force at the time of his accession, and had then 
encouraged this raid by Mbawulomeh, in which Bundu was killed and 
which was clearly not in the interests of the people of Luawa. It 
is hard to think that any ruler in any period would have dealt with 
auch treason more leniently. The Gbands mahanacisia were ready to 
harbour Mbavulomeh after his raid on Nyandehun, and thus to provide 
him with an excellent base for further attacks on Kailondo's Luawa. 
Kailondo was bound to take some form of action to prevent this. 
76. Hollins, "Short History", p. 18. Cf. P. C. Comber's account (quoted in 
Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p. 31) which suggests that the 
initiative for action against Mbawulomeh cams from Sabba Sei of 
Mando (P. C. Comber's own father). 
77. Hollins, "Short History", p. 18. 
78. Comber, op. cit., quoted in Little, The Mende Qt Sierra Leone, p. 31. 
79. Ngiehun Tomago (see Note 66 above) was apparently just a solitary 
town controlled by Nbawulomeh, while the surrounding area was part 
of Gums, country. In 1892 it seems the ruler of Gwna vas Tanga Fema. 
80. Unfortunately, these details of the Gbande War are to be found only 
in one source - Hollins, "Short History", pp. 18. "19. Clarke, Foundation 
of Luawa, p. 12, corroborates the fact that Kailondo reached Ipelle 
country. Abraham, Traditional Leadership. pº. 74w75, gives a brief 
outline of the campaign, as does Wylie, "Mende Chieftaincy", pp. 3 02. 
303. Dr. Wylie incorrectly states that Mbavulomeh "never bothered 
Kailundu again" (p. 302s of. this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, 
pp. 02- e3 below); that the taws Mbawulomeh first took in Luawa was 
"Nyangahun" (the correct spelling being Nyandehun); and that when 
Kailondo pursued Mbawulomeh he was countering"rebellion" (whereas 
in fact he was countering externen. aggression). 
81. Fobewuru is mentioned as "Fobaywulo" in Comber, op. cit., quoted in 
Little, Mn hMende of Sierra L on , p, 31, and his death recorded. In P. C. Comber's account, `-"Gbandi" is-wrongly described as a torn, 
when in fact it refers to a whole language group. Fobewuru in also 
mentioned in the account of-Luawa under Kailondo in the p6gd23*Zj 
D1, t_rict Inty] 1i LaaOQ Book (SEGA), p"791 Kailende "took the chief 
Fobewuru prisoner to Sarre Lahun, and killed him there, because he 
would not agree to sit down to him". 
82. Helling, "Short History", p. 18: -. "Bau-wuru_me" is the same person 
as Mbawulomeh. As regards Hollins suggested identification of the 
bannette River with the ý St. Paul, - of. Clarke, -, ? caber , fit ,-p. 12, 
138 
where it is recorded that Kai reached "the Bclc country (seven days 
journey from Kailahun)". Taking 15 miles as an average day's 
journey, this would represent just over 100 miles, which is the 
distance away from Kailahun of the St. Paul River at its nearest 
point to Luawa. Of. KDO&, Pendembu District 128/1927; Subjects 
Transfer of Pendembu District Headquarters to Bailahun, enc. Petition 
from P. C. Momo Banya to gis Excellency the Governors Luawa in the 
time of Kailondo was bounded "on the east by the rivers Lanwa, 
Lumbumba in Bereyela in the Republic of Liberia". A small town 
called Beliyela may be found on modern maps of Liberia, lying about 
40 miles north-east of Bopolu and 20 miles north-west of the St. Paul 
valley. There is, of course, no clear evidence that this was the 
route taken by Kailondo. But a route from Massa through Jene 
(Fobewuru's town) and Beliye]. a would be a fairly direct and short 
route from Luawa to the St. Paul River. 
83. Hollins, "Short History", pp. 1&. 19, noted concerning the Gbande people 
that Bailondo "received the fealty of that tribe, which sent him 
presents or tribute to Kailahun but was not called upon to work for 
him". The account of Luawa under Kailondo in the Pe deubuDistrict 
Intelligence Book (SLG&), p. 79, agrees with thins "Later he carried 
war- into the Bandi country, and defeated them at Pupelahun near 
Kamatahun, and made them submit to his rule which they did till his 
death". However, it is unlikely that Kailondo had direct control of 
the whole of Gbande country becauses- 
(i) there was clearly no single ruler through whom the whole Mande 
people could offer submission, but rather (as in the case of the 
Mer eblcisia) a multiplicity of petty rulers, only a few of whom met 
Kailondo. 
(ii) when Alldridge visited the area in 1891, there were no very 
clear signs of Kailondo's overlordship (The Sherbro end its hinterland, 
pi. 211-231+) . 
84, Hollins, "Short History", p. 19. No further reference to Nelfa or 
Molifo has been found, but Alldridge, The sherbro ar 
ate Hinted an4, 
p. 212, mentioned Fabanna as "chief of this Vaasa country", and signed 
a Treaty with him (ibid., p. 250). On the, map of hie 1891 tour, at 
the back of his book, Popalahun is marked mid-way between Yandahu 
Vaasa and Kolahun. 
$3. In an earlier despatch, A. tldridge described Mande, Javalama as lying 
between Guma and Vaasa countries (00267/394/217; f'leming; 30.5.92, 
one. Alldridge, 2.5.92, Sulima), south of the Magovi River. 
CM-. C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, eno. Alldridge 29.5.92, Dia. 
87. Ibid. 
88. It was a limited 'peace treaty' because it involved only three 
mahangcisia. A comprehensive treaty covering all the MdbMjjAjA 
immediately south and east of Luawa would have involved ten or more 
mahWjoia. As regards the use of the phrase 'peace treaty', it is 
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recognized that this has strong connotations in European history 
which may not all be applicable in African history. However, no other 
phrase could be found to describe an agreement between various rulers 
at the end of a war, in which the rulers We a coUectire promise 
not to fight each other. 
89. These hopes were frustrated by the military activities of the Kpaodeme 
'sofas' in the early 1890s, and later by the behaviour of British and 
Liberian officials (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. $L. -93 below, and Chap. 4) pp"26*' W1+'below respectively), 
90. Hollins, "Short History", p. 19. In interesting sidelight is the note 
made by Mr. Hollins that Tengbe, who was Lavale of Luawa in the late 
1920s, brought back a Kpelle cannibal as a slave, and cured him of his 
lust for human flesh. Mr. Gorvie attempts to record this same incident, 
presumably as it was told to him by one of his own informantst when 
Kailondo was leaving Kpelle country, "one Tengbe a Belo chief was 
forced to go along and became a member of Kai's household" (op. cit., 
p. 45). An illustration of how easily distortion can creep in to any 
historical work 
91. As the foregoing Notes show, all the major written sources for Kailoncto's 
reign, as well as most of the oral traditional mention this Grande War. 
92. See Note 82 above. 
93. Wallis, The Advance of our. West African Emmnir , p. 39. 
94. Hollins, "Short History'', p. 19, alone among the written accounts records 
this war, which he says broke out 0.1890, two pare after the Gbande 
War. 
95" Ibid. Mr. Hollins recorded the name as "Taws of Foyas, but this must 
surely be the same mahei-who came from ? oya to the Gbondou Conference 
(see Chap. l of this thesis, pp. io-u above). 
96. Hollins, "Short History", p. 19, where the name is spelt "Gegba". He 
was probably present at the Gbcndou Conference -(pea Chap. 1 of this thesis, p, so above). Mr. -Hollins noted that heýwas the father of P. C. Seku Davowa of Kissi'-Tuagii', who died in 1928. 
97. Writing in 1908, Governor Probya noted that Luuangkorli "vas formerly 
'under' Chief Kie Lundu"(C0267/507/Conf.; Probyn;, 16.11: 08). 
98. See map opp. p. 13 in this . thesis. ý: .. _s 
99. The chronology at this point4n not easy to eort, out, ° an neither Mr. Hollins -nor Rev. Clarke, nor any other source, gives an adequate 
number of precise dates. _ t ,.;. 
100. See this chapter of the, -thesis; ": -. Chep. 2, '-. pp. s4.. q3 , below. _-- 
101. Ibid., p. 9a. below. 
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102, The Mende word , gam 
is usually translated as Swart in English, but 
as in so many other cases, the translation is liable to misunder- 
standing, especially when dealing with the pre-1896 period. These 
'wars' did not involve 'total war' in the sense that the peoples of 
Europe experienced in 1939-4.5, or the peoples of Luawa in the Kpove 
War c. 1880. Most people in Luawa were, probably, hardly affected 
by most twars' during Kailondo1s reign (the Gbande War being an 
exception, with the result that its details were vividly remembered 
in folk stories). The wars may not have involved large forces on 
either aide, nor protracted campaigns, and the aim was usually to 
capture enemy towns rather than fight big, bloody pitch battles 
(see Chap. 1 of this thesis, p. 33 abovet even in the Gbande War, 
Kailondo's usual tactic was to capture and destroy enemy towns). 
103, Clarke, Formation of Lnawa, p. 14, noted that "Gbolo" is "a Marsdingo 
word for the Komende country". But since Luawa, was itself the north.. 
easterly limit of Ro ý[ e, and the Gbolo War was clearly fought east 
of Luawa, it is probable that Rev. Clarke meant Kommende rather than 
Ko *--Mende. Migeod Qº VSp. 114) made a clear -of distinction between Koo-Me cam. people (the northern and eastern Mende 
people) and Kom¢nende. Two individuals from the latter group visited 
him in Kailahun in 1924. "I took down some of their language, which 
I found to be a pure Marsdingo dialect. As soon as they said they 
called themselves Koniaka, I knew who they were. How they came to be 
called Konuendi I was not able to ascertain, but the Creoles have a 
genius for giving other names and so passing them on to Europeans". 
McCulloch, Peoples of Sierra Leone, also notes the distinction, though 
she seems to deal with it rather less satisfactorily than Migeod, 
The Kommende are described as a Mandinka-speaking "tribe" who are 
nevertheless "of the same group as the KO-Mende of Sierra Leone" 
(p. 4, Note 3). The Konyanke, in the present-day, live east of Mende 
and Kimm country, just east of the Loma people (see Murdoch, op, cit., 
map in back cover; Ajayi and Espie, op. cit.., map inside front cover). 
3.04. For the source of these guns, and firearms in general, see Chap. 3 of 
this thesis, pp. t9$-1q below. 
105. Unfortunately, the details of these Wars. are recorded only by Rev. 
Clarke (ftm4atlon of LuLvM, p pp. 14 -15), '_ though a number . of other sources allude to them (see Notes immediately below). Information is lacking 
to identify the location of "Gbolo", "Ndama", and "Jewelehu" territories. 
"Gbolo" country was apparently; in, Liberia,: and Rev. ýClarke stated this 
was also true of "Jewelehu", but that,; "Ndama'; was-in, French Guinea. 
Pa Langama (Int. 20) confirmed that "NdamO was in Guinea (though later 
in the interview be said it wes-in LiberiatAPa Langaura is now an old 
man, and was getting tired towards the' end of, -the, interview). 
106. Langama was the father of _ 
Pa " Lsngama, 
of : Duedu - (Int. 20), -and presumab 
the son of Langaura of Po lama, .ej, of 
: W'hanº 
_ 
in 
, 
Kailondo !a_., time . 
(ibid 
. Bundor Foryoh of Dia was one,, of the at the Gbondou Conference 
in 1880 (see Chap. l of this thesis p, w above). . 
Nothing more is known 
of Kot Bususus was he, perhaps,,. the , 
father of geikýor: Bundu of Buedu, 
LamI2 under P. C. Kaitungi, during - the : l940e 'r? ;: _- .__;. 
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107. Int. 20. 
108. Most of the places in "Greater Luawa" were less than thirty miles 
away from Kailahun by footpath. 
109. Rev. Clarke made clear that these disturbances occurred after the 
Gbande war, which Mr. Hollins assigned to the year 1889. They were 
still going on when Kaailondo died in late 1895 or early 1896, an 
Cardew shoved is his despatches from Luawa in March 1895 (C0267/ 
417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, at Kane Lahun) and March 1896 (C0267/4W 
Conf. 19; Carder; 10.3.96, at Kanre Lahun). 
uo. C0267/40%/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, at Waima: "I had invited Rai Lundu 
... to meet me on my why up, but it appears that he is really ill 
and unable to come, so he sent his brother FABUN'DEH instead, who met 
me at Looms". This might, of course, have been a diplomatic illness. 
Kailondo wao still pleading sickness in February 1895 as a reason 
for not doing what Cardew wanted (C0267/417/ä1; Cardev, 1.3.95, at 
Kanre Lahun). 
133.1. Clarke, F undati, on of u wa, pp. 14-15. Garvie, op, cit. i pp. 46-47, 
noted that this last war, began when "once again Bawulome with a great 
army of mercenary war-boys invaded some of: the poseessiors of the 
Luawa chiefdom" - but the 'great army' sounds like an exaggeration. 
A date late in 1895 is suggested because on 1.11.95, J. O. E. Parkes 
wrote to Kailondo to say that news had reached Preetown "that you 
have been fighting on the Liberian side of the country", and to 
advise him "not to carry war anywhere" (SLGA, NADL 558/1895t cf. 
Abraham, Traditional Leaders ip, p. 76). 
112. See this chapter of the thesis Chap. 2,1 pp. i11-12, % below for a 
discussion of the date of Kailondo's death. 
113. For details of this incursion by Mbawulomeb, ibid., pp. -Is-ii 
above. The only other time at all when there gras an armed incuroion 
into the Luava Heartland during Kailondo'e, reign was, apparently, 
in early 1892 when the ; raided Tungi and attacked Gbandewulo 
on the borders of Kailondo's: heartland, but there io. little evidence 
that this involved various, fighting wit) Kailondo's heartland. 
U4, See Chap. 3 of this thesis, pp. too-tos`below, for the development of 
agriculture and trade in Drava dur3 ng , äailondo Is day., 
115. As early as the 1860x, t ri aiLeu. ro, ednfia formed the backbone of 
the fighting force available -to, the French Governor in Senegal. "France 
owed her success in the Western, Sudan` to , the use she, made of African troops. The tirailleura, accustomed to, local conditions, able to with- 
stand the effects of the climate, well armed, well trained, and 
stiffened by European '- cadres, ` , were 
by-far the most effective fighting 
force in the area. In relying on local manpower, however, the French 
were obliged to adopt local methods of warfare. Except- xcep t for its 
veneer of European discipline, `tý the` whole military . machine was modelled 
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on African lines. Basically there was little difference between a 
oa of and a tirailleur L Kanya-Foratner, A. S., Te CC 
Western 3 ans A StW-Y in-French Military Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1969 p. 272. /. 
116. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. 1o3"ttbelow. 
117. Ibid., p. 85 below. 
128. &lldridge wrote a summary despatch about his 1891 expedition on 
24.4.91, from Bonthe, one. in 00267/389/239; Crook. Gov. ); 
19.5.91. In his first book, The Sherbro And Its Hin r1 nd, ppaZOZ- 
236, Alldridge wrote at length about his 1891 visit as far as 
Kpandeme, but, strangely, in this book he conflates the 1891 visit 
with his first visit in 1890. 
119. Evidence from their names and their style of writing would suggest 
that the Frontier Police NCOs stationed in Xailahun In the l890a 
were semi. -literate Creoles 
(or 'creolized' up-country men). The 
present writer has found no information on the interesting question 
of how well these NCOO spoke the Mende or Kiwi languages; nor on 
the vital question of whether some of the Frontier Police stationed 
at Kailaban were of _R or 
Kiset origin. 
120, Author of a book and several articles on the Protectorate of Sierra 
Leone, Wallis later became British Consul in Liberia. 
121. Wallis, C. B. "A Tour in the Liberian HinterlsxA in Ike Journal of 
the Ito ographical Scev (March 1910), p. 286. 
122. Person, Y., "Guinea-Samori" in Weat Af`ri. n Reaietano (od. Crowder, M", 
Hutchinson, London, 19Th), p. 122. 
123. In his 1891 reports, A11dridge did not apply the name sofas to the 
large groups of armed men whom he found in and around Kpandemej but 
when he later came to write his first book, he described how Xpandeme 
in March 1891 was "the residence of the paramount chief" of "the land 
of the warlike s ofas u (The Sherbro H, p. 22'? ). He 
gives the name of the Mahgj as Sonor (ibid., p. 2r31 . 
124. Person, "Guinea - Samori", p. 134, provides a map of Semorits Empire 
in January 1885 which indicates the Samorils rule eroded over Loma 
(or Toma) country just west of Kpandeme, but did not include Kpandeme 
itself. However, presumably there were no preoiae territorial 
boundaries to Samori's Empire. in this area, and, as With Kailondo'e 
Luawa, 'direct rule' no doubt shaded off gradually into, 'considerable 
influence'. 
125. Ibid., for a map of Samori's Empire about 1896. 
126, C0267/4426/Conr. 45; Cardew; 12.10.96, 
, enc. 
Fairtlough, 15.9.96,1anguma. 
Cardew'e comment appeared in the margin as an explanatory note. 
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127. Wallis, "A Tour in the Liberian Hinterland", p. 285, wrote in 1910 of 
Kpandeme as a "large war-town" which "harboured thousands of fighting 
men known as Sofas". Samori died in 1900 (see Persons "Guinea. 
Samori", p. 140), but his Empire had come to an end two years earlier 
in 1898 (ibid., p. 139)* 
128. For a readily-available and near-contemporary description of the Waima 
incident from the French viewpoint, see Aroin, His_ re derma xi 6e 
F an jLq (Challamel, Paria, 1911), pp. 528-'532. Po ekere in 1893 was 
apparently trying to make "a 'road' to Freetown" L D'Orfond, P. S., 
"New Light on the Ori in of the aiima Affair, 1893" in ierr Leone 
S& Wies (n. a. ) No. 11 
ýDec. 
1958), p. 129J. Porekere in described as 
a lieutenant of Samori. 
129. Waima was a small village near Kainkordu, 
130, Tekuyema is in Gbane Chiefdom about 8 miles vest of Gandorhun. 
Lieutenant Maritz described it in a letter to Captain Valentin, who 
was in Kissidougou, in the first days o December 1893 "Porequere's 
base is composed of a central disraa wall or fence , which he uses 
as his private enclosure; a second encircling the first encloses the 
houses of the Sofas and their Wives, A third encloses women captured 
in the country and guarded by a body of Sofas. Porequere has eight 
horses and each morning he summons his Sofas and organizes small 
revictualling expeditions. The rest of his troops stay under arms 
prepared for any attack from the local warriors" (D'Orfond, "Nev Light 
on the Origin of the Waiima Affair, 1893", p. 130). Early on 5.32.93, 
Maritz attacked and destroyed Tekuyema, and was given information 
that there had been 300 sofas in the village altogether, 
131, For Remo Bila1, see Fyfe, A History of Sierra Ieoae, pp, 504,517. 
132. Ibid., p. 517. 
133, Ibid. 
134. Ibid, 
1354, Ibid. 
336. For example, oral traditions recorded by Rev. Clarke, Found tfon of 
Luawa, pp. 13-34. 
137. See especially the despatches of T. J. Alidridge from Luava in, 189l 
and 1892 (00267/389/239; Crooke (Ag. Gov. ); 19.5.91, one. Alldridge, 
24.4.91 - though he did not mention the lofas by name in thin deopatoh. 
00267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, eno. A1idridge, 29.5.92, Dies). 
]38. Clarke, Foundat on oP Luawa, pp. 13-1.14 placed Ke ilondo's first fight 
against the Wag just after. the arrival at älldridge in 1894. He 
suggested that after leaving Wunde, ' the 10909 moved on to Kono, and 
the devastation they caused there led to_French'aod British action 
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against them, and thus to the Waima collision in late 1893. Alldridge's 
1891 despatches on his expedition east of Luawa (e. g. C0267/3g3/2o2; 
Hay; 15.4.91, ene. A11dridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun) show that tho oa 
were strongly entrenched at Kpandeme by then; but no mention wan made of 
them at the time of Kailondo's Gbande War, Which might suggest that they 
gained their commanding position in that area between 1889 and 1891. 
139. Although Alldridge made the sot sound so terrible, and the local 
people so frightened, yet in 1892 Kailondo and Nyagaa were eager to 
fight them and were confident of possessing the military force to defeat 
the of ; and Alldridge agreed with the estimate of the two mah l 
(C0267 395 312; Fleming; 26.8.92, one. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia). 
140. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p. 291. 
141. The details of the two alternative theories, and the evidence on which 
each is based, are discussed in this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, 
pp. ttt - tt3 below. 
142. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp. 517-521. 
143, D'Orfond, "Nev Light on the Origin of the Waiima Affair, 18930, pp. 131-133. 
144. Fyfe, Sierre Leone Inheritancc, pp. 251-252, quoting C0267/407/12; 
Fleming; 14.1.94, one. Report by sub-Inspector of Police Taylor, 
C. N., 4-1-94- 
3.45. C0267/4O/75; Crooks (Ag. Gov. ); 10.3.94, one. Wilson, P. S. (Cpl., NCO 
i/c F. P. Kaijahun), 18.1.94, Kailahuns "Kaffurah in a town WW MI at 
the interior Gizzee has now joined with the French to bring war in this 
country". Crooks, commenting on the rather confusing set of enclosed 
reports, suggests Kafula still had some connection with the sag, but 
by May 1895 all reference to sofas in the Wunde area had ceased, and 
Cardew was writing of a French post at Kiseidougou (C0267/417/Conf. 34; 
Cardew; 5.5.95)" 
146. A1ldridge, The Sherbro and Ito Hinterland, p. 225. Murdock, op. cit., 
p. 260 relates the 'Bunde people' to the Gbende. 
147. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. $5-babove. 
11+8. Person, Y., "Guinea - Samort", p. 114, indicates that by 1885 the 
town of Macenta, some 80 miles east of Luawa, was unier Samori'e 
control; and even Voinjama, only 50 miles east of Luava, might have 
been under his rule. 
149. it is tempting to describe the Kpandeme people as allies of the Was, 
but there is insufficient evidence to justify auch a statement, 
150. C0267/394134; Crooke (administrator); 22.12.91, enc. Coker, A. W. 
(L/Cpl i/c F. P. Kailahun), 20.11.91, Kailahuns the gotAs "are stationed 
in a town named KOKO-LAA00N the Chief of the town named GBUMB00 1EERw. 
Of. C0267/389/239; Crooke (Ag. Gov. ); 19.5.91, one. Alidridge, 24.4.91, 
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Bonthe: Alldridge noted that Gombo was ZCjIci of Tengea (the central 
town of which was Foya). Towei (see note 95 above) must have either 
died or been displaced by this time. 
151. Mahangcisia is a Mende-language word, and the Gbande people must have 
had their own word for their leaders. MMhWcisia is used here to 
describe the Gbande rulers partly because this thesis attempts to 
look at events from the viewpoint of the Luawa peoples, partly because 
the Mende concept of mahci is applicable also - as far as can be 
judged - to the situation in Gbande, Kono and Kissi countries. The English concept of 'chief' is applicable to none, See 'Note on 
Political Terminology', pp. 4Z- 43 above. 
152. C0267/390, /434; Crooks (administrator); 22.12.91, one. Coker, A. W. 
(L/Cpl i/c F. P. Kailahun), 20.11.91, Kailahun. 
153. This account of the situation in January 1892, and its development, has 
been compiled largely from A ldridge's despatch from Dia, 29.5.92 
(enc. in C0267/395%312; Fleming; 26.8.92). Some hel is also given 
by a letter from Iý/Cpl. Coker in Kailahun 20.11.91 
(encq 
in C0267/ 
3W434; Crooks (administrator); 22.12.915 - but Cokor's information 
is not clearly presented in his letter. Alldridge himself had earlier 
noted the impossibility of arriving at the truth about the sofa war, 
"information at present being very meagre, and statements extremely 
conflicting" (C0267/393/80; Jones; 12.2.92, one, Alldridge, 30.1,92, 
Puabu). Al1dridge's report from Dia, 29.5.92, is largely a report of 
statements made by the different mahanacteta at the Pendembu meeting 
(see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, p. 199 teLow#). These state- 
ments are sometimes contradictory and the British official was probably 
uncertain where the truth lay, for he does not try to give a Ifni©' 
detailed explanation of the causes and course of the fighting; he merely 
records the statements which were made to him. 
Many of the gcisia are merely namesi about which 
nothing more is known, but Kabba Sai is mentioned at a number of points 
throughout this chapter. For Pambu of Maleraa, see Wylie, no Politi_ag 
oLTrans ormaatton, pp. 256-265$ for Fabina of Vassa, see Alld, idge, 
The Sherbro and its Hinterlandp pp. 210,212 (with photo opp. ), 
250 - Alldridge made a Treaty with him in February 1892. Quaume may 
perhaps be the same person as "MOM0ii BAACI4ü, the Chief of BUM" who 
appears in Cardew's despatch from Luawa in 1895 (00267/417/61; Cardew; 
1.3.95, at Kanre Lahun). 
154. lailondo's second principle was to be in alliance with surrounding 
rulers, not to fight them, C0267/393/80; Jogas; 17.2.92 and one* 
indicate that Kailondo refused to get involved in the war, and as 
late as mid-January was possibly hoping to avoid conflict with the 
ag. 
153, Ibid., enc. Coker, A. W. (X/Cpl, 1/c. F. P. Ka, lehut)ý 15.1.92. iLibun. 
156. Ibid. 
-I I f- JAP 
157. Ibid., one. Kailondo (using Coker as amanuensis), 15.1.92, Kailahun. 
158, Ibid. 
159. Ibid. enc. Coker, A. W. (I, /Cpl. I/o. F. P. Kailahun), 21.1.92, gailahuzi 
"Chief Kie Lundoo told me today that messengers came from Gbandy Woaro 
his tom, and that the sofa war is fighting there the whole of the d;; 
A 
v 
and so Kailondo set off to defend his town. 
160. Fakai means in the Mende language, hamlet, small village. 
161.00267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, one. Alldriäge, 29.5.92, Dia, pp. 24-21. 
162. C0267/393/80; Jones; 17.2.92, enc. Sawyerr, R. (sub-officer, 1/o F. P. 
Bandasuma), 29.1.92, Bandasuma. Sawyerr took down the statement of 
Maligy from Gbande country saying that "... the sofas come down with 
their horses, they did not Dome with swords but they come with guns 
and bows ad arrows". 
163. The official despatches do not clarify all the details, but it would 
seem that the only me whom the odag did not drive down to }3aiwala 
was Jama Poto - understandably, since he was the one who had called 
on the oa for help. 
161. Alldridge, The Sherbro its H4nter1e , p. 6. In the 18900, thore 
was a time of "tribal peace, the result of the Friendly Treaties 
between the paramount chiefs and the Government" and "it was to the 
Government, and the Government alone, that the peoples of the Sherbro 
and its Hinterland owed the security to life and property that they 
had enjoyed since 1890". This is just a random examples many others 
are scattered through Atldridge's despatches, articles and two books. 
165. C0267/394/170; Jones (administrator); 26.4.92, eno. Alldridge, 8.4.92, 
Gonoru. 
166, C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, one. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia Afdridge 
mentioned this meeting again in The Sherbro and. Ile Htr, d. p"191 
(Kangama. being A Transformed Colony, pp"175-179, he gives some details 
of the "annoyance" which Nyagua caused him at that meeting. 
167. Ibid., pp. 177-178. 
168. C0267/393/80; Jones; 17.2.92, one. Afldridge, 30.1.92, Ruabu. Altdridge 
made this report lese than four months before his meeting with the 
chiefs at Baiwala. 
169. Audridge, A Transformed Colonv, p. 173. 
170. C0267/39! V312; Fleming; 26.8.92, one. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia, p. 22. 
The only creative initiative taken by Alldridge at this time eee00 
to have been his arbitration between ICabba Sei and Kailondo, which 
achieved a reconciliation of the two mgjhen2cjgia. In }, , be felt 
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he was successful, but in fact the ill-feeling between them broke out 
again several years later. Alidridge tried to discover the origin of 
the 'sofa war' but could do nothing to stop it. 
171, Ibid. 
172. Aildridge, A Lor; gA Colon . p. vii. 
173. Ibid., p. 291+. 
174. CO267/395/312; F1em ng; 26.8.92, enc A1ldridge, 29.5.92, Dial p. 22: 
"I yielded to his [ i. e. Kailondo'searnest solicitations that he, 
in conjunction with Nyagwa might go against the sofas". The plan was 
clearly formulated without the help of the British official, and 
Kailondo at least had made some preliminary arrangements before Alldri1ge 
was approached. 
175. C0267/394/170; Jones; 26.4.92. 
176. SLGA, NADL (16.9.91 - 2.2.93), 128/1892; Parkes, J. C. E. (supt. Dept. 
Native Affairs) to Alldridge, T. J. (Travelling Commr. ); 26.4.92. 
177. C0267/40ä/75; Crooks (Ag. Gov. ); 10.3.94, one. Aldridge, 19.2.94, Bonthe. 
178. Ibid. 
179. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima. Cardew had interviewed 
Nyagua. 
180.00267/409/165; Cardew; 15.6.94. 
181. SLGA, NADL (16.9.91 - 2.2.93), 226/1892; Parkes, J. C. L. to Chief Kai 
Lunde; 27.8.92. See also Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp. 75.76. 
182. Alldridge, The S brqend_its Hinterland, p. 254. 
183.00267/408/94; Quayle-Jones (De uty Gov. ); 31.3.94, one. Wilson 
(P. S., Cpl. i/c. F. P. Kailahun), 13.3.94, Kailahun. 
184. C0267/40W131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Wem. 
185. Int. 
186. C0267/416/Conf. 4; Cardew; 14.1.95, enc. Statement of Kan Hula. 
187.00267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95,1. from - Knre Lahun: "SAWDFM H" in clearly 
a niis-spelling of Kpandeme. 
188, Ibid. 
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189. Ibid. Cf. Afldridge, The Sherbro and its $igterl A nd, p. 231, Describing 
his 1891 visit, Alldridge noted that the "chief of Pandeme was Sosor". 
Presumably, between 1891 and 1895 this hgj had died, and had boon 
replaced by Dukori. Cf, ibid., p. 225, where three Mahan a are mentioned 
as being in alliance: "Kikora, Jasa, and Sosor", Might Dukori and 
Kikora be the same person ? 
190. Komahan2a in the Mende language means war-"leaderg commanders of the 
armed forces (see Clarke, F tQ atior} of L w, p. 5). 
191. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kanre Lahwn. Possibly Bahomi was 
the same person A1ldrid e called "Quaume", who was i her of "the 
Lukaaso Country" (C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, sac. Aildridge,, 
29.5.92, Dia). 
192. Cardew also planned to place 4 constables in one more town, which 
remained unchosen. C0267/417/Conf. 15; Cardew; 7.3.95, from Waima. 
193. C0267/417/Conf. 20; Cardew; 6.4.95. 
194.00267/417/Conf. 26; Cardew; 16.4.95, enc. Tarbet (Insp. Gen. F.?. ). 
195. The climax of the effort probably came only a few weeks after Cardew 
left Kailahun, in March 1895 (ibid"). 
196. The invaders apparently never reached Kailondois heartland; and even 
by 1894, as Samori withdrew eastwards, the 1r pressure against 
Kailondo was probably decreasing. See, e. g. D'Orfond, op. cit., p. 135t 
"The year 1894 saw the end of sofa domination", at least in the area 
north of Luawa. 
197. This statement is based on the fact that there is no evidence of the 
Kailahun F. P. or the Freetown Government having taken positive, helpful 
action to support Kailondo against his main protagonists. It such 
action had been taken, there would surely have been some record left 
of it in the official despatches. 
198. C0267/393/80; Jones; 17.2.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia. 
199. Alldridge made the Treaty with Kailondo is the same year (00267/3 62/ 
182; Hay; 3.5.90, one. copy of the Treaty). Dr. Wylie in his doctoral 
thesis (The Politics of , 
fgr , on) notes that Alldridge arrived in Luawa in 1890t but consistently gives the date of the Treaty as 
1891 (e. g. p. 1771. 
200, Alldridge himself says he was the first European to visit the areas 
in 1890 he penetrated "into the remote parts where no white man had 
ever then been seen" The Sherbro and its H nterla g, p. 165). Governor 
Hay commented on Alldridge's visit to Luawa and the other polities 
that "they have probably never been visited before" (CO267/362%1s2 
Hay; 3.5.90). No evidence has been found that any literate Muslim 
had ever before this time written any account of a visit to Luava, 00 
that Alldridge'a 1890 despatches were almost certainly the first written 
records to be made concerning Luawa. 
149 
201. Extraordinarily, Mr. Hollins ("Short History'' p. 20) gives quite a 
long and detailed account of a visit to Luawa in 1892 by Governor 
Sir Francis Fleming. This visit certainly never took place I There 
is no record of it anywhere else, either in oral traditions, written 
records, or official documents - and if it did ever take place, it 
would undoubtedly have been mentioned in official despatches. Mr. 
Hollins seems to have been confused by a visit Fleming made to 
Bandasuma, in the lower Moa valley, in March 1893 (00267/401/113; 
Fleming; 28.3.93). On this occasion the Governor clearly did not 
travel north of Bandasuma. The details of Flemings supposed route 
to Kailahun, and his calling of Kail. ondo to most him in Vahun (which 
the latter refused to do) are virtually identical with the sequence 
of events which took place during Cardew's 1895 visit to Kailahun 
(00267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95). It seems that somehow Mr. Hollins 
confused and partly conflated Fleming's 1893 visit to Bandasuma and 
Cardewts 1895 visit to Kailahun; but it is impossible to discover 
where he got the date 1892 from. 
202. C0267/389/239; Crooks (Age Gov. ); 19.5.91, one. AUdridge, 24.4.91, 
Bonthe. 
203. C0267/395%312; Fleming; 26.8.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia Station. 
204. A11dridge, The Sherbro and- Ito HjUterland "The Governor* 
Sir Francis Fleming, " eta the Treaty Chiefs r 
1893, " pp. 252-264. 
205.00267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima. Present-day Gandorhun 
is very near the site of Taninahun. 
206.00267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun, for the 1893 expedition: 
and C0267/424/Conf. 19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun for the 1896 
expedition. Hollins, "Short History" p. 20, notes that Cardew visited 
Kailahun in "1894 or 1895", and that he "cams by sea to Sulima", 
Cardew in fact travelled overland from Freetown both in 1895 and 1896. 
207. A7ldridge ap arently made at least two later visits to the Protectorate, 
one in 1907 
JA 
Transformed- C v, p. 86), and one in 1908 (ibid. p. 163). 
Arriving in Luawa in January 1908 (ibid., p. 175), Alldridge noted that 
it was "fourteen years since my last visit there in the days of my 
friend the late chief Kai-Lun4u" (ibid;, p. 180). In his paper "Sierra 
Leone Up to Date" (Proc-eedtngs `of the novae. " Colonial Institite_ Yo1.40, 
1908, pP. 37-55), he noted that between 1905 and 1908 he twice visited 
Sierra Leone, the second visit lasting from November 1907 to May 1903. 
He also noted that he wes District Commissioner of Sherbro from 1894 
to 1905 (p. 38). 
208. For Tarbet's visit, see 00267/417/Conf. 26; Cardew; 164: 95, For 
Fairtlough's visit, see C0267/418/Confj Cardew; 26.6.95, one. Fairtlough, 
30.5.95, Fanguma" 
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209. Neither oral tradition nor written records indicate that Freetown 
Creoles reached Luawa in Kailondo's reign, and if they had done so 
it seems certain that some record would have remained. The first 
Creoles probably reached Luawa fairly early in Fabuurxdeh'a reign, 
around the turn of the century (see Chap. 4, of this thesis, Not 6151?. TfZ 
below). 
210. Alldrldge, A Transformed Colony. p. lfft Fyfe, A Histor3r of Sierra Leone, 
pp. 486-487. 
211. Ibid. Alldridge, The Shepbro and. ite Hinteland, p. 166. 
212. C0879/32/African No. 387, Conf. 7; Hay; 24.2.90, one. Instructions 
Issued to Messrs. Garrett and Alldridge. Cf. Alldridge, The Sherbro 
AW its Hinterland, p. 165: OHy mission was to become acquainted with 
the country and the people, and to extend to the paramount chiefs who 
then ruled, an invitation to accept the privilege of entering into 
friendly treaties with the British Government". 
213. C0879/32/African No. 38'7, Conf. 7; HA; 24.2.90, one. Instructions Issued 
to Messrs. Garrett and Alldridge. 
216. Alidridge, A Transformed CQ ony, Chaps. mx and XXX, pp"279.395, 
215. Ibid., p. 293. 
216. Ibid., p. vii. 
217. This was equally true of later British officials in the Luawa area. 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, Major Le Mesurier 
twice initiated quite serious action without the approval of the 
Governor in Freetown. See Chap. 4 of this theeiep pp"3a-%-3,3 below, 
218, C0267/394/170; Jones; 26.4.92, enc. Alldridge, 8.4.92, Gonoru in Mando. 
219. Ibid., comments on A1ldridge'a enc. despatch by Parkes and Queylc4onea. 
220. 'Local history' of both areas in West Africa which came under French 
control and those under British control. At least until the early 
twentieth century, it seems that local French officials sometimes 
acted in ways which were not always approved-by senior officials on 
the coast; just as Freetown might sometimes, disapprove of the actions 
of the up-country D. C. See Kanya-Forataer, op. cit., passim. 
221, The local up-country D. C., his attitudes and actions, is as yet a 
largely unstudied character, either in the early colonial period or 
in later years. For a first attempt in this direction, see Perraton, 
H. D., "The Man on the Spot" in The Theory or, Im, eri*1 eIx endig 
Euroges} Partition of Africa (Proceedings of a Seminar held at the 
Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 34.21.67). 
151 
222, Perhaps the main reason why the attitudes and actions of local up. 
country British officials have not been the subject of much study 
is that, by its nature, such a study can, concentrate only on one 
or two individuals at a time in one specific area. " They can only 
be the subject-of intensely detailed local history, relating their 
own attitudes and actions to the local socio-political situation 
and to the reactions of individual indigenous rulers and their 
societies. Such history is much needed, but most historians of 
West Africa still prefer to deal in generalities involving whole 
colonies over several decades; or even referring to the entire sub. 
continent throughout the 'colonial era'. The contention of the 
present writer is that little of real value will emerge from West 
African historical studies until the 'broad sweep' approach is 
dropped in favour of close examination of particular people (African 
and European) and events within a very limited area and time-period, 
After perhaps 50 years of such detailed studies there may be enough 
material available to permit the writing of a 'broad-sweep' synthesis. 
223. Hollins, "Short History", p. 19; Clarke, Foundati¢n of Lua , p. 33. 
224. kobanga in the Mende language means a cleared space, often at the 
centre of several separately-wailed but immediately adjacent 
villages, used for public meetings (see Inner, A e. g sh 
Dictionary). 
225. Alldridge, The S rbro and its Hinterland, p. 107. 
226. Ibid., p. 215. 
227. C0267/324frican No. 387, deep. 248/1890; Hay; 6.6.90, one. kLldrjd gei 
12.5.90, Sulima. Alidridge states that these peaceful conditions 
reflect "the magnitude of your Excellency's work throughout the 
country". But it is fantastic to think that Hay's forward policy 
had affected Luawa by 1890, when before then no British official had 
ever been in contact with anyone in Luawa, It is probable that 
Kailondo had never even heard of Hay or his policy, let alone being 
ready to obey his policy. Luawa was in "a state of tranquility=' in 
1890 simply because that had been the normal condition within the 
wui ever since Kailondo's accession in 1880. 
228. In Alldridge's second book, his attempt to make out a case leads to 
some rather tendentious writing; and even its title -" A Transformed 
Colony - suggests that the book is in the nature of an apology for 
colonial rule and the writer's life's work. 
229. Ibid.,, p. 290. 
230. Ibid., p. 291. 
231. Ibid., p. 292. 
232. Ibid. 
152 
233. Ibid. 
234. See Chap. 3 of this thesis p. Igo below. The key documents in 
which Alldridge described his 1890 and 1891 tours are C0879/32/ 
African No. 387, deep. 182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. A1ldridge 
17.4.90, Joru: C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 
6.6.90, one. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima: C0267 388/133; HAY; 15.3.91, 
one. Afldrid$e, 12.2.91, Kailahuna CQ/267/3802; Hay; 15.4.1, one. 
Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kailahun: C0267/389/211; Crooke (Ag. Gov. ); 
22.4.91, one. Alldridge, 30.3.91, Joru; and C0267/389; Crooke 
(Ag. Gov. ); 19.5.91, one. Alidridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe. 
235. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p. 292. 
236. Ibid., p. 293. 
237. Ibid., p. 295. 
238. C0879/32/Afrioan No. 387, deep. 248 of 1890; HaYi 6.6.90, enc. 
Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima, p. 115. 
239. Alidridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p. 215. 
240. AZ2dridge, A TranBforme Colons, p. vii. 
211. A Transformed Colo rýv was published in 1910, nine years after 
The Sherbro and__its Hinterland. 
242. At the beginning of Chap. ]= in A Transformed Colon, ALldridge notes 
how in "certain quarters we are continually hearing of the rapacity 
of Great Britain; the British Lion is represented as incessantly 
prowling about the world seeking for some new territory to devour" 
(p. 290). For a short summary of some of the British poreonalitioo 
who were critical of imperialism at this tine, and some of their 
criticisms, see Taylor, A. J. P., The Trouble Makers (Panther Books, 
London, 1969; original ed. 1957) pp. 87-101., From whatever 'quarters' 
Alldridge heard this criticism, he could hardly fail to feel it was 
personally hurtful, since 'on the ground' in Sierra Leone he had been 
one of the main agents of British colonial, expansion. 
243. There are occasions in T ha 3herbro ADA its Hinterland when he writes 
about what he calls "the darker side, of native African life". Also, 
in AM =ed Colo ffv there are, passages, in'which he remembers the 
old conditions with a good deal'of nostalgia. ýeýg. pp. 1g0.181, on 
the subject of Kailondo'e character), , 
But in genera.. in the later 
book there is a considerably more liberal peppering of the "shocking 
terrorism" type of comment than inhie earlier writings, 
244. A Tr . @tormed Colony, ph177-! 
l80.. 
, 
Although 
, 
the 
. 
1892 meeting was 
help up by lack of cooperation on: the,, part of Nyagua, when he was 
not feeling well Alldridge sent him medicine in the form of "half-. 
a-dozen pills of a much advertised make". 
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245. The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p. 190. 
246. Ibid., p. 187. 
247. Ibid., p. 189. 
248. Ibid., pp. 194, -195. 
249. Ibid., p. 194. 
250. Ibid., p. 188. There is a slight discrepancy between the list of 
presents recorded by AUdridge here in his book and the list 
recorded in his despatch C0879/3ýA rican No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; 
Hay; 6.6.90, one. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima. The differences may 
be tabulateds- 
ITEM BOOK I ESPATCIJ 
Cloth 32 CountrT cloths 4]. Country clothe 
2 Country gowns 
Ivory 1 small tusk of ivory 1 tusk of ivory, 0 lbs. ueight 
Animals 1 Sheep 2 Sheep 
1 Bullock 1 Bullock 
1 Goat 
Rice - Rice 
251. The present writer would agree with the statement that Europeans in 
the tropical climate of Sierra Leone, after a few months residence, 
often find themselves increasingly short-tempered and tending to out.. 
bursts of violent anger. This statement has often been made verbally 
to the present writer by both Africans and Europeans, and has 
occasionally appeared in print. Edward Blyden'once commented, "S do 
not think the mind of any European can be relied on after a year's 
continuous residence in that climate", (00267/144/ ..; 28.7.98, p. 26 
quoted by Wylie, Polities of Transformation, `p. 198). From personal 
experience, the present writer would agree with Blyden'a comment in 
some cases at least, if not as a general rule. Why some Europeans 
are unbalanced by residence in Sierra Leone is hard to say; physical 
conditions of daily life, climate, and peychologio&l factors such as 
'culture shock' may be among the reasons. 
252. The_Sherbro and _ 
to Hinter z, " p. 254" 
253. Ibid., pp. 193-194. Of. Little, ¬ 
The Mende ofSerra It pp. 4.56# 
where the similar point is made that A1ldridge-vsa°"at great pains 
to create a favourable impression". 
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251. Clarke, Foundation of Luava p. 11: Kailondo's advice "was constantly 
sought in 'palavers' and his judgements strictly adhered to. itany 
times he was called upon to give his judgement in 'palavers' of out. 
side chiefs who respected him as much as did his own people". 
255. C0267/388/133; Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Aüdridge, 12.2.91, Kanre Lahun. 
256. Ibid. When the dispute was discussed before Alldridge at a meeting 
in Ngiehun in 1891, it was said that Kai Woni'a seizures (Alldridge 
spells the name KANRE WUNE) were "made nearly five years ago". 
257. Ibid. 
258. Comber, P. C. Bai, The Hi@tory of the Mando Chiefdo, quoted in Little, 
The Mande of Sierra Leone, p. 31. Cf. AZldridge, deformed Coioq , 
p. 181, where the name is given as 'Gurt'. P. G. Comber's History states 
that Kai Wont's seizure was made while Mendegla and Kailondo were 
meeting amicably at Kabba Sei's town of Potolu to settle their 
differences (see this chapter of the thesis, Cbap. 2, pp. 7'f. 1S above). 
259. Ibid. 
260. The 3hgrbro vita Hinterland, p. 1851 Alldridge notes that Momo 
Babahu "in himself" was "far less powerful"; but adds that he might 
have "got the assistance of other chiefs". 
261. C0879/32/African No. 387, deop. 182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, eno. Alldridge, 
17.4.90, Joru. 
262. Ibid. 
263. Ibid. The Treaty with Kailondo was signed on 7.4.90; Alldridge was 
writing from Joru ten days later. 
261+. Ibid. 
265. C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 248 of 1890; ' Hay; 6.6.90, eno. Aidridgs, 
12.5.90, Sulima, p. 116. 
266. C087%/3g/African No, 387, desp. 162 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, eno. llldridge, 
17.4.90, Joru. 
267. See Note 260 above. 
268. Alldridge, The Sher bro and its Hinterland, p. 187, wrote of Kaflondot 
"He immediately professed great 'friendship, i and I never had any cause 
to doubt his sincerity. I always found hian' a true friend", A decade 
later, when many of his earlier views on; 'pre-Protectorates adelnd 
had changed, he was still able to refer to Kailoado `as "a vary special 
friend of mine in whom I was able to place iinplicit oonfidenoe" (A-TransfoMad Col=, p. 199)*, 
269. Malcolm, "Mende Warfare", p. 49. 
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270. in The Sherbro and Ito Hinterlaod, as in his 1890 despatches, Alldridgo 
indicates that it was Kailondo who realised that if he was strictly 
to fulfil the conditions of the Treaty, he could not wage war against 
Morro Babahu. But in every other way in the book, A1ldridgt gives credit 
to himself and Morro Babahu for taking the initiative, not to Kailondo. 
Yet in his 1890 despatches, the British official cQU arlr shows that it 
was Kailondo who took the initiative. 
271. In his second visit in 1891 it rya Momo Babahu who first brought up 
"the old grievance between his people and KILUNDU and the LU1 
people .... and he solicited me in open barri, is the presence of his 
sub-cfliefs and people, to use mir influence with KILUNDU to re-establish 
a friendly intercourse between them" (C0267/38ß/133; Hay; 15.3.91, onc. 
Alldridge, 12.2.91, Sarre Lahun). But in The Sherbro and its Hinteriax4, 
p. 184, A1ldridge clearly states that Homo Babahu first brought up the 
subject "at the time the treaty was signed (ibid., p. 250), i. e,, in 
1890, -ot 1891. 
272. Ibid., p. 184. 
273. Ibid., pp. 184, -185. 
274. Ibid., p. 188. 
275. Ibid. 
276, Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
277.00267/388/133, - Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Afldri4 ge, 12.2.91, Kanrs Lahua, 
278. It is here supposed that Alldridge's official despatch does in fact 
better represent the truth than the passage in The Sherbro slid its 
Hinterland, pp. I, 8Lr-189. This seems a thir presupposition bocauses.. 
(i) the despatch was written only 10 days after the incident, whereas 
the book was published U years later. The account produced closer to 
the event is taken prima facie as the more reliable. 
(ii) it is difficult to think of any reason why AUdridge might have 
subconsciously introduced distortion of the events into his despatob, 
but there was good reason in the book. Th Sherbr and its Ni r't n 
was in one sense an ! ahoi a r0 a ,. vt &' in which he was describing 
and justifying his own work in the Protectorate to the general public. 
(iii very often, as spatial and-temporal distance from the scene of 
an incident increases, so a person's estimate of their own role in 
the incident seems to grow larger. 
279. Rev. Clarke and Mr. Hollins accept lllldrtdgefs statements at race 
value: so do Messrs. Atherton and Kalous ("Nomoli"), McCulloc , (Peorles of Sierra Leone), and Little -(The 
Mende Qf Sierrp Lone) 0 Dr. Wylie believes that nowhere in Alldridge's writing "does the 
Euroýean arrogance so common to MAY other ottioers in his day crop 
up" Pol ticsfo Tranefor, on, p. 176); °' Recently, however, '-) r. Arthur Abraham has encouraged a more questionaing approach to Alldr. 1dgets 
156. 
writing. See Abraham and Isaac, "A Further Note on the History of 
Luawa Chiefdom", and Abraham, A", "Ntagua, the British, and the 
Hut Tax War" in T Irate na ionAl J AfriM-Histor 
Studien, V, 1 (1972 pp. 944-93" 
280, DetaiUod examples of extravagancies in the writings of ouch British 
officials would produce more documentation than, can be dealt with 
here. Perhaps the most fanciful and exotic pieoe of writing by a 
British official in Sierra Leone during the 18909 and early 19QO 
was Wallis' The Advance of our Well African Emnire. 
281, Scholars are right to question the reliability of much oral tradition 
which, apart from Alldridge's writings, forms the only source of 
information on Kailondo's Luawa before 1895: but the written documents 
should be treated with a similar healthy scepticism, The conclusion 
that virtually all the evidence for Luawa before 1$95 (sind much of it 
bearing even later dates) is unreliable must reduce the area of 
'historical certainty'; but that conclusion is a necessary first 
step to the writing of an ultimately better history of up-country 
West Africa. 
282, Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp. 1+87-488. The names of the NCOc, 
recorded in their despatches from Kailahun, would suggest that they 
were mainly Creoles, or men who had come under Freetown influence. 
The standard of writing in some of the despatches would suggest they 
possessed only a rudimentary literacy. 
283. The names of the first constables as remembered by jWga James Bailondo 
(Int. 19) were clearly of Marne origin (e. g. Ngombu); though there is 
the possibility that these names were in fact nieknis s. See Fyfe, 
A History of Sierra Leone, p. 487* of. Hargreaves, J. D., "Frontier 
Police postirr st the growth of a historical legend" in §jerra I&Ono 
Studies (n. e. 
) 
No. 3 (Deo. 1954). At all events, at least one of the 
constables in Kai]ahun must have been able to speak at least a little 
of the Mende language, otherwise there could have been no contact 
between Kailondo and the Frontier Police, 
284. Fyfe.. A H{story of Sierra Leone, `p. 487. See Also Davies, R. P. M., 
Hf 8jejXg e$ VIO& 
Fronttier Force, p. 19. 
285. C0267/417/74; Cardew; 11.4.95, one. Report on Frontier Police, 18%. 
286. See Chap. 4 of this then ia, pp. H9- ito below. 
287. C0267/417/74; Cardew; 11.4.95, enc.. Report on Frontier, 1894. Mongheri 
was about 100 miles west of Kailahun. 
288. C0267/417/Conf'. 15; Cardew; 7.3.95" ý The; Governor told the Officer 
Commanding Frontier Police to proceed to"Pangums "where the head.. 
quarters of company in the 2Mongheri District will in future be 
stationed", 
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289. C0879/3Z1&frican No. 387, desp. 182 of 1890; HAY; 3.5.90, enc. 
Alldridge, 17.4.90, Joru. 
290. A1ldridge, The Sherbro dis }! nterlend, p. 190. 
291. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone. _ pp. 
483-484. 
292. Ibid., p. 487; and Int. 19. Davies, Hi, starp of the S. L. ßtn. of the 
R. WA. F'. F., p. 20: 'The uniform consisted of a blue jumper and short 
knickers, a red fez with a blue cummnerband, black leather belt and 
accoutrements". 
293. Ibid. "They were armed with the Sneider rifle and sword bay net". 
In March 1890, at Gegbvema, south of Joru, All. dridge noted how at 
the public meeting for the signing of the Treaty his "police escort, 
fully equipped with Tifles and side arms, were drawn up" behind him 
(The Sherbro its_ Hinterm, p. 176). Presumably this was the 
procedure he also adopted at Kailahun. 
291. C0879/32/African No-387; Hay; 14.5.90, eno. J. C. 1. Parkes' trans- 
lation of the message brought by Kailondo's emissary to the Governor. 
295. C0879/32/African No. 387, desp. 182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90" 
296. SI, GL, NADL (12.90 - 9.91), 401/1891, from Lendy, E. A. S. (Ag. Supt. Dept. Native Affairs) to Ag. Inop. General of Police, 6.6.91. 
297. Ibid. 
298. Ibid. 
299. C0267/394/434; Crooke (Administrator)l' 22.12.91, one, Coker,, Alfred W. 
(L/Cpl. i/c Kailahun F. P. ), 20.11.91, Kailahun. 
300. Ibid. Coker's letter seems to be the earliest indication that a 
detachment of the F. P. was permanently stationed at Kailahun. This 
evidence that they were permanent from late 1891 onwards is 
(i) the steady stream of reports from F. P. -NC0e which come out 
of Kailahun from late 1891 onwards. 
(ii) the building of 2 houses as 'barracks' which Bailondo would 
not, presumably, have been asked to erect if the detachment was 
not going to be permanent. 
301. A11dridge, The Sha ro and tsa Hintersand, £p. 190. 
} 
302. Coker's letter 20.11.91 (aee Note 299) s° "I give his the order to build 
the house in the centre of the three Fended Towns', Cfý g James 
Kailondo (Int. 19)s "Kailahunwas tree tonne in those days " Taaoveshun, Gitbina, and Tongoyama. In the centre of these three towns there was kolAwa a sort of open place which called a 
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303. Int. 19. Cf. Hollins, "Short History", p. 22, where the Frontier 
Police barracks are stated to have been "on the site of the present 
Kailahun market place", which is on the other side of the present- 
day motor road to Mofindor, immediately opposite the N. A. Offices. 
304. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. ixt-l2 below. 
305. C0267/382/182; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. 
306. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, one. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kailahun, p. 11. 
307. For Kono, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. %-. '17 above. 
As regards Guma, the earliest British records considered it a separate 
mahawu from Luawa, and no oral tradition discovered by the writer 
states that Kailondo was ruler there, yet at the time of the Gbande War, 
Kailondo "drove Barome out of Gau and out of Guma also and himself 
built a town in Guma .... When ace was once nor established, the 
people from Vahun and Bunumbu 
peace 
towns in Gau, / returned and built 
those towns and then sough permission of K. Lundu and Jung-holy 
one of the Guma leaders again built Gundama in Gau and sat down 
with Kai Lundu" (KDV, Pendembu District NM4P 27/1924; Subjects 
Luawa-Upper Bambara boundary. Minute by Bowden, W. D., (Commissioner 
Central Province), 11-12.9.25, Ngiehunj. 
308. But Kailondo had some influence west of the Moa, as is shown by his 
Kono war against Mane of Walihun, and his capture of Kapeta (see this 
chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. 76 -77 above). 
309. See Chap. l of this thesis, pß. 38-39 above. 
310. An outstanding example of the confusion and disruption caused by 
British officials, trying to re-order the political organization of 
Mendeland to fit in with their own ideas, is to be found in Kabba Seile 
Mando. For details, see Little, The Mende of Sierra Leong, pp. 177-179. 
311. Gbandewulo was apparently at this time the headquarters town of Kissi 
Tungi: in the colonial period, Buedu became the headquarters, and has 
remained so since. Tungi in the 1890s, though may have differed in 
extent from what it became by the 1920s. 
312. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, one. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun, p. 3. 
313. KDOA, Loose papers relating to the election of a P. C. for Ktssi Tungi 
Chiefdom, 1942: "Kai Tungi's claim"$ Sembe Fawundu received his 
stipend "for two years and then died". See also Aildrld ge 16.3.91 
(Note 312 above), where he says Sembe'a father died three years earlier. 
Sembe Fawundu must therefore have been m ahý of fungi from 1888 to 1893. 
314, C 0267/38Z/182; Hay; 3.5990, enc. 
315, AUdridge used the eapreasion "paramount chiefs" in 00267/389/202; '3 
15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun, p. 4. 
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316. KDQA, Loose papers relating to the election of a P. C. for Kiesi Tungi 
Chiefdom, 1942s "Kai Tungilo claim". In details, the story which 
Kai Tungi records here of Kailondo's begging of Sembo Fawundu to sign 
a Treaty with Alidridge does not seem accurate. But it almost certainly 
has a factual basis, since there is no doubt that Fabundeh did later 
on give Momo Banya's sister, Kutu, to Sembe Fawundu's son Koli Tungi. 
Of. Int. 22, where Koli Tungi is referred to as Sembe Fawundu'o brother. 
317. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alidridge, 16.3.91, Kanro Lahun, p. 4. 
318, Ibid. 
319. Comber, The History of the Mando Chiefdom, quoted in Little, Th 
of Sierra Leone, pp. 32,178-179. 
320. See Abraham, "Nyagua, the British, and the Hut Tax War". 
321. The Sherbro and Its Hinterland, p. 177. A1ldridge wrote elsewhere 
that he did not know much of the Mende language. His slightly naive 
assumption therefore seems to be that he was consistently well-served 
by Interpreters. 
322. C0267/38Z/182; Hay; 3,5.90, one. See also Hollins, "Short History", 
p. 19, where it is stated that the Treaty was signed "in the open space 
where the Kailahun market place now stands", i. e. in the k2h%Dzfti. 
But cf. 00879/32/ fries No. 87, desp. 248 of 1890; Flay; 6.6.90, and. 
Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulymah, where Alidridge writes of "the barrio 
in which the treaty was made". 
323. For the Homo Babahu-Kailondo dispute, see this chapter of the thesis., 
Chap. 2, pp. ioo .. X03 above. 
324. pu m in the Mende language means British person, European, any 
person of a light-coloured akin pigmentation; also an indigenous person 
who follows 'European' ways (Inns, A e-English Dictionary) = man, 
living person. A perhaps rather fanciful explanation has been given of 
the prefix ', }', Many of the first Europeans whom the Morde people met 
(presumably on or near the coast) were English traders who used Liverpool 
as their port of entry into Britain. But when they explained where Choy 
came from, it was only the distinctive sound of the last syllable of 
the word that the Mende people remembered -" 'pool'. 
325, As with the team Luawa, Wund® in this period cannot be easily defined 
geographically. After c. 1896 it seems that Kaftla ruled from Kisei. 
Kenema, and the term Wunde may have been applied to the whole of the 
south-western quarter of what was later called the 'Carole do Guackedoul. 
But later maps, taken in conjunction with comments in Clarke and Hollins 
concerning mahawu sa surrounding Wunde, might suggest that Wunde 
proper extended only about 10 to 15 miles north of the Moa. As with 
Luawa, the essential point may be that the people of, the area in those 
days simply did not formulate the concept of aha cS in territorial 
terms, but rather as a matter of personal allegiance. 
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326. SLGA, Pendernbu District Intelligence Book, "Luawa Chiefdom", p. 79, 
for note about Kafula's father. Also Abraham, adit$io al I eadersh Leon o of , p. 47, p. 75, Gorvie, Oar Peoples of the Sier describes Kafula as "a friend and relation of Kai". C0267/388/3,33; 
Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Alldridge, 12.2.91, Kanre Lahun: A ldridg© notes 
that Kafu a was "one of his sub-chiefs", and that WUNDI is one of 
KILUNDU'S places, and one days walk from here". Since Kafula was 
still active as late as 1908 see Wallis, C. B., "A Tour in the 
Liberian Hint rland" in The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society 
(March 1910)) it may be presumed that his birth date could not have 
been much earlier than Kailondo's - c. 1845. But since he was already 
ame by c. 1890, his birth date could hardly have been much later 
than c. 1855, since youth disqualified a person from becoming a Mahcj 
in Mende and Kissi society. The date of Karula's death is not known; 
but in 1929, Mr. Hollins noted that Kaftlla's son Nyandekoi, was then 
Chief of Wunde (see Hollin, "Short History, p. 21). 
327. Clarke, Pound t no Luawa, pß. 13-11,. 
328. Ibid. Also Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p'. 75-76. 
329. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. st%. it' below. 
330. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp. 14-15. 
331. Ibid., p. 15. 
332. Maada James Kailondo, for example, stressed this point (tnt. 19)$ 
"Kailondo and Kafula did not quarrel. They stayed in the same country, 
they belonged to the same area". 
333. Ibid. See also Chap-4 of this thesis, pp. 264-266 below. 
334" This was presumably the same war against the sofas as Rev. Clarke 
mentions (see Note 327 above). 
335. C0267/388/133; Hay; 15.3.91, one.. AUdridge, 12.2.91, Kanre Lahun. 
The Freetown Government took Kafula's threat quite seriously, and as 
a result established a Frontier Police detachment of 3 constables in 
Kailahun. It seems that the original intention was to leave the 
detachment there only for the duration of the emergency, but in fact 
it became a permanent police post with its own barracks (see Notes 
296-303 above). 
336.00267/389/202; Bay; 15.4.91, one. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun. 
337. Ibid. 
338. The tendency to describe most 'foreigners' from the north, or from 
'up-country' as Susus' has already been mentioned. "W " means big, 
large or important (Inneau A) er e-Hanish Di ct ,o.. repetition 
of an adjective or adverb in the Honda language given the force of a 
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superlative. See Person, Y., "L1aventure do Porekere et la drama do Waima", p. 266, for details of an alliance between Porokore and 
a group called the "Kuraa-Ware" in South Kono, presumably early in 
1893. Possibly, then, the 'Susuwala' represented a separate group 
who launched an additional offensive against Nya ua and Kailondo at 
roughly the same time as Kafula (with c If help? 
) 
was beginning his 
attacks on Luawa. 
339. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. 86 -8b above. 
310. C O267/40$/73; Crooks (Ag. Gov. ) ; 10.3.94, enc. Aldridge, 19,2.94, 
Sherbro. 
31,1. Ibid. enc. Wilson, P. S. (Cpl. i/c F. P. Kailahun), 18.1.94, Karray 
Cahoon. The evidence presented by Wilson for the presence of the 
French in Wunde is not very strong. Apparently Kailondo sent a spy 
to Kissi-Benema, and "as the man reached he noticed Kaffurah give 
more than 12 heads of country, money to the French to assist him to 
fight". The information is thus third-hand; the spy's story sounds 
rather improbable, and it is unsubstantiated by any other witness. 
Nevertheless, subsequent more weighty evidence suggests there need 
be little doubt that French influence was steadily increasing in 
Kafula's mahawui at this time. 
342. Ibid. s "he is a Treaty Chief with the English now he fears that the 
French will spoil his country". 
343. Ibid. Aldridge did not think it was necessary to give help to 
Kailondo against Kanalas "there is no reason why Kai Lundu and his 
powerful subchiefs should not be able to deal with him in accordance 
with the country laws". This remark reveals how very little the 
British had affected Luawa politically by 18940 despite the clauses 
of the 1890 Treaty. 
344.00267/40 %943 Quayle-Jones (Dep. Gov. ); 31.3.94, enc. Wilson, 13.3.94, 
Kailahun. 
345. Ibid" 
346. The French and Samori's sofas had been, and were Still, in conflict 
with each other. Kafula may, of course, have been trying to play them 
off against each other. 
347. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, at Waima. 
348.00267/409/45, Cardew; 9.6.94. Also 00267/409/165; Cardew; 15.6.94. 
349. Ibid. The early maps for this area contained in official deapatchea 
for the 1890a in Cß67 indicate that Yandahu was on or near the 
present-day site of Darn. 
350, Ibid. 
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351. The Kpandeme menace and Cardew's new postings of F. P. are also noted 
in this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. 91-9Z above. 
352. C0267/1+16/Conf. 4; Cardew; 1/+. 1.95, one. Statement of Kan Hula. The 
other information concerned news of an intrusion of the Kpandeme 
people who had attacked tea, and the French message which had been 
sent to Kailondo. 
353, Ibid. 
354. Ibid. Cardew's own comments on the statement. 
355. C0267/417/Conf. 34; Cardew; 8.5.95. 
356. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, at Kailahun. Despite the seriousness 
of the threat from Kafula, Cardew implied that the threat from the 
Kpandeme people was much more pressing. 
357. The French were undoubtedly penetrating south into the sphere of 
Kafula's influence. To an agitated NCO in Kailahun, perhaps aware of 
the superiority of Senegalese tirailleurs over the Frontier Police, 
the very presence of the French in the Wunde area could easily be 
misconstrued as a Kafula-French alliance. Likewise Kailondo, committed 
to the British, and Cardew, fearful of another Waima, mi ht both tend 
to exaggerate the situation. In March 1897, Fairtlough 
(Ag. 
D. C. Panguma) 
reported how in October 1895, one of his own NCOs met a French detach- 
ment of 'native soldiers' at Kundo (just north of the Moa River) who 
produced "a paper which purported to come from the Commandant at Parana 
and stated that all. Kafura's, country and Kundo belonged to the French" 
(C 0267/432/Conf. 23; Cardew; 10.4.97, one. Fairtlough, 16.3.97, Penguma). 
Fairtlough had also heard that "the French post which was established 
in Chief Kafura's town of Kenema in Lower Kissi, was owing to disagree. 
ments with the Chief, withdrawn some time about September" 1896 (ibid. ). 
358. C 0267/427/Conf. 54; Carden; 26.11.96, one. Fairtlough, n. d. (around 
20.32.96). 
359. Ibid. Corporal Clements, who had been patrolling as far north as 
ICainkordu, reported the French attack. The reference to "sofa friendlies" 
assisting the French would suggest that the term's was being applied 
very generally to any local armed band containing horeemen. 
360. See Chap-4 of this thesis, pp. 7-16* -2%10 below. 
361. The hypothesis which follows is tentatively advanced as a poaaible 
explanation. The evidence is perhaps insufficient ever to allow this 
hypothesis to be accepted as 'solid history'. 
362. For KafulaIa relations with Fabundeh, ibid., pp, X44- 10 below. 
363. Wallin, aA Tour in the Liberian Hinterland", p. 293. 
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364. The French defeat of Samori, and the British reaction to the 1893 
War in the Protectorate had proved the unprofitability of auch a 
policy to virtually every other local ruler in the area. 
365. The evidence on Kafula's career points clearly to the way in which 
he left one 'ally' for another according to where he considered lay 
his greatest opportunity for political gain. 
366. An alternative possibility is that Kafula only once made a request 
for Kailondo's help against the sofas. This was, to begin with, a 
genuine plea for help, but after some initial skirmishing Kafula 
decided that more was to be gained by opposing Kailondo than by 
staying in alliance with him. So at that stage the former set an 
ambush in order to assassinate the latter. If this alternative 
possibility is accepted, it would mean that Kailondo made only one 
anti-sou raid into Wunde, not two. 
367. Kafula may have been a distant relation of Kailondo s certainly they 
were 'related' by both their fathers coming originally from the name 
mahawui of Wunde. Relevant then to Kafula's position at the death 
of Kailondo is the following passage describing 'traditional' Monde 
burial customs: "every member of the extended family should partici. 
pate in the funeral rites of a relative whether close or distant, by 
making a contribution, of food or cloth (in modern times, in cash or 
kind), towards the funeral expenses. Failure to do so breaks the 
link in the ancestral chain which should be formed with the deceased. 
It is believed that the deceased will become, hostile and seek to 
cause harm to the defaulter and those near to him within the family 
circle" [-Harris, E. T., and Sawyerr, H., The SB 
and Conduct (S. L. Univ. Press andO. U. P., Freetown, 18p. . 
368. For evidence of this, see Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp. 216+4"t165 below. 
369. For French and British failure completely to subjugate Kafula, see 
Chap. l+ of this thesis, pp. 27e-219 below.: The . Europeans never 
achieved solid victories because Kailila was supported by a substantial 
proportion of his own Kissi people. 
370,00267/389/202; HaY; 15.4.91, enc. A1ldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun, 
p. 28. Alldridge is quite clear that Katula's attempt on iCailondo' q 
life took place "towards the latter part of last year", i. e. 1890. 
371. Int. 20. Strangely, the present writer's two most reliable informants 
Magda James Kailondo (Int. 19) and Pa Langama (Int. 20) - were agreed 
that Kailondo never fought Kafula. It. is possible that there is some 
truth in this. Although Alldridge 
_(and, -latar_. 
Cardew) mention a 'state 
of war' between the two Kissi rulers, they giv, no evidence that 
Kailondo ever took the offensive against. Ifatula. The-latter, on his 
part, tried to assassinate Kailondo, and his raiding parties had 
become a serious nuisance in northern, Luawa by the time of Kialondo' 
death; but (probably recognizing his own militarily inferior position) 
Kafula apparently never attempted a systematic invasion of Luawa. 
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Maeda James Kailondo went even further, however, and said that 
"Kailondo and Kafula did not quarrel" (Int. l9)$ this is the only 
point at which M Ca James' oral account is in serious conflict 
with what is virtually indubitable 'fact' in the official despatches. 
372, See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. 14"St above. 
373. C0267/4O/75; Crooks (Ag. Gov. ); 10.3.94, eno. Alldridge, 19.2.94, 
Sherbro. 
371. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, p'. toi -sto above. 
375. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, one, ALtdrldge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun, 
pa. 28-29. Alldridge nowhere reports that Kailondo had definitely 
waited to discuss the matter with the British official before taking 
action against Kafula. But the probability that Kailondo did wait 
in this way is suggested by the facts that (i) Kailondo took no 
action against Kafula before the arrival of Alldridge, though they 
Luawa Mahei had had ample time to do so - at least 4 months since 
Kafula's assassination attempt. (ii) Kailondo made a formal report 
on the matter to the British official, and was clearly eager to hold 
a consultation. 
376. Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
377. The letter does not make clear whether the 1890 Treaty is being 
referred to, or whether Kailondo had made some further (unreported) 
promise to Alldridge in 1891. Perhaps the writer, Lerrly, was him.. 
self unsure 
378. SLGA, NaDL (11.90 - 9.91), x+95/1891, from Lendy, E. A. W. (Ag, Supt, 
Dept. Native Affairs) to Kie Linda, 16.9.91. Kailondo's letter was 
dated 16.8.91. 
379. SLGA, N&DL (16.9.91 - 2.2.93), 563/1891 from Lendy, E. A. W. (ag. Supt. 
Dept. Native Affairs) to Ag. Insp. General of Police, 29.10.91. 
Kailondo's letter was dated 22.9.91. 
380, Ibid. 
381. C0267/394/434; Crooks (administrator); -22.12.91, enc. Coker, A. W. 
(L/Cpl. i/c F. P. Eailahun), 20.11.91, Kailahun. 
382. The Treaty stated that Kailondo should "not enter into any vare with 
neighbouring Chiefs, and should refer serious disputes with his 
"Headmen" to the Governor. In general Kailondo kept to these provisions, 
and after 1890 only involved himself in fighting when it seemed vital 
(though indeed this had been his policy even before 1890). The main 
armed clashes in which he was involved after 1890 were -" (i) the g9JA incursion into Wunde, probably-in late, 1890, which 
Kailondo took action against immediately, presumably because it 
seemed so serious that immediate action was necessary. But when, 
during the campaign, Kailondo got caught up in Kafula's rebellion, 
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he waited for Alldridge's next visit and consulted the British 
official before going to war against his Wunde "Headmen". In 
this way Kailondo avoided violating the 1890 Treaty. 
(ii) in 1892, Kailondo sent reports to Freetown about fighting 
involving the Kpandeme oe and again waited to gain Alldridg®'a 
approval of a campaign against lCpandeme. Alldridge conaented to 
this, and the fighting continued intermittently till Kailondots 
death. This fighting may have included some raids into Liberia 
which were linked with the disturbances caused by Mbawuulomeh 
(see this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. St-%ö above). 
383. C0267/418/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, one. M'Cauley (C. B., 4/Cpl. i/c 
F. P. Kailahun), 26.5.95, Ka" M'Cauley reported disturbances 
at Yibema and Mofindor. This report, like several others from 
1891-1895, mentions the threat of raids against Luawa by Kafula 
see e. g. C0267/408/75" Crooks (Ago Gov. 
); 
10.3.94, one. Wilson, P. S. 
tCpl. I/c F. P. Kailahuný, 18.1.94, Kailahuns Kap4la "has now joined 
with the French to bring war into this country" . 
384. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp1S4fS9below. 
3 85. Ibid., ppi4-$Obelow. 
386. There is no record in the oral tradition of the Mofindor.. 4ano 
Sewalu. -Dia area of any fighting or disturbance in this area between 
x. 1880 and c. 1890, nor do the written records like those of Hollins 
or Clarke suggest any. 
387. In neither of his books does Alldridge so such as mention Kafula. 
To do so would demonstrate that British 'pacification' was lean than 
complete. 
388. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Wa1ma. Kailondo was not well, 
so he sent Fabundeh to meet Cardew at Laomas Cardew made these comments 
to Fabundeh, to be passed on to Kailondo. 
3 89. Ibid. 
390,00267/417/61; Carder; 1.3.95, at Keare Iahen. 
3 91. C 0267/424%Cont. 19; Cardow; 10.3.96, Kanre Lahun, p. 10. 
392. C0267/417/Conf. 26; Carden; 16.4.95, enc. Report of Capt. Tarbet'e 
journey to Kanre Lahun. Tarbet wan Inspector General of the 
Frontier Police. 
393. SLGA, NADL (11.5.95 - 11.5.96), 558/1895, from makes, J. C. E., to 
Chief Ki Lundu, 1.11,95. 
394. Kailondo died in late 1895 or early 1896. The protectorate was 
proclaimed in August 1896. 
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395. C0267/427/Conf. 54; Cardew; 26.11.95, enc. Fairtlough, n. d. (around 
20.11.96). 
396. See Chap-4 of this theeis, pp, 6 -S0below. 
397. Int. 19. 
398. Ibid. 
399. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp. 515-516. 
400. Ibid., p. 553. See also, however, Hargreaves. "Frontier Police postings: 
the growth of a historical legend". 
401. Alldridge, The Sherbro and it Uint erfand, p. 194. 
402. Int. 19. 
403. From late 1891 onwards, there were constables permanently situated 
in Kailahun. The only other contacts of any sort with the British 
and the Freetown Governn nt before the death of Kailondo were the 
occasional visits of British officials to Luawa » illdridge in 1890, 
1891,1892,1893; and Cardew, Tarbet and Fairtlough in 1895. 
404. Kailondo's request was transmitted to the Governor by Capt. Tarbet 
(Inap Gen. Fr. Police) in the latter's report on a visit to Kailahuns 
"he [LKaijondoJ said he was very glad that Frontiers had come up, and 
begged that more would be sent" (C0267/417/Conf. 26; Cardew; 16.4.95, 
enc. ). 
405. For example, SLGA, N. DL (16.9.91 - 2.2.93) 226/1892, from Parkes, 
J. C. E., 27.8.92, to Chief Kie Lundu. Also possible N&DL (11.5.95 
11.5.96), 289/1895 from Parkes, J. C. E., 26.6.95, to Chief Ki Lui4u, 
where Kailondo is simply advised to give his "war news" to "the Officer 
Commanding the Police at Panguma". 
406. See p. txb below, and Note µ15 below. 
1+07. From April 1895 onwards, the use of Frontier Police in the Luawa area 
was governed by Cardewto instruction to the Officer Commanding 
Frontier Police recorded in C0267/417/Conf. 20; Cardew; 6.4.95, eno. s 
"Patrols may use the road from Vahun to Kanrelahun but they must not 
go to the eastward of that road". In other words, Frontier Police were 
forbidden to operate in the Kissi-speaking area of Luawa or to the east 
of it. But it was precisely against his Kiasi-speaking areas that 
Kailondo knew an attack might be launched. And his whole aim in 
requesting more Frontier Police seems to have been to launch an attack 
eastwards into Gbande country and beyond (see also Note 413 below). 
108. SLGA, NADL (11.90 - 9.91), 401/1891, from Lendy, E. A. W. (Ag. Supt. 
Dept. Native Affairs), 27.6.91 to Ag. Insp. General of Police. 
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409. C0267/417/Conf. 15; Cardew; 7.3.95, enc. Instructions to the Officer 
Commanding, Frontier Police, Mongheri District. 
410. No such record is to be found in C0267 ' (where most auch actions, 
even if minor, anywhere in the protected area 1890.1895 are 
recorded), or in SLGA, or in oral traditions. 
43.1,00267/390/434; Crooks (Administrator); 22.12.91, one. Coker, A. W. 
(1/Cpl. i/c F. P. Kailahun), 20.11.91, Kailahun. 
412. C0267/418/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, enc. M'Cauley, C. B. (1Cpl. 1/c 
F. P. Kailahun), 26.5.95, Kailahun. 
4)3. Cardew specifically instructed that patrols could use the Vahu.. 
Kailahun road (presumably meaning the route he himself used in 1695 
through Batema, Nygndehun and Pandobu - C0267/417/Conf. 39; Cardew; 
13.5.95, one. part of route map). The ýatrols were not, however, 
to travel east of this road (00267/417/Conf. 15; Cardew; 7.3.95, from 
Waima). 
134. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima. 
415, Ibid. 
416, See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. iz-73 above. 
417. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, ps. 187-199, suggests - 
probably accurately - that both Kailondo and his people were initially 
surprised and delighted by the strange appearance of the white man, 
his possessions, and the power he seemed to represent. 
4.18. SLGL, NADL (2.2.93 - 22.12.94), 498/1893, from Parkes, J. C. E., 2.11.93, 
to Chief Kei Lundu, in which he was threatened with loss of his stipend 
for 1893 unless he cleared the roads and repaired the bridges in his 
district. 
419, C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima. Ordere had been given to 
the Frontier Police for "the suppression of intertribal care and the 
slave traffic". 
420. Alldridge, The Sherbro and iota Hinterland, p. 254. Kailondo sensibly 
excused himself on the grounds of ill-health, and preoccupation with 
the war against the sofas. 
421. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Watma. Kailo do pleaded iu- 
health, and instead sent Fabudeh to meet Cardew at Laoma. 
422. C0267/417/61; Cardewj 1.3.95, from Kailahun, Kailondo did not go to 
Vahun, pleading in-health as in 1893 and 1894. Cardew failed to 
realize that in Mende custom it was undignified and showed disrespoet 
to send messages summoning a Mahd in this way. 
423. A1ldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p. 166. 
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424. C0267/417/Conf. 15; Cardew; 7.3.95, from Waimea. Cardow's party left 
Kailahun for Bandajuma - Jawei on 2.3.95, "with 454 men" 
425. C0879/32/African No-387; Hay; 14.5.90. 
426. SLGA, NADL (11.90 - 9.91), 273/1891, from Crooks, J. J. (Administrator), 
24.4.91, to Insp. General of Police. 
427. SLGL, NADL (22.2.94 - 10.5.95), 197/1894, from Supt. Dept. Native 
Affairs, 11.4.94, to Chief Sie Lundu. 
428.00267/416/Conf. 4; Cardew; 14.1.95, enc. Statement of Kan Hula. 
, x29. SLGA, NADL (11.5.95 - 11.5.96), 289/1895, from Parkes, J. C. E. (Supt. Dept. Native Affairs), 29.6.95, to Chief Ni Lundu. 
430. Ibid. 390/1895, from Parkes, 23.8.95, to Chief Xi Lundu. 
431. For example SLGA, NADL (11.90 - 9.91), 273/1891,563/1891, and 226/1892 
all refer to letters received from Kailondo. 
132. Kailondo made the request for Frontier Police in May 1890 (C0879%32/ 
African No. 382; Hay; 14.5.90), and 3 constables were sent to Kailahun 
in mid-1891 L SLGA, NADL (11.90-9.91), 401/1891, from Lendy, E. A. J. 
(Ag. Supt. Dept. Native Affairs), 27.6.91, to dg. Insp. Gen, of PoliceJ. 
433. C0267/416/Conf. 4; Cardev; 24.1.95, one. Statement of Kan Hula. 
1,34. Ibid. 
435. Ibid. 
436. Ibid. 
437. C0267/427/Conf. 54; Cardew; 26.11.96, one. Fairtlough, n. d. (around 
20.11.96). One of Fairtlough's constables, Cpl. Clements, had mot 
"fifteen to twenty Sengalese soldiers "at Mendekelema in January 1896, 
In October 1896, "ten French soldiers" had been Bean at Koundou, just 
north of the Moa near Mofindor. 
438. See Note 115 above. 
439. The evidence for this is based on the 1895 despatches of Cardew himself 
and other Government officials. See Notes 440.481 below, passim. 
"0. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. Cardew and his party travelled from Segbwena to "Yendahu". The first maps of the area show Yandahu as being on or near the site of present-day Daru, (see 16M 
Map of Sierra Leone). There was another Tandahu in Wunde. 
441. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Ka. ilahun. He first travelled to 
Vahan "with a view to moving as near as possible to our boundary with Liberia". In fact, Vahun, as well as Kailahun itself, aas east of 
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Longitude 13 degrees West of Paris, which Cardev accepted at that 
stage as the boundary between Sierra Leone and Liberia. Thus Vahun 
was in Liberian territory. 
442. Ibid. The nature of Cardew's opinions suggest that Momoh Nahomi and 
Mbawulomeh impressed him with the rightness of their own views in a 
way which Kailondo never managed to do. 
4 3. Ibid. This was his conclusion after talking with Kailondo in Kailahun. 
444. Ibid. He told them this when he met them at Yahun. 
445. Ibid. Cardew noted about Mbawulomeh that the "Chiefs in this district 
with the exception of K&ILU1DU have no objection to his return". The 
Governor proposed writing to the Liberian Government to see whether 
they had any objection to Mbawulomeh'a return; and if not, he 
apparently intended to allow him to rebuild Ngiehun. 
446. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp. 19-90 above. 
447. C0267/4,17/61; Cardow; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. 
4.48. Alldridge, The She roand its Hinterland, Chap. XXIV, pp. 252-264. 
Alldridge had immense difficulty in persuading the iangcisia to 
travel down to Bandasuma in 1893 to meet Governor Fleming. Aldridge 
ascribed his difficulties to "Mori fetish workers". But in fact no 
mE would easily leave his mahawui, or answer a summons from somoone 
who was not clearly his superior. J'ven in the 1960s and 1970a, to have 
a Chief visit someone was a signal honour to the person visited. 
449. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. It is quite likely that 
Kailondo was far from well. As early as 1893 he seems to have been 
ill (Alldridge, The Sherbro anti its Hinterland, p. 254), and he died 
in either late 1895 or early 1896, lese than a year after Cardow'a 
1895 visit. 
450. The personal experience of the present European writer in the 1960s 
in Kailahun was that (in general) the local people wore much more 
sensitive to 'attitude' and 'atmosphere' than would be the case with 
an ordinary group of people in rural England. This is quite unquanti- 
fiable, and such an evaluation is highly subjective; but such a factor 
should not be completely ignored just because it is so elusive. 
451. C0267/4]7/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. 
452. A1ldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland. p. 165. 
453. See this chapter of the thesis$ Chap. 2, pr, gq-ioo above. Unfortunately 
there is no record of how Alldridge explained to Kailondo (or to any 
other Mahei) the clauses of the Treaty. However, auch passages as that 
on pp. 176-177 of The Sherbro and its Hinterland suggest he emphasized 
that it was "a friendly treaty with the great English Queen". 
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454. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2 pp. Ili -12o above, for the 
behaviour of the constables. For the peremptory tone of some letters 
see, for example, SLGA, NADL (16.9.91-2.2.93), 563/18911 the NCO 1/o 
Kailaban F. P. is to "tell KIELUNDU that the Governor forbids him 
rebuilding his fence". 
455. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. Cardew reported that 
Kailondo had been saying these thingss the remarks of Kailondo were 
"brought to my notice", but he does not indicate by whom. Presumably 
it was by constables of the Frontier Police. There is the possibility 
that these constables were for their own ends, deliberately spreading 
false rumours and misreporting Kailondots remarks. But these remarks 
of Kailondo fit in with other evidence of his attitude from the time 
of Cardew's visit onwards. 
456. See C0267/409/Conf. 45; Cardew; 9.6.91+. This is a long despatch in which 
Cardew puts forward a scheme for Protectorate administration in many 
ways identical with that introduced in 1896. He even suggests a house 
tax to help pay for the cost of administering a Protectorate, as well 
as the building of a railway to Kailahun ! In C0267/417/74; Cardow; 
11.4.95, enc. Report on Frontier Police 1894, the protected area in 
divided into 4 police districts, with a company of Frontier Police 
established in a Headquarters town for each district. The company at 
Mongheri was soon to be moved to Panguma. By mid-1895, the Officer 
Commanding in each district was apparently already doing some of the 
work later undertaken by District Commissioners. 
457. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. 
458. Kailondo could certainly have taken action against Kafula. Alldridge, 
Cardew and Tarbet all felt he had the power to defeat Kafula and keep 
his other enemies at bay. But, faithful to the terms of the Treaty, 
he apparently tried to avoid war as far as possible. 
459. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. 
460. Puub1c_isia is def. plu. Of NUwnoi (see Note 324 above). 
461. C0267/427/Conf. 61; Cardew; 14.12.961 "... rumours have reached me 
that some Chiefs are going to protest against the house-tax, but I 
attach but little weight to these rumours". 
462. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p. 605s "Card©wss five-year term 
expired towards the end of 1900 .... No post was vacant for a 
Governor so dangerously endowed. He retired into private life and 
died in 1921". 
163. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from ICailahun. 
464. C0267/41`7/Conf. 26; Cardew; 16.4.95, eno. Report on Journey to äanre 
Lahun. 
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465. See Chap. A, of this thesis, pp. 254-LSip below, for details of the 1895 
expedition against Mbawulomeh at Vahun, and the probable involvement 
of Kabba Sei. 
466. C0267/47/Conf. 26; Cardew; 16.4.95, one. Report on Journey to Keare 
Lahun. Kailondo again reported in May 1895 that Kabba Sei was one of 
sre of the the disturbers of the peace in the area, and the NCO in2g4C0287/41S/Gonf.; Frontier Police at Kailahun apparently agreed with him 
Cardew; 26.6.95, enc. M'Cauley, C. B. (L/Cpl. 1/c F. P. Kailahun), 26.5.95, 
Kailahun]. 
467. There is no record of any action having been taken. Possibly Fairtlough 
was sent to Kailahun partly in order to investigate Kailondo's complaints 
468. C0267/1.18/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, enc. Fairtlough, 30.5.95, Panguma. 
Captain Fairtlough was at this time o/c Frontier Police, Panguma. 
469. Ibid. 
4? 0. Ibid. 
471. It might just be possible to argue that Fairtlough was right; that 
Llldridge was completely mistaken about Kailondo, and that the ruler 
of Luawa was all the time wanting war for its own sake as a reckless 
aggressor. Cardew*s 1895 despatch from Kailahun might add some further 
evidence to this hypothesis, which Abraham and Isaac in "A Further 
Note on the History of Luawa Chiefdom" go some way to accepting. Yet 
the weight of evidence strongly favours the interpretation given in 
this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, that Kailondo's policy was essen- 
tially constructive and pacific, and it seems the more natural inter. 
pretation. 
472.00267/418/Conf; Cardew; 26.6.95, one. Fair tlough, 30.5095, panguma. 
473. In February 1895, just before Cardew arrived in Kailahun, Kailondo had 
been threatening to break his allegiance with the British. See C0267/ 
417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. 
474,00267/118/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, one. M'Cauley, C. H. (1/Cpl. i/a 
F. P. Kailahun), 26.5.95, Kailahun. Considering its importance as 
evidence of a change in Kailondo's attitude, it is a pity that this 
report is so confused. 
475. k "head of money'" was not a fixed figure. It represented the amount 
of money paid for one slave - almost literacy for 'one head' I 
Alidridge noted in the Luawa area that one 'Kiost iron' was equal to 
one English penny, and a slave could be bought for 200 irons or seven 
country cloths (The Sherbro and its if nterland, p. 217). In this case, 
a 'head of money' would be roughly the equivalent of 25a. in English 
currency. On p. 268 of the same book, Alldridge reported that a slaver. trader had bought a man and a woman, each for eight pieces of cloth, "the value of a piece of auch cloth being probably three ohillingon 
so that one head of money was equal to about 248, in English currency. 
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476. The context indicates this must be Kafula. 
1.77. C0267/418/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, one., McCauley, C. B. (1/Cpi. i/o 
F. P. Bailahun), 26.5.95, Kailahun. 
478. Ibid. This was on 22.5.95. M'Cauley reported that on 23 May the 
number of people was about 700. Next day, however, M'Cauley and 
Kailondo were together in Mofindor and drove them away from the area. 
479. C0267/42]JP. 0., 5.9.95, min. by C. O. official. Cardew was on leave 
in England in July 1895, and attended a conference at the C. O. on 
the subject of Luawa and the Liberian border (C0267/422'/ Individuals, 
Cardew; 24.7.95). It was presumably Cerdow who noted that Kailondo 
"complains that he is betrayed + deserted + threatens to return his 
stipend + break off his allegiance to the British Govt. " Earlier 
(C0267/417/Conf. 40; Cardew; 13,5.95) Cardew had stated that "the 
partition of this country by an arbitrary line entails peculiar 
hardship on Chief Kai Lundu". 
480. See This chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, p. 83 above. 
481. Between 1890 and 1895, Kailondo seems to have reported, orally or 
by letter, every disturbance round his borders and each military 
campaign he was involved in (see Note 382 above). He clearly did 
not do this in late 1895, because J. C. E. Parkes wrote to Kailondo 
about news "having reached here that you have been fighting oh the 
Liberian side of the country" 
(SLGA, NADL -. 11.6.96), 5581 
1895, Parkes, J. C. E., 1.11.95, to Chief Ki Lundu /. Abraham, 
Traditional Leadership, p. 76, mistakenly notes that this letter was 
written in September 1895. 
482. Kailondo instead sent Fabundeh to lead his forced. The present writer 
here presumes that the fighting noted by Parkes in Liberia (see Note 
481 above) refers to Kailondo's same campaign as Rev. Clarke (F , .o of Luawa, pp. 14.15) mentions as the "Jevelehu-goi (Liberia)". It is 
also presumed that the death of Kailondo occurred either late in 1895 
or early in 1896. These assumptions are also made by Abraham, 
Traditional Leadership, pp. 76-77. 
483.7 April 1895 is given as the date of Kailondo's death by Rev. Clarke 
in Foundation of, ýLuaw_, p. 
15. Mr. Gorvie also gives April 1895, 
(op. cit., p. 47and Dr. Wylie simply notes that Kailondo died sometime 
in 1895 (Monde Cheiftaincy' , P. 307). Mr. Abraham (Traditional Loade hin 
p. 90, Note 44) reports that Mr. Hollins in "A Short History of Luawa 
Chiefdom" stated that Kailondo's death occurred on 11 April 1895, but 
the present writer could nowhere find this reference in Mr. HollinsI 
article. On p. 20 Mr. Hollins noteds "In 1895, Kailundu died at Dukono". 
484. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 90, Note 44, quoting NADL, 547/95, 
227/95. 
185. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, ppa26-1 above. 
486. Ibid., p. ßi, 7 above. 
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487. SLCA, NADL (21.. 5.95-u"5.96) 289/1895, from Parkes, J. C. E. (Supt. 
Dept. Native Affairs), 26.6.95, to Chief Ki Lundu; and 39q/1895, 
from Parkes, 23.8.95, to Chief Ki Lundu. 
4 88. Ibid., 558/1895, from Parkes, 1.11.95, to Chief Ki Lundu. 
489. The relevant files are C0267/416-420 for 1895, and 424 for January 
to March 1896. The lack of reference to Kailondo and Luawa for a 
period of months, although this was one of the most powerful polities 
in the British sphere, illustrates the fragmentary nature of inform- 
ation on Luawa which is provided during this period in the British rocords. 
490. C0267/424/Conf. 19; Cardev; 10.3.96, from Kailaban. 
491. Ibid. 
492. All the written accounts suggest that the funeral ceremonies for Kailondo 
took place immediately after his death (Hollins, "Short History", p. 20; 
Clarke, Foundation of Lus a, p. 15; Combey M0, p. 15). It j customary 
to soften the shock of a person's death by first announcing to unsus- 
pecting relatives that he is 'very sick', but no attempt is made to 
maintain this fiction once the relative has know the truth. 
493. Cardew does not state that he only heard of Kailondo'e death when he 
arrived in Kailahan in March 1896, but in no earlier despatch does he 
mention the death. Cardew's despatch from Kailahun implies that Kailondo'e 
death had not just occurred in the previous few days. Cardow therefore 
might well have been somewhat annoyed by the fact that no one had 
previously informed him of Kailondo's death. 
1194. The fact that he entered into the Jewelehu War in late 1895 in a fair 
indication of Kailondo'e continuing sense of his own military adequacy 
and ability to control his own subjects. If he had felt militarily weals 
or unsure of his own position within Luawa at this stage, he would hardly 
have entered into war at a time when there were several possible aggressors 
on his borders, and when he may have been on the point of repudiating his 
agreement with the British who had become his main allies. 
495. Cardew and the London Colonial Office were in some ways more sympa- 
thetic to Kailondo'a problems than Kailondo could have gathered from 
the interviews with Cardew during the latter's 1895 visit to Kailahun. 
Q. C. O. official, presumably briefed by Cardew, minuted in September 
1895 that Kailondo was "very naturally utterly unable to comprehend 
how his territory can be divided between G. Britain + Liboria" (C0267/ 
421/F. O.; 5.9.95, min. ). 
